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On November 8th the United States of America 
voted on who would be the 45th President. In the 
end the US election, as is always the case, came 
down to a binary choice - but the choice this time 
was not between two ordinary candidates. While 
the candidates represented the status quo of the 
Democrat and Republican parties, each candidate 
offered a unique dimension to the campaign. 
Hillary Clinton offered the potential to be the 
first woman President, a milestone as significant 
as the first black President. It also marked the first 
time a former First Lady was standing, so creating 
a unique form of political dynasty. Her promi-
nence and experience signified her as particularly 
qualified, yet she was also a figure mired in scandal 
and lacking in popularity. 
Donald Trump presented himself as the 
ultimate political outsider. Businessman, property 
magnate and reality TV host figured on his CV, 
but he had no experience of any form of political 
office. Trump was the gauche, crude voice of the 
people, or at least the section who equally felt as 
outsiders from modern American society, culture 
and politics.
It was an election contest that would enthral, 
bewilder, horrify and polarize in equal measure, 
both in the USA and around the world. Beyond the 
Americans who threw themselves unequivocally 
behind a candidate the choice was seen as difficult:
“there must be 700 elected into politics in 
America. Some of them are really good at their 
jobs. From that pot how the **** did it come down 
to a choice between these two”
These words of an ordinary American, a 
tourist in New York like the lead editor at the time, 
perhaps sum up the thoughts of many US citizens 
as election day approached. This may have been a 
factor in causing turnout to decline to an estimated 
57.9%, down only marginally from 58.6% in 2012 
but a marked reduction from the 61.6% who voted 
in 2008.
Of the 130 million who did vote, 47.8% 
supported Hillary Clinton, 47.3% backed Donald 
Trump. But this narrow win in the popular vote 
means little in the US system. It is electoral college 
votes that matter, and Trump won 306 to Clinton’s 
232, a clear 36 over the threshold. The bigger the 
states, the greater the number of electors, and most 
of these are expected to vote on a winner takes 
all basis. Trump may have gained only 68,236 
more votes than Clinton of the 6 million votes 
cast in Pennsylvania but in doing so he won all 
20 electoral college votes making her win by a 3 
million vote margin in California meaningless 
despite gaining all 55 electoral college voters. 
The polarizing rhetoric of his campaign, coupled 
with the mismatch between actual votes and the 
electoral college and the tightness of the race has 
already led to street protests and signals greater 
divisions to emerge in the future.
Whilst there is undoubtedly an eventful presi-
dential term ahead, in this report we pause to look 
back at the 2016 contest. The aim of this publica-
tion is to capture immediate thoughts, reflections 
and early research insights of leading scholars in 
media and politics in the US and around the globe; 
and in this way contribute to public understand-
ing of the contest whilst it is still fresh in the 
memory and help shape the path ahead. Here, we 
are particularly interested in what ways different 
forms of media, journalism and political commu-
nication contributed to people’s engagement with 
the democratic process during the election – and 
crucially the relationship between media, citizens, 
and politicians. 
Published within 10 days of the election, these 
contributions are short and accessible. Authors 
provide authoritative analysis of the campaign, 
including research findings or new theoretical 
insights; to bring readers original ways of under-
standing the election. Contributions also bring a 
rich range of disciplinary influences, from political 
science to popular culture, journalism studies to 
advertising. We hope this makes for a vibrant and 
engaging read.
The early analyses explore eight aspects of 
the election which emerged as our contributors 
reflected. There are explorations of the campaign 
tactics of the candidates, the rhetoric, advertising, 
body language and the interjections of celebrities. 
Policy differences, similarities and silences are 
assessed. While not a policy area in itself, diversity 
and social divisions became a key theme of the 
contest, therefore we dedicate a section to under-
standing how the election highlighted divisions 
in US society. The role of mainstream media is 
explored and critiqued, while others assess the 
coverage of the election from other nations. Digital 
media is deemed of sufficient importance to have a 
unique section, given it functioning as a space for 
both candidate campaigning and citizen commen-
tary. Popular culture also played a key role, both in 
shaping perceptions of what a President should be 
as well as developing the persona of the candidates. 
The final section looks at the result, its implications 
for US and global politics and what we can infer 
with regards to the state of democracy in the US. 
As the US and the world ponders on a future 
with Donald Trump leading the US, our project 
offers insights into how he came to power and 
what this means for us all.
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The question of objectivity in the 2016 
Presidential Election
In 1896, during the heyday of the sensational, 
opinionated, and interventionist newspapers of 
Yellow Journalism, New York Times owner Adolph 
Ochs boldly declared that the paper would report 
“impartially, without fear or favor”—a nod toward 
the norms of neutrality and objectivity that would 
mark American newspapers in the 20th century. 
These norms became professional values, under-
girding journalists’ claims for authority. Journal-
istic objectivity has long been subject to scholarly 
critique for either too simply dismissing human 
subjectivity or for disarming journalists from being 
able to stake positions of advocacy. 
Yet, 120 years after Ochs’s statement, the 
question of objectivity was thrust into public view 
by Times media columnist Jim Rutenberg. His 
front-page column on 9 August 2016 made waves 
in journalistic circles by questioning whether the 
Republican nominee Donald Trump deserved to 
be treated neutrally: 
“If you’re a working journalist and you believe 
that Donald J. Trump is a demagogue playing to 
the nation’s worst racist and nationalistic tenden-
cies, that he cozies up to anti-American dictators 
and that he would be dangerous with control of the 
United States nuclear codes, how the heck are you 
supposed to cover him?”
The question exposes the dilemma of jour-
nalists trapped in a system that prides neutrality. 
Trump was positioned as extraordinary and 
therefore worthy of extraordinary coverage. Jour-
nalist Jorge Ramos argued this point on the website 
of Time magazine: 
“Just providing both points of view is not 
enough in the current presidential campaign. If a 
candidate is making racist and sexist remarks, we 
cannot hide in the principle of neutrality. That’s a 
false equivalence.”
Meanwhile, the digitally native Huffington 
Post staked out an oppositional stance early on, 
first by only running stories on Trump in the 
entertainment section until his emergence as a 
frontrunner for the Republican Party nomination 
forced him back into the news pages. However, the 
site continued to treat Trump as an unusual threat 
not to be normalized by appending the following 
editor’s note to stories on Trump:
“Donald Trump regularly incites political 
violence and is a serial liar, rampant xenophobe, 
racist, misogynist and birther who has repeatedly 
pledged to ban all Muslims — 1.6 billion members 
of an entire religion — from entering the U.S.”
As an anchor at the bottom of every 
Trump story, this statement strived to hold the 
candidate as contemptuous and unworthy of 
normal news treatment. 
One way to make sense of this handwringing 
over objectivity is through Daniel Hallin’s sphere 
model, which he laid out in his seminal book The 
Uncensored War. For Hallin, journalists sort events 
into three categories, or spheres anchored at one 
end by the sphere of consensus in which objec-
tivity is not necessary because of shared beliefs, 
and, at the other end, the sphere of deviance in 
which objectivity is supplanted by shared loathing. 
Ordinarily, political contests fall squarely in 
between these sphere, in what Hallin labels the 
sphere of legitimate controversy. Disagreements 
between candidates occur, and the journalists’ job 
is to stand aside and let the campaigns make their 
case without the intervention of partisan jour-
nalists. This fits squarely with rationalist models 
of democracy that place the news media as the 
conduits between campaigns and the mass public. 
The press is there to provide information; news 
audiences-as-the-voting-public are to make up 
their minds. It also confers the news media with 
tremendous cultural and political power to dictate 
the divide between normalcy and deviancy. 
Trump struck a nerve that threatened how 
journalists think about what qualifies as legitimate 
controversy. And it was not only his controversial 
stances and actions that sparked soul-searching 
among journalists. More to the point, his callous 
disregard for the unwritten rules of political com-
munication coupled with a penchant for perfidy 
regardless of countervailing information put him at 
odds with this system. Rutenberg and others took 
this as an affront, and suggested that Trump be cast 
into the sphere of deviancy—that is, as illegitimate. 
But to place the nominee of a major party into the 
sphere of deviancy requires a clear-eyed argument 
and commitment to parting with precedent. It 
asks journalists to break with ingrained ways of 
thinking and acting—a difficult request, even in 
the face of Trump’s transgressions.
These questions have become only all the 
more pressing now that Trump has been elected 
President. His electoral surprise defying con-
ventional polling wisdom presages an equally 
unorthodox presidency. But journalism does not 
respond well to unorthodoxy; it is regimented 
and orthodox, driven by patterns that make 
possible the unending crush of news stories. The 
next four years will test how journalists actualize 
their normative commitments, and whether this 
President is treated as other Presidents have, 
or if they come to occupy a new critical space. 
Either position is risky and will alienate part 
of the populace at a time when news industry 
economics are already flagging. But the choice 
still must be made. 
Dr Matt Carlson
Associate Professor of 
Communication
Saint Louis University, 
USA 
Email: mcarls10@slu.edu
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As the results of the 2016 election came in, the 
mainstream media in America and around the 
world demonstrated their inability to cope with the 
challenge of a President Trump within the conven-
tional paradigms of journalistic objectivity, balance 
and fairness; or rather, to cope with it without 
normalising the most conspicuously overt racism, 
sexism, and proto-fascism ever seen in a serious 
candidate for POTUS. 
As street protests broke out in Portland, 
Oregon in the days after the election, for example, 
BBC World noted the police definition of the 
events as a ‘riot’, in response to what it coyly 
described as ‘some racist remarks’ made by Trump 
during his campaign. A man whose comments 
were denounced even by his own party chief Paul 
Ryan as “textbook racism”, and whose references 
to “grabbing pussy”, “a nasty woman”, “Miss House 
Keeping” and other indicators of unabashed 
misogyny horrified millions in the US across the 
party spectrum, was now President. For the BBC, 
henceforth, criticism of even the most outland-
ish and offensive remarks – when judged by the 
standards of recent decades - would be severely 
muted, if not excluded. Suddenly, rather than call a 
spade a spade in coverage of Trump’s hate-monger-
ing campaign, his ascendancy to office legitimised 
those views, and the process of normalisation had begun. 
The ‘quality’ media have largely followed suit 
in this approach to Trump’s victory, bestowing a 
new respectability on what before election day 
had been generally reported as absurdly offensive 
statements and policies. One could without too 
much imagination foresee Ku Klux Chan chief 
David Duke becoming an expert commentator 
on CNN or MSNBC (or at least on Fox News). In 
News Corp press titles all over the world, which 
had in any case been predictably ambivalent, if not 
outrightly supportive of Trump, commentators and 
pundits were to the fore in constructing legiti-
macy around policies such as US protectionism, 
weakening NATO, embracing Putin and so on. 
This descent into normalisation of the hitherto 
unacceptable, occasioned by Trump’s democrat-
ically-endowed seizure of political power as of 
November 8, is of course very similar to the rise 
of Hitler and the Nazis in 1930s Germany. Hitler’s 
ascent, and all that came from it, was a product 
of free choices made in ballot boxes, and of free 
media coverage which moved to the extreme right 
with the ruling party. Then, as now, a demagogic 
populist exploited perceptions of victimhood and 
‘anti-elitism’, targeting ethnic minorities as the 
Enemy. No-one forced national socialism on the 
German people, or on their media, nor on the 
many western media such as the Daily Mail in 
England which spoke out in his favour. 
Post-November 8 the mainstream media have 
shown their inability to engage with the enormity 
of what has happening in western and global 
politics within conventional paradigms of objectiv-
ity. Left to them, the slide into fascism will simply 
become another news story, another ‘he said, she 
said’ performance of balance, legitimised by the 
fact that this is what democracy has delivered. No 
matter that in the 1930s the same obeisance led to 
the Holocaust.
This tendency is not the fault of the main-
stream media, nor of their journalists, who are 
simply applying the professional codes and 
practices with which they have been raised. For 
those in the media who wish to stem a slide into 
democratically-legitimised fascism in the next 
four years – and of course, similar processes are 
now unfolding in Europe, Australia and elsewhere 
– it is time to rethink the appropriate response of 
‘objective’ journalism to the post-factual politics of 
extreme subjectivity.
 
After objectivity?
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Journalism and the Illusion of Innocence
On October 23, two weeks before the US election, 
a Florida newspaper apologized to its readers for 
running too much news that was critical of Donald 
Trump. It happened at the Daily Commercial, 
based in Leesburg, Florida, a conservative-lean-
ing area of the state with a lot of affluent retirees. 
The editors published an open letter to readers in 
which they they said: “This is not an endorsement 
of Trump, a candidate whose brutish, sometimes 
childish antics are responsible for his sizable deficit 
in the polls. Rather, it is a recognition that you, the 
voter, deserve better than we in the media have 
given you. You deserve a more balanced approach.” 
Reporting the news and serving readers are 
first principles in journalism, bedrock for sound 
practice. But protecting against criticism is not like 
that at all. It has far less legitimacy, especially when 
the criticism itself has thin legitimacy. This is how 
the phrase “working the refs” got started. Political 
actors try to influence judgment calls by screeching 
about bias, whether the charge is warranted or not.
My favourite description of “protecting 
ourselves against criticism” comes from a former 
reporter for the Washington Post, Paul Taylor, in 
his 1990 book about election coverage: See How 
They Run. I have quoted it many times: 
“Sometimes I worry that my squeamish-
ness about making sharp judgments, pro or con, 
makes me unfit for the slam-bang world of daily 
journalism. Other times I conclude that it makes 
me ideally suited for newspapering– certainly for 
the rigors and conventions of modern ‘objective’ 
journalism. For I can dispose of my dilemmas by 
writing stories straight down the middle. I can 
search for the halfway point between the best and 
the worst that might be said about someone (or 
some policy or idea) and write my story in that 
fair-minded place. By aiming for the golden mean, 
I probably land near the best approximation of 
truth more often than if I were guided by any other 
set of compasses – partisan, ideological, psycho-
logical, whatever… Yes, I am seeking truth. But 
I’m also seeking refuge. I’m taking a pass on the 
toughest calls I face.”
I am seeking truth. But I’m also seeking 
refuge. What if it’s not possible to do both? This 
is what the editors of the Daily Commercial failed 
to ask themselves. And this is what the movement 
for Trump forced journalists everywhere in the 
US to realize, even if word never reached 
Leesburg, Florida.
Earlier in the campaign, Dean Baquet, editor 
of the New York Times, said Donald Trump had 
changed journalism. 
“I was either editor or managing editor of the 
L.A. Times during the Swift Boat incident. Newspa-
pers did not know — we did not quite know how
to do it. I remember struggling with the reporter,
Jim Rainey, who covers the media now, trying to
get him to write the paragraph that laid out why
the Swift Boat allegation was false… We didn’t 
know how to write the paragraph that said, “This 
is just false…” We struggle with that. I think that 
Trump has ended that struggle.”
You may wonder: in 1990, in 2004, or in 2016 
how could it be hard to say in a news report “this 
is false” when the reporter and the editor are both 
persuaded that it is false? I have an answer for you. 
Alongside the production of news, reporters and 
editors in the mainstream press have for a long 
time been engaged in another manufacture: per-
suading us of their own innocence, especially when 
it comes to a contested election. 
But as Dean Baquet declared: “Trump has 
ended that struggle.” His point is not that it’s 
suddenly “okay” to take sides. Trump ended 
the struggle in this sense: by openly trashing 
the norms of American politics, by flooding 
the campaign with wave after wave of provable 
falsehood, by convincing his supporters to despise 
and mistrust the press, Trump made it a certainty 
that when honest journalism was done about him 
it also worked against him.
For journalists this destroyed the illusion 
of innocence: just by doing your job you were 
undoing Trump… unless he could turn his portion 
of the electorate against you so decisively that the 
very possibility that you may be trying to do an 
honest job was rejected out of hand. And then the 
disaster became complete, for now by doing your 
job (applying scrutiny, checking facts) you were 
actually helping Trump, confirming among his 
most committed supporters the hateful image of a 
media elite trying to rig the election. 
Either way the production of innocence failed. 
In this vexing situation the Daily Commercial 
of Leesburg, Florida published its open letter to 
readers. Unable to think it through clearly, the 
editors surrendered their right to speak truth to 
power (in this case audience power) and sold out 
their colleagues in the American press.
Prof Jay Rosen 
Media critic, writer, and a 
professor of journalism at 
New York University
Email: jr3@nyu.edu
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Did election results trump frames of newspaper 
endorsements?
With the endorsement of only two of the top 
100 circulation newspapers in the US, Repub-
lican Donald J. Trump stunned the country by 
becoming the 45th president of the United States 
on November 8, 2016. Never before in the history 
of US politics had a presidential candidate received 
so few major newspaper endorsements.
Democrat Hilary Clinton was endorsed by 
57 newspapers while Libertarian candidate Gary 
Johnson was endorsed by 4, and 3 newspapers 
recommend ‘Not Trump.’ The other 31 either did 
not endorse as a matter of principle or chose none 
of the candidates.
In comparison, in 2012 President Obama was 
endorsed by 41 of the top 100 circulation newspa-
pers and Republican Mitt Romney 35; the other 24 
newspapers did not endorse.
Was Trump’s victory as stunning as a rebuke 
to the influence of newspaper endorsements as the 
election results were a surprise to most Americans 
– to most American opinion pollsters anyway?
That may be determined by how the frames
used by the newspapers are understood. American 
newspapers have been steadily getting out of the 
presidential endorsement business during recent 
elections, framing their exit in terms of question-
ing the influence of endorsements.
Yet, in an interesting twist to the trend, this 
year some newspapers, such as USA Today, that 
previously refrained as a matter of principle from 
endorsing candidates at presidential elections 
jumped into the fray. Also, some that never or 
almost never endorsed a Democrat did so this time.
Many endorsements framed Clinton as flawed 
but acceptable, although many also went out of 
their way to say she was the best prepared presi-
dential candidate ever. She was framed as having 
the character and temperament to be president.
Trump was framed ‘dangerous’ and ‘unfit’ 
because of personal comments and behavior that 
stoked racism, stirred anti-immigration sentiment, 
and disrespected women. He was framed as not 
having the character and temperament to be president.
And so, is it that newspaper endorsements – 
despite framing the candidates so drastically differ-
ently - did not have any influence in the election?
According to preliminary results, Clinton 
actually won the popular vote total. Trump won 
the most Electoral College votes, which determines 
who wins the presidency. Each state has a number 
of electoral votes equal to the state’s number of 
members in the House of Representatives (which 
is based on the state’s population) and US Senate 
(each state has two Senators). The candidate who 
wins the most votes in a state wins that state’s 
electoral votes. 
An analysis of endorsements of top 100 
circulation newspapers and voting results in swing 
states (whose election outcome typically cannot be 
predicted) suggests areas for further study.
Trump’s performance when endorsed shows 
he lost 46% to 48% in Nevada despite the endorse-
ment of the Las Vegas Review Journal, a newspaper 
owned by one of his key wealthy supporters. 
He won Florida by the thin margin of 49% to 
48%, after having been endorsed by the Florida 
Times-Union. In that state, four newspapers, 
including the largest, endorsed Clinton and one – 
the Palm Beach Post – did not endorse anyone.
Trump’s performance when not endorsed 
shows he won some swing states by comfortable 
margins: Iowa (52% to 48%) although its largest 
newspaper, The Des Moines Register, endorsed 
Clinton; North Carolina (51% to 47%) and Ohio 
(52% to 44%) despite being repudiated by multiple 
newspapers in both states which endorsed Clinton 
or did not make an endorsement.
Trump’s performance when not endorsed also 
shows some razor thin victories in swing states: 
Michigan (48% to 47%) and Wisconsin (48% to 
47%). One might wonder whether the endorse-
ment of Johnson on the Libertarian ticket by the 
Detroit News in Michigan and the recommenda-
tion of anyone but Trump by the Milwaukee-Wis-
consin Journal Sentinel siphoned votes from 
Clinton. Many editorials framed a vote for Johnson 
as a vote for Trump.
Trump won Pennsylvania 49% to 48%. While 
Clinton won the big prize of the endorsement of 
the Philadelphia Inquirer, her reward might have 
been urban voters who would support her anyway. 
Neither she nor Trump earned the endorsement 
of the four other newspapers, two of which did 
not endorse and a further two did not endorse as a 
matter of principle. 
Clinton won Virginia easily (50% to 45%) after 
its typically Republican leaning newspapers did not 
endorse Trump, although they did not endorse her 
either: one supported Johnson and the other did 
not endorse. Her vice presidential running mate 
was also from Virginia.
This analysis suggests that endorsements may 
still play an important role, and the frames used 
should be further explored. Perhaps the role of en-
dorsements has changed and therefore the framing 
of endorsements should reflect that change. Maybe 
they already do so. This may be an invitation to 
other newspapers to come back to the presidential 
endorsement business. As some editorialists now 
say, endorsements no longer tell us how to vote, 
but rather they contribute to the conversation. 
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Trump and Mediatization
In 2007, the short-lived Fox News satire program 
The Half-Hour News Hour opened with a fantasy 
skit featuring a President Rush Limbaugh on his 
first day in the Oval Office. With the “joke” of 
the skit being that the right-wing radio host had 
somehow become President, Limbaugh calls for 
his Vice President, and in walks Ann Coulter, 
Limbaugh’s fellow provocateur. It was a layered 
moment, with Fox News – itself a hybrid blend of 
broadcast news, conservative advocacy, and enter-
tainment spectacle – imagining the fusion of con-
servative attack media and actual political power. 
Some eight years later, when Donald Trump 
announced his candidacy, he abandoned the 
prepared speech his advisers had crafted for him, 
and instead offered his ad-lib rant about Mexican 
rapists and the need for a “beautiful” border wall. 
That, interestingly enough, was a direct invoca-
tion of Coulter’s anti-immigration screed ¡Adios, 
America!, which had been published two weeks 
earlier. Coulter herself was a Trump advisor and 
evangelist, promoting him unequivocally in her 
next book: In Trump We Trust. Coulter, of course, 
won’t be vice president, but the lines between 
presidential policy, political-entertainment media, 
and celebrity spectacle have become as profoundly 
fused as Fox had once imagined.
If we are to understand the phenomenon 
of a Trump presidency, then, we have to place it 
within the context of the melding of politics and 
entertainment. European scholars might call this 
mediatization – the culture-wide turn in which 
the organizing logic, institutional imperatives, and 
discursive practices of the media come to shape 
the very workings of the political system itself. 
Elsewhere, I have described this as “discursive 
integration” – a deep blending of once-discrete 
ways of talking about, knowing about, and acting 
within a world where politics, news, entertainment, 
commerce, and marketing have become insepara-
bly intertwined.
Trump, as individual and as phenomenon, 
sits squarely at this point of intersection. His 
emergence as a public political figure well predates 
the 2016 campaign. Some date his decision to run 
for president to the 2011 White House Corre-
spondence dinner, that weird hybrid of national 
politics, news media, and celebrity culture. Prior 
to that, though, Trump had long cultivated his 
public brand. Through the 1990s, he was the 
playboy: the swashbuckling negotiator imagined in 
Art of the Deal (1987) and the gold-plated ladies 
man constructed across media locales, including 
The Howard Stern Show and Playboy magazine. 
In the Bush years, when a neo-liberal ideology of 
corporate commerce rose to its global ascendance, 
Trump morphed into the mogul. For 11 years, 
he starred on NBC’s The Apprentice, the popular 
reality TV show from executive producer Mark 
Burnett, the man behind Survivor and Sarah Palin’s 
Alaska. There, as the Washington Post’s Dan Balz 
writes, “Trump cultivated an image among mid-
dle-class Americans as a straight-shooting billion-
aire who had the bucks and the brass to stand up 
to anyone.” That perception of “bucks and brass” 
in turn led to Trump’s starring role on Fox News, 
where he used his weekly call-in segment on the 
propagandistic morning show Fox and Friends to 
aggressively push the Obama “birther” movement.
While many would understandably reject 
Trump’s media trajectory as legitimate qualifi-
cation for the US presidency, the reality is that 
in an age of mediatization, standards of all sorts 
are being radically refashioned. That point is well 
understood by Trump’s long-time political adviser 
Roger Stone, who suggests that Trump’s time on 
The Apprentice was “the greatest single asset to 
his presidential campaign.” There, Stone explains, 
“He’s perfectly made up. He’s perfectly coiffed. He’s 
perfectly lit. He’s in the high-back chair making 
tough decisions. What does he look like? He looks 
like a president.” To those of us who still want to 
envision the presidency as existing independently 
of what one “looks like” on television, Stone offers 
a rebuttal equally provocative and penetrating: 
“Now, I understand the elites say, ‘Oh, that’s reality 
TV.’ Voters don’t see it that way. Television news 
and television entertainment: it’s all television.”
It’s all television, Stone suggests, suggesting 
that in an age of mediatization, television en-
tertainment is as viable a path to the height of 
political power as a record of public service used 
to be. It also emphasizes the point that commer-
cial television news is structurally incapable of 
providing any pushback. The US television news 
industry, of course, gave Trump an estimated 2 
billion dollars in free air time during the campaign 
in pursuit of their mutual interests. Proclaimed Les 
Moonves, the head of CBS TV (home to Burnett’s 
Survivor), the Trump phenomenon “may not be 
good for America, but it’s damn good for CBS. … 
Sorry,” he continued, “it’s a terrible thing to say, but 
bring it on, Donald. Keep going.”
Moonves, and his frenemies at Fox News, have 
got their wish. The Donald Trump show will be on 
nightly, for at least the next four years.
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The 2016 election and the success of fact free 
politics
The US 2016 elections campaign will be re-
membered for many reasons, not the least for 
its surprising outcome. One of the most striking 
features of this campaign is the large amount of 
factually incorrect statements of President-elect 
Donald Trump. According to fact checkers about 
7 out of 10 statements turned out to be (partly) 
false. Trump made false statements about his own 
past, things he said before, but also about major 
trends in society. Journalists have pointed this 
out numerous times, and after every debate the 
large number of incorrect statements highlighted 
by fact-checkers. How come this coverage had 
no effect on his electoral popularity? I see at least 
three reasons. 
Emo trumps ratio
The growing relativity of opinions and emotions at 
the expense of facts and knowledge is hardly new. 
For over a decade the origins and consequences 
of ‘fact free politics’ are studied. It was comedian 
Stephen Colbert who introduced the term ‘truthi-
ness’ to refer to things that are true according one’s 
own conviction or view, but that are not necessar-
ily supported by factual proof. The term became 
quite popular in the US as it nicely reflected the 
anti-intellectual climate that was on the rise. 
Policy makers and journalists that rely too much 
on figures and knowledge are getting out of touch 
with the concerns of ordinary people. 
It is no surprise that in this climate there 
is ample room for false rumors and conspiracy 
theories rooted in strong political and religious 
views. Two of the most famous ones are related 
to Barack Obama’s election in 2008. The wrong 
conviction that Obama is a Muslim is particularly 
strong among traditional Christians, while the 
myth that Obama is not born in the US seems 
mainly popular among outspoken conservative 
voters. Both fake stories are related to the fact that 
Obama is seen as different. The idea that a black 
man is running their country is for many hard to 
accept. They have a nostalgia for a familiar white, 
Christian country. That feeling is so strong that 
they are willing to believe a man that promises ‘to 
bring back their country’.
The press is lying
During the primaries the US press had no idea 
how to deal with the phenomena of Trump and 
were fascinated by this unconventional, enter-
taining figure. Gradually, journalists started 
to reveal the factual mistakes and blunt lies of 
Trump. However, this coverage had probably 
little-to-no effect since the trust of US citizens in 
traditional media is extremely low. For instance, 
research shows that many attempts of journalists to 
debunk the myths about Obama had no effect and 
potentially even backfired. Where there’s smoke 
there’s fire. During this campaign the distrust in 
the media even turned into hatred. When Trump 
talked at his rallies about journalists as “the most 
dishonest people I know”, his supporters booed 
fiercely and turned their anger to the cameras. 
Meanwhile more and more people rely on an in-
formation diet of conservative talk show radio, and 
internet stories that provide ‘the real truth’.
Trump 4 truth 
The book ‘Trump revealed’, written by two Wash-
ington Post journalists, describes well how for 
Donald Trump the truth has always been subser-
vient to his goals and ambitions. Trump believes 
what he says is true, or almost true, or ought to 
be true. According to Trump the people want 
someone who sees it big, and who plays to their 
wildest dreams and expectations. They know that 
he exaggerates, but believe, or want to believe, 
that he is right. Tony Schwartz, the ghostwriter of 
Trumps’ book The Art of the Deal came up with 
the term ‘truthful hyperbole’. It is a contradiction, 
but Trump loved it. 
Trump used several truthful hyperboles to 
promote his core messages, and even adjusted 
the facts to fit his story. For instance, he claimed 
unemployment is eight times higher than official 
figures indicate, and the number of Syrian refugees 
that Obama plans to permit into the US is multi-
plied by 25. It makes his claim stronger, and the 
attention he gets larger.  
While these exaggerations and deliberate 
factual mistakes lead to consternation among 
his opponents, his followers don’t mind. On the 
contrary, they see in Trump someone that finally 
tells the truth. Trump tells it like it is and calls 
problems by their name. He is not afraid to tell 
the public that the US has become a loser and 
their President is the founder of ISIS. According 
to his own words, he has to, because he is a ‘truth 
teller’. Telling the truth is stronger than himself. 
His spontaneous outbursts and insults seem to 
strengthen that reputation. And in case there is any 
doubt, Trump uses the phrase ‘believe me’, to stress 
that he knows well what he is talking about. 
You don’t need to believe me, but I doubt the 
latter is true. 
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Trump, truth and the media
The manner of Donald Trump’s electoral success 
presents the Western media – not just America’s 
– with an urgent and profound question: what is
the role of truth in contemporary democratic
political discourse?
In the midst of the US presidential campaign, 
The Economist newspaper devoted a cover story to 
the concept of “post-truth” politics, a term coined 
by an American blogger, David Roberts, in writing 
about American climate-change policy. With a 
climate-change denier now about to sit in the Oval 
Office, the urgency of the “truth” question becomes 
starkly obvious.
Denial of climate change is one of Trump’s 
more serious but less fantastical lies. Among 
innumerable outrageous untruths, he has asserted 
that President Obama and Hillary Clinton were 
co-founders of Islamic State (IS), that Obama was 
not a US citizen, and that Hillary Clinton had 
laughed at a 12-year-old rape victim. After the 
second presidential debate, The New York Times 
enumerated 27 specific lies that he uttered in the 
course of the debate. The term “trumped up” has 
thus been given a new lease of life.
In the relatively recent past when at least some 
plausible degree of truth mattered in politics, this 
would have severely weakened his candidacy. 
Not now. Trump simply condemned the media 
as corrupt, as part of a great conspiracy by the 
so-called “elites” against the American people. 
How did democratic politics become so 
detached from reality?
Clearly there are larger forces at work than 
anything the media alone can generate. A con-
ventional but persuasive wisdom is emerging that 
millions of ordinary people, particularly in the 
Anglophone democracies, have been left behind 
by globalisation, and sacrificed on the altar of 
neoclassical economics. Evidence for this can be 
found in the Brexit vote and by the Occupy Wall 
Street movement. 
Voters trapped in these circumstances know 
only one big truth: their living standards, share 
of the cake, and place in society are imperilled or 
reduced. Against this big truth, which they live 
every day, untruths about who founded IS, about 
Obama’s birthplace or Hillary Clinton’s alleged 
heartlessness towards a child rape victim, count for 
nothing in the moral calculus.
It is in exploiting this sentiment that 
elements of the media, particularly in the US, are 
seriously culpable.
An outrage industry has burgeoned, in which 
radio shock jocks such as Rush Limbaugh, and 
right-wing populist copycats such as Bill O’Reilly 
and Sean Hannity, have made large fortunes and 
global reputations for themselves as purveyors 
of outrage.
Limbaugh is reported to have 13.25 million 
regular weekly listeners, an audience size 
guaranteed to generate a mighty revenue stream. 
He is also reported to be on an eight-year $400 
million contract, which has been extended to 2020.
Online entrepreneurs such as Matt Drudge, 
jumped on the outrage bandwagon, adding to 
its momentum.
Turbo-charging the industry of outrage, 
however, has been Fox News, the creation of 
Rupert Murdoch and a former Republican 
operative, Roger Ailes. Under the ludicrously 
misleading slogan of “balance”, they conjoined the 
dynamics of talkback radio with the visual power 
of television and a bank of outspokenly conserv-
ative commentators to create the highest-rating 
cable news channel in the US.
Factual accuracy has not much to do with 
what these propagandists publish in the guise of 
journalism. Drudge has said that only 80% of his 
material is verified. Even accepting that improba-
bly high number, the difficulty for everyone else is 
in knowing which 80%.
Longer term issues were at work as well.
The 24/7 symbiotic news cyclone in which 
social media and professional journalism are both 
caught up is destructive of truth. Material appears 
on social media, goes viral and becomes news for 
no better reason than that it is virulent. Newspa-
pers, shrunken by the onslaught of the digital rev-
olution on their revenues, with fewer journalistic 
resources and in a constant scramble for “hits” and 
“eyeballs”, amplify “news” without troubling with 
time-consuming verification.
Resultant fragile levels of public trust in the 
media have been exploited by Donald Trump, and 
the media have been in no position to mount a 
credible defence.
In the spring 2016 issue of Meanjin Quarterly, 
the political editor of The Guardian Australia, 
Katharine Murphy, faced up to this issue of trust by 
asking: What role for journalism if facts no longer 
count? She wrote: “We have to look in the mirror. 
Our intemperate excesses have discounted our own 
moral value. Our own behavior has helped fuel a 
lack of trust.”
This is a crisis for the media but also for the 
democratic process. The media has an ethical 
obligation to restore what it can of public trust. The 
starting point is to hew to the truth: verify material 
before publishing, make it more important to be 
right than to be first, and call to account people in 
public office who tell lies.
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Rise of Donald Trump: media as a voter-Decision 
accelerator
The media are key in shaping public opinion 
during campaigns and can help voters with their 
decision making. If there were any doubts about 
the role of the media and their ability to compete 
with the Internet, those doubts were smacked 
down by this year’s election. The first of three 
televised presidential debates between Hillary 
Clinton and Donald Trump was watched by 84 
million Americans – and this does not include 
those who viewed it on the Internet and abroad. It 
was not just the debates which had an influence on 
public opinion. There were also subsequent media 
and Internet commentaries and analyses which 
emerged after each of the three debates. How the 
media represent each of the candidates has the 
ability to affect people’s voting decisions and thus 
the election results.
Ironically, Donald Trump, who complained 
about media bias and accused them of conspir-
ing to rig the election, profited the most from 
the media attention. After Trump announced his 
candidacy for President of the United States in 
mid-June 2015, he was considered by most of the 
media to be more of an amusement than a serious 
candidate. They could not have been more wrong.
Priming of the Primaries
Even during the autumn and winter, Trump was 
considered to be an anomaly, despite the fact that 
he was doing well in the polls. The situation began 
to change with the first caucuses and primaries. It 
was then that it became obvious that the support 
for Trump was real and that he was a candidate to 
be contended with. And, in fact, he received the 
nomination smoothly.
The Democratic Party presidential primaries 
brought us a surprise, too. Hillary Clinton, the 
party favourite, found a capable opponent – 
certainly more a robust one than might have 
initially been expected – in Bernie Sanders. 
Sanders had more in common with Trump than 
mere criticism of the current political elites and 
system. Their popularity was greatly supported 
with the help of the media. Not that the media 
were uncritical of Sanders and Trump, quite the 
contrary. Although the media criticized them more 
than they praised them, neither of them were affected. 
Some Democratic Party voters did not intend 
to accept the fact the only serious candidate in 
the primaries was Hillary Clinton. Bernie Sanders 
represented an alternative, not only on a personal 
level, but also for his socialist program and 
criticism of the political system. And there were a 
total of 17 candidates running for the Republican 
Party nomination. Although five of them withdrew 
from the race before the first caucus in Iowa, the 
biggest challenge for the rest of the candidates 
was to stand out from the crowd and claim their 
time in the media spotlight. Trump was the best at 
this. He also managed to be the most salient critic 
of the political system – a position shared with a 
considerable amount of Republican voters. So it 
happened that Sanders lost the party nomination, 
and the Republicans had to accept the bitter pill of 
a party nomination for Donald Trump.
From Conventions to the General Elections
In early summer there was a shift in how the media 
represented Donald Trump and his campaign. 
– the media began to put Trump’s statements
into context and the critique increased. Trump,
however, managed to convince his supporters
that the media are biased and that they were
trying to harm his campaign. Several events have
occurred since the July conventions which affected
candidate preferences in the polls. The most
important moment for the Trump campaign was
the publication of an eleven year old tape of Trump
insulting women and approving of sexually violent
behaviour towards them. A big issue for Clinton
was the possible re-opening of the FBI investiga-
tion into her e-mail. Of course, the three presiden-
tial TV debates that took place in September and
October were also important major events.
In terms of mentions of Trump and Clinton 
on the Internet, we can identify each of the three 
debates as a milestone in a given period (see 
graphs of positive, neutral and negative sentiment 
mentions). However, the last graph is the most 
interesting as it shows a balance in sentiment. The 
most negative Trump mentions were found in 
articles published during (and immediately after) 
the debates and in the days when his tape-scandal 
appeared. However, a huge increase of articles with 
neutral and positive sentiments can be seen just a 
few days before the general election. If we compare 
the evolution of the poll preference with the 
semantic balance of the articles and comments that 
have been published on the Internet, we find that 
the development of the polls is strikingly similar 
to the sentiment balance of the candidates. And, 
as the case of the US Presidential election in 2016 
shows us, Internet discussions follow the media.
The graphs show the result of real-time and ongoing sentiment 
analysis of over 100 million articles from 275 thousand 
sources. These cover media websites, commentaries, political, 
business and academic analysis, etc. The graphs 1 – 3 show 
number of articles with specific sentiment published every 
day. Graph 4 shows sentiment balance made from average of 
positive and negative sentiments.
Source: Semantic Visions.
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The new normal? Campaigns & elections in the 
contemporary media environment
In our 2011 book, After Broadcast News: Media 
Regimes, Democracy, and the New Information 
Environment, Bruce Williams and I argued that 
political, economic, cultural, and technological 
changes in the United States have fundamentally 
altered the media environment, with signifi-
cant implications for the practice and even the 
meaning of politics. This emerging “media regime” 
blurs traditional distinctions between fact and 
opinion, news and entertainment, information 
producers and consumers, and mass mediated 
and interpersonal communication, creating a 
political landscape that is both “multiaxial” (i.e., in 
which control of the public agenda emerges from 
multiple, shifting, and previously invisible or less 
powerful actors) and “hyperreal” (i.e., in which the 
mediated representation of reality becomes more 
important than the facts underlying it).
The impact of these changes on political 
campaigns could be seen in small but significant 
ways as early as the 1980s, when the Reagan 
campaign used satellite technology and pre-pack-
aged “video news releases” to bypass the national 
press and target local (and presumably less aggres-
sive) journalists and media outlets (Hertsgaard, 
1988). Other signs of change included Ross Perot’s 
appearances on the cable talk show, Larry King 
Live to jump start his third party candidacy, and 
Bill Clinton’s appearances on The Arsenio Hall 
Show (think sunglasses and saxophone) and MTV 
(think boxers or briefs), all in 1992; John McCain’s 
unprecedented use internet fundraising in 2000; 
Howard Dean’s insurgency campaign fueled by 
his (and Joe Trippi’s) creative use of the internet to 
motivate and mobilize young supporters in 2004; 
and the implosion of Senator George Allen’s reelec-
tion bid (and presidential aspirations) in 2006, the 
result of a cell phone video that went viral (think 
“macaca moment”). 
By 2008 and 2012 the use of digital, social, and 
non-traditional media and technology to announce 
ones candidacy, fund-raise, reach and engage sup-
porters, and get out the vote had become firmly en-
trenched as an integral part of campaigning, more 
effectively by Democrats than Republicans (Kreiss, 
2012). But despite some prominent examples (e.g., 
Saturday Night Live’s parodies of Sarah Palin; 
The Daily Show’s election coverage; The Colbert 
Report’s satirical civic lessons on campaign finance; 
the viral releases of problematic comments by Mitt 
Romney and Barack Obama; even Obama’s ability 
to overtake front runner Hilary Clinton), the 
impact of this reconstituted information environ-
ment remained largely channeled within the tradi-
tional media and political parties, often in informal 
partnership with tech savvy people “borrowed” 
from digital media companies (Kreiss, 2016).
The 2016 presidential campaign was a more 
radical departure from the recent past. The success 
of Donald Trump’s and (though ultimately falling 
short) Bernie Sander’s insurgent campaigns would 
be unthinkable in the campaign structure of the 
late 20th Century. To be sure, the new information 
environment did not cause their success – there 
were real issues of race, class, gender, religion, glo-
balization, culture, and a deep mistrust of both the 
traditional media and Washington politics driving 
these candidates’ unexpected popularity. But most 
of these fissures have existed since the nation’s 
founding, and none were unique to this election. 
What was unique was the ability of a 75 year old 
socialist and a 70 year old businessman turned 
reality television celebrity to exploit the contem-
porary information environment in ways that were 
unprecedented, and done outside – and against the 
concerted efforts – of the traditional institutions of 
national politics. 
Consider the Trump campaign. While disputes 
over “the facts” are common, Trump took this to 
a new level, demonstrating that a candidate can 
make statements that were verifiably false, be called 
out on these misstatements, and pay no political 
price for them. His campaign shattered the already 
dissolving distinction between news and entertain-
ment, with primaries resembling nothing so much 
as a reality television show, debates that drew huge 
audiences in large part for the spectacle, and a 
traditional news media that provided Trump with 
unprecedented coverage because of his celebrity 
status. The presumed importance of both “free” 
(i.e., positive news coverage) and “paid” (i.e., 
televised campaign ads) mass media was upended 
by his use of Twitter to speak directly to, motivate, 
and mobilize his followers. And his message was 
amplified through online social networks, making 
his followers both consumers and producers of 
campaign discourse. Combined, these tactics 
exploited both the multiaxiality and hyperreality 
of the current information environment. 
The future is difficult to predict, but one thing 
seems certain: Donald Trump is not an aberra-
tion. The type of candidates that emerge (in terms 
of ideology and personality), where they emerge 
from, who they mobilize, and how they exploit the 
radically changed information environment, will 
depend on the context. But the days of campaigns 
that are controlled by a stable set of political and 
media elites are over.    
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“Trump’s victory is no surprise. He was never a 
joke. Treating him as one only strengthened him. 
He is both a creature and a creation of the media 
and the media will never own that”, claimed 
filmmaker Michael Moore in his Facebook post, 
minutes after Trump had won the presidential race. 
Indeed, one of the most recurring questions before 
and after Trump’s election was whether the media 
were to be blamed for his sweeping successes 
during the long campaign and, especially, for the 
shocking finale. The debate engaged mostly the 
liberal media outlets, where influential pundits, 
academics, and bloggers tried to come to grips 
with the widely shared feeling that the media’s 
coverage of Trump was actually drawing him more 
popular support. 
Donald Trump, to be true, helped the media 
to help him. The candidate was a celebrity on his 
own, a flamboyant tycoon, a controversial outsider 
in the GOP camp. He crisscrossed the country 
rallying crowds with intemperate speeches against 
blacks, muslims, Mexicans; raised hell worldwide 
with outrageous comments on females, tweeted 
insults to politicians and stars, he was a newsmaker 
and an agenda-setter all the way through. How 
could the media ignore such a bizarre presidential 
hopeful? That’s the point. They just couldn’t! So, 
they covered his triumphant march toward the 
nomination, using the horse race frame, the one 
that they are long accustomed to. The coverage 
willy-nilly ended up in boosting Trump’s public 
image, in donating him billions worth of free 
publicity and, more importantly, in legitimizing 
his standing as presidential frontrunner, months 
before the Republican Convention in Cleveland. 
All not overtly partisan media outlets implemented 
both the typical journalistic production norms, 
and the commercial imperatives that scholars 
identify with the ‘media logic’. It’s the unusual, the 
sensational that draws the attention of the media, 
and Trump was both, and sensational stories ‘sell 
well’, and bring in a lot of money. That was honestly 
acknowledged by CBS CEO Leslie Moonves: “It 
may not be good for America, but it’s damn good 
for CBS.” 
What happened with the media after Trump 
won the GOP nomination in July is something that 
will need further academic investigation. The news 
media suddenly realized that they had contribut-
ed to the process of ‘king-making’, a traditional 
power in the hands of the US media, but in this 
case it turned out to be a frightening burden. All 
the major (as well as several minor) media, even 
those traditionally aligned with the conservatives 
endorsed Hillary Clinton sort of felt remorse-
ful, and started to strike a different chord. The 
liberal media stopped pretending to be unbiased 
observers of the political fray, and initiated an 
escalating, overt ‘anti-Trump’ campaign that 
lasted until the eve of Election Day. To what 
extent this media war helped again, of course 
in a quite different way, Trump to get elected as 
45th President of the United States remains to 
be assessed. But some ‘mea culpa’ for failing to 
predict Trump’s victory are starting to be heard in 
the defeated anti-Trump camp, like from the New 
York Times and the Washington Post. Anna Palmer 
and Jake Sherman in Politico’s Playbook newsletter 
sum up marvelously the new certitude: “We were 
all wrong. That seems obvious, right? But we were 
more than wrong. We were laughably oblivious. 
The entire Washington political-media complex 
completely missed the mark. Not by inches or 
feet, but by miles.” Let alone that by bombarding 
Trump on a daily basis, the media might also have 
fueled an “underdog effect” that prompted many 
undecided voters to support the “hated” candidate.
Did the media then ‘create’ Trump? They 
clearly did not create the personage, who was 
already to some extent a media darling, but 
contributed, unintentionally at first, and regret-
fully later, to the build up of his political persona, 
if negative. At the end the media may have been 
complicit in the defeat of Hillary Clinton, a 
candidate who was all but advantaged by a (too) 
favorable media frenzy. 
Prof Gianpietro Mazzoleni
Professor of Political 
Communication at 
University of Milan 
(Italy). He has research 
interests in the intersection 
of media and politics. His 
most recent publication 
(as editor-in-chief) 
is The International 
Encyclopedia of Political 
Communication (Wiley, 
2016), and he is the 
president of the Italian 
Association of Political 
Communication.
Email: gianpietro.mazzoleni@
unimi.it
Did the media create Trump?
22
Prof Sarah Oates 
Professor and Senior 
Scholar at the Philip 
Merrill College of 
Journalism, University of 
Maryland, College Park, 
USA. She is a former 
journalist who has studied 
elections and news in the 
United States, Russia, and 
the United Kingdom.
Twitter: @media_politics
Email: soates@umd.edu
Trump, media, and the ‘oxygen of publicity’
Media scholars have paid a lot of attention to social 
media in recent elections. Yet, there is a compel-
ling argument to think about the whole political 
communication sphere – from how the candidates 
frame their messages to how the traditional mass 
media covers them to how people comment and 
share on social media. In particular, our research 
suggests that the traditional mass media gave 
the ‘oxygen of publicity’ – to borrow the phrase 
Margaret Thatcher used to talk about British 
terrorism coverage– to the early Trump campaign. 
Although the coverage was often critical of the 
candidate, particularly for his statements about im-
migration, it arguably had the effect of consolidat-
ing the Trump political brand at a critical juncture. 
In a joint project between the Philip Merrill 
College of Journalism and the Smith School of 
Business at the University of Maryland, Prof. 
Wendy W. Moe and I analyzed both traditional 
newspaper coverage and tweets relating to Hillary 
Clinton and Donald Trump in the early primary 
period (July 1 to September 24, 2015). The purpose 
was to establish how effective the candidates were 
at communicating their brands into both tradi-
tional and social media, as well as to examine how 
much people on Twitter were relating to either 
campaign messages or the news coverage. We 
focused on news stories and tweets that mentioned 
either of the candidates and words linked to four 
important primary campaign issues (the economy, 
healthcare, the Iranian nuclear deal, and immigra-
tion) as well as personal issues or traits linked to 
the candidates (such as “Bill Clinton”, “corrupt” or 
“liar”). 
We found that the US political communica-
tion landscape was overwhelmed by amplification 
of Trump’s statements about immigration (this 
was soon after his speech that called Mexican 
immigrants “rapists” and while he was promising 
to “build a wall”). Clinton tweeted more about the 
economy and healthcare and Trump tweeted more 
about immigration. This pattern was reflected in 
public tweets, in which tweets about the economy 
and healthcare were linked to Clinton and those 
about immigration were linked to Trump. While 
they were by no means always positive, the sheer 
volume of immigration/Trump tweets was the 
single largest election issue we measured circulat-
ing on Twitter from July to September 2015. 
In 475 newspaper articles linked to the issue or 
personality keywords, immigration was mentioned 
in 264 articles (56 percent), while all other issues 
combined were mentioned in 232 articles (some 
mentioned more than one issue). And if you look 
at Chart 1, you’ll see that in this most popular 
category of immigration, there was a huge focus on 
Trump. This crowded out discussion of other issues 
or even our personality keywords.
Journalists would be quick to point out that 
this coverage of Trump was generally aimed at 
highlighting how people found his statements 
outrageous or upsetting. In this sense, they were 
fulfilling the role of journalists as those who 
patrol the boundaries of culture, signaling that 
public officials should not make false or deni-
grating comments about social groups. But while 
this might have been the message intended, the 
message received by much of America was that 
Trump was a political force. This amplified his 
brand in a crowded primary in a far more powerful 
way than a carefully constructed policy message 
or paid advertising. While we have yet to carry out 
the analysis for the general election, observing the 
news coverage emphasis on scandals and threats 
– such as Trump’s caginess about accepting the
results – suggests that Trump continued to direct
the narrative.
Thatcher famously claimed that denying those 
the British government deemed terrorist groups 
the ‘oxygen of publicity’ would help end terrorism 
in Northern Ireland. That didn’t work out, not 
least because the roots of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland are broad, deep, and not dependent on 
frames by the British media. However, in the case 
of Trump, the mainstream media’s constant barrage 
of coverage from the primaries onward – arguably 
designed as a warning but interpreted as a sign 
of influence – may have given critical oxygen to 
Trump’s campaign. 
Chart 1: Candidates linked with issues or personality keywords in newspaper articles, 1 
July to 24 September 2015
Chart 2: Tweets that mention either Trump or Clinton and contain a key word
Source: Author’s research. Our project collected a total of 955,193 tweets that named Trump and 272,579 tweets 
that named Clinton. The chart above shows only those tweets that also mentioned one of our keywords. The 
tweets were automatically categorized by keywords. 
Source: Author’s research. Coding of 475 articles from The New York Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today. 
Articles were retrieved by using keywords for the issues and personality factors. 
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The American electoral system was supposed to 
be resilient against the siren call of the populist 
demagogue. This is by design. In many electoral 
systems, a party that can attract 15% of the popu-
lation will receive (roughly) 15% of the representa-
tion. The United States is a winner-take-all system. 
Our lengthy, two-stage, extraordinarily expensive 
electoral process is designed to reward two centrist 
parties that each try to appeal to the broad center 
of the electorate. 
And yet... Here we are. Donald Trump won 
the Republican primary over the opposition of 
virtually the entire Republican party leadership. 
He offered a message of xenophobia, a message of 
renewed racial dominance, a message that echoed 
fascist, autocratic appeals heard in other countries 
in decades past and present. Having won the Re-
publican primary, his party leadership mostly fell 
in line, and Republican voters committed to voting 
for him regardless of his history or positions, his 
qualifications or his policy promises. That set up an 
inevitably close race in a deeply divided country. 
And against all expectations (including his own 
campaign’s predictions), he emerged as the winner 
of that race.
This should not have happened. Setting 
aside the large-scale diplomatic, regulatory, and 
policy implications of Trump’s victory, it should 
not have happened because Donald Trump ran a 
ludicrously poor campaign. He failed to pay his 
pollster. His field operation was a series of puff-
yourself-up rallies with little call-to-action at the 
end. His data operation was effectively nonexist-
ent. His messaging was designed to appeal to the 
worst impulses of a shrinking white electorate. 
His communications team was mostly concerned 
with keeping their candidate locked out of his 
own Twitter account. He lost all three debates, 
confirming the worst public fears about his awful 
temperament. He had a terrible convention, beset 
by own-goal mistakes practically every night. He 
picked fights with his own fellow Republicans, 
and with the families of fallen soldiers, and with 
individual reporters on the campaign trail.
Hillary Clinton, by comparison, ran the type 
of sophisticated, professional campaign that we 
have come to expect in modern American politics. 
She had better data, better field operations, better 
fundraising, and better communications. Her 
television commercials were marvelous. She was 
weighted down by a faux-scandal about her use 
of a private email server, by interference by the 
director of the FBI, and by interference of Russian 
hackers and WikiLeaks. But those were challenges 
that were not created by her own campaign. They 
were problems that the campaign tried its best to 
respond to.
It is tempting to reconstruct the history of 
this campaign in order to fit the outcome. Surely, 
if Donald Trump was the victor, he must have 
outmaneuvered his rival, or stumbled upon some 
secret formula for campaign success. We should 
resist this urge. Donald Trump ran a godawful 
mess of a campaign. His only strength was his 
singular, message: that American politics is (a) 
simple, (b) broken, because of (c) corruption and 
incompetence, and that (d) everything would be 
better once he was put in charge. That is the siren 
song of the strongman dictator. It is a rejection 
of liberal pluralism, which holds that politics and 
governance is messy and complicated, and requires 
a subtle hand to achieve positive change. 
America has never had such a pure 
demagogue run for President before. Past pres-
idents, dating back to the founding fathers, all 
concurred with the assumption that government 
is complicated, and requires deliberate intricacy 
to run successfully. American institutions – both 
parties and media organizations – were supposed 
to be strong enough to reject such an appeal.  
But many white Americans were swayed by the 
siren song of right wing demagoguery. And many 
people of color faced difficulty when trying to vote 
at the polls, due to voter suppression efforts crafted 
by the state itself. The result was that Hillary 
Clinton received a couple of million more votes 
than Donald Trump, but they were not the right 
votes in the right states. (Democrats also received 
several million more votes in the House of Rep-
resentatives, and will have 47 fewer seats than the 
Republican party.) 
America now lives under one-party Republican 
rule. It is a party that received fewer votes, a party that 
prioritized suppressing votes rather than reaching 
out to new voters, a party that has made impossible 
promises that run counter to deeply-held American 
norms and values. It is a party now led by an unstable 
individual who lacks the respect of his own partisan 
allies or even a modicum of policy expertise or diplo-
matic temperament.
We did not reach this state through a sophisti-
cated propaganda operation, or through reasoned 
policy debate, or through the self-immolation of 
the non-authoritarian party. Donald Trump did 
not hide who he was. His mistakes and limitations 
were plain to see. But a substantial minority of the 
electorate chose to ignore his flaws, to behave as 
though American policy making and diplomatic 
leadership no longer mattered.
So here we are. Donald Trump is the legiti-
mately elected president of the United States. If 
campaigns mattered, if policy details mattered, if 
endorsements mattered, if competence mattered, 
then Hillary Clinton would be President. Political 
scientists such as myself entered this election 
believing that all of these things mattered, at least 
a little bit. We, and our fellow citizens, are now left 
wondering if anything matters at all.
The #LolNothingMatters election
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Evidence for the powerful roles of polarization 
and partisanship
The 2016 presidential campaign featured two can-
didates who were viewed negatively even by many 
members of their own party. In other words, many 
voters may have experienced ambivalence about 
their party’s nominee throughout the campaign. 
While definitive data is not yet available, it appears 
that both candidates were able to overcome, to 
varying degrees, such ambivalence with many of 
their partisan supporters.
An uneasy feeling
A voter is ambivalent when he or she possesses 
both positive and negative feelings or beliefs about 
a candidate. For example, coverage of Clinton’s 
email scandal may have caused a Democrat who 
otherwise would support many of her policies to be 
wary of her. Similarly, a potential Trump supporter 
may have felt positively about his positions on 
taxes while being alarmed by his bragging about 
sexually assaulting women, his racist language, or 
his tendency to pick fights with members of his 
own party.
Ambivalence has important consequences 
for both attitudes and behavior. Most relevant to 
our discussion here, ambivalent voters may be, 
in some cases, more willing to vote against the 
party they usually support. Perhaps more likely, 
ambivalent voters will take longer to make up their 
mind, indicating a lack of enthusiasm for his or her 
candidate. Consequently, a candidate and his or 
her party will have to spend more effort convincing 
an ambivalent voter to cast a ballot for his or her party.
Consistent with this conclusion is research 
demonstrating that more often than not, voters 
who have a history of supporting one party over 
the other do not defect from their party, even when 
experiencing ambivalence. Ambivalence toward 
the nominee of one’s preferred party often declines 
over the course of the campaign. That is, individu-
als become more favorably disposed to their own 
party’s candidate.
Underlying these findings is a long line of 
research indicating one of the major roles of a 
campaign is to bring home ‘mismatched partisans’. 
For example, the GOP would attempt to persuade 
a Republican hesitant to support Trump. In recent 
elections, including 2016, the vast majority of 
partisans who voted have ended up supporting 
their party’s nominee.
The role of campaigns
Conventional wisdom suggests that positive 
messaging by the party, the candidate and his or 
her surrogates causes positive feelings about the 
candidate to become more relevant to a supporter 
of a party, and negative feelings less so. 
How might this work? With Clinton, months 
of advertisements and positive statements from 
President Obama, Bernie Sanders and others likely 
led to a softening of negative attitudes. And, we did 
in fact see her overall favorability numbers increase 
among Democrats.
There was reason to believe throughout the 
campaign that this process was not going to work 
as smoothly for Donald Trump and the Repub-
licans. Trump has a habit of both starting and 
escalating disagreements with members of his own 
party. For example, from the very early days of his 
campaign he has had flair ups with recent presi-
dential nominee John McCain and Speaker of the 
House Paul Ryan. 
Moreover, several Republican Senators 
declared they would not be voting for Trump. And, 
public intellectuals such as Charles Krauthammer 
and George Will have also disavowed Trump. 
Likewise, many newspapers that have historically 
endorsed Republicans declined to endorse Trump 
and some even endorsed his opponent — for 
example, the Dallas Morning News endorsed 
Clinton, the first time the paper has endorsed a 
Democrat since 1940. Indeed, the editorial stated 
that “Trump is no Republican.”
While Democrats heard members of their 
party consistently praise and defend Clinton, 
Republicans often encountered messages ranging 
from tepid support to open hostility toward 
Trump. Yet, many Republicans supported their 
party’s candidate — early evidence indicates 90% 
of Republicans who voted cast a ballot for the 
Republican nominee.
This presents a puzzle: how did such a unique 
nominee result in such a typical outcome? The 
answer may partly lie in the powerful forces of 
partisanship and polarization. As the parties have 
moved increasingly distant ideologically, voters 
have sorted into partisan camps. As a result, par-
tisanship matters more than it ever has and voters 
are reluctant to abandon their party. Indeed, recent 
elections have tended to be far more competi-
tive than we observed in the middle of the 20th 
century. The 2016 election suggests that partisan-
ship remains a powerful force.
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The emotional brand wins
The 2016 US Presidential election proved the 
power of emotional branding, positioning and 
understanding the strategic conditions in which 
a campaign is run. Emotional brands build deep 
brand loyalty, have the power to go viral on social 
media and earn media thus reducing the need for 
a campaign to pay for media. Emotional branding, 
while making its users vulnerable to charges that 
they lack detail about their ideas, it fits with the fast 
moving world in which most voters live their lives. 
Emotional branding can be part of a positioning 
program. Both Sanders and Trump positioned 
themselves as outsiders and agents of change in a 
year in which many voters sought such qualities. 
While Sanders was the future oriented candidate 
of Revolution and Trump the nostalgic candidate 
of Restoration, their emotional branding programs 
positioned them well to compete in an unhappy 
country against a candidate selling stability and the 
status quo: Hillary Clinton. 
#feelthebern
Bernie Sanders sought to pull the Democrat-
ic Party leftward and denying the nomination 
and control of the party to the centrist Clintons. 
Sanders targeted much of the Obama coalition. 
He stressed a “rigged” economy and game, bank 
reform, and presented voters with an America 
that was in need of a “political revolution”. Under 
President Sanders things would be radically 
different as the bad behavior of the one percent, 
the big banks and Wall Street and the rich would 
follow the rules and pay their “fair share” of taxes 
and that free trade agreements would end. He 
proposed universal healthcare and free higher 
education. Sanders had a great appeal with a few 
segments of the electorate but couldn’t expand and 
did not win. 
#MAGA
Donald Trump had extent corporate and personal 
brands. For this campaign, he used a tag line 
first used by Ronald Reagan in 1980: “Let’s Make 
America Great Again”. The contents and attitudes 
of the Trump campaign were much closer to the 
silent majority messaging used by Richard Nixon. 
In the Trump emotional brand the country is 
under siege by liberals, elites, liberals, terrorists 
and illegal aliens. Like Sanders, Trump argued 
the system was “rigged” and offered himself as 
a corrective to that. He presented in a narrative 
in which Americans were much worse off and 
in more danger than they had been eight years 
earlier. Trump’s policies were aimed at making the 
country safe and economically viable for average 
people again. Trump offered highly visual solutions 
to the nation’s problems: building a wall, tearing 
up free trade agreements, banning Muslims from 
entering the country and using signs of his wealth 
and business experience to show that he alone 
could clean up Wall Street and turn the country 
around. He developed colorful names for his 
opponents like ‘Lyin’ Ted (Cruz), Little Marco 
(Rubio) and Crooked Hillary (Clinton). His tag 
line and its heritage were a positioning statement 
that the country needed to be improved again and 
resonated with older voters who remembered the 
Carter years and the Reagan Revolution as the 
corrective to those. Thus, a vote for Trump was 
a vote for change back to an America in which 
working class Americans could make good money, 
everyone spoke English, law and order prevailed, 
and the country was feared and respected around 
the world. 
Conclusions 
Trump and Sanders built emotional brands that 
created deep loyalty, inspired customer evangelism 
and generated a high level of enthusiasm about 
voting for them. Both Trump and Sanders were 
able to use social and earned media to get their 
message out efficiently and both staged mass events 
to bring their brands to life in highly emotive 
ways. If Sanders was the candidate of the future 
and the Revolution then Trump was the candidate 
of nostalgia and the Restoration. The Revolu-
tionary and the Restorer both faced off against 
a candidate presenting herself as a continuation 
of the Obama legacy and upholder of the status 
quo. Hillary Clinton struggled in both contests. 
Her branding failed to motivate key Democratic 
audiences to vote. While stories were legion about 
the enthusiasm of the Sanders and Trump voters, 
Hillary Clinton struggled to build deep brand 
loyalty partly because of a lack of emotion that 
went right down to the hashtag: #imwithher. These 
failures mattered on election day when Trump 
won a huge number of working class whites, split 
on college educated whites, did well with female 
voters and showed great improvement with 
Hispanic and African-American voters versus what 
Mitt Romney had done four years earlier. Hillary 
Clinton’s more stability oriented branding failed 
do the same. On Election Day, turnout amongst 
key Democratic audiences was down, Trump did 
just enough with his target audiences and the rest 
is history. The lesson of the cycle appears to be that 
strong emotional branding and how to position 
a such a brand in light of market conditions are 
more important than clearly thought out policy 
positions, political experience, more sober values 
like competence or stability or winning debates.
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At its most basic, all democratic politics could 
be described as a fight over the future. Different 
factions, parties or candidates propose competing 
visions for a society which would in some crucial 
way change it; the electorate assesses their ideas 
and decides which is the more desirable or feasible. 
But watching Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton 
grapple over America’s future, it’s clear that this 
model is breaking down. To different extents, both 
candidates have retreated into the past rather than 
facing the future.
Trump’s famous and ubiquitous slogan 
is “make America great again”. He gives only 
the sketchiest of outlines as to what this would 
entail: jobs and growth, a wall on the Mexican 
border, defeating Islamic State – all huge, ill-de-
fined, and questionably feasibile.
The problems Trump identifies in today’s 
America greatly outnumber his solutions. During 
the debates, Trump tossed out the word “again”, the 
crux of his slogan, with compulsive insistence – 
“great again, safe again, wealthy again”. In the third 
debate in Las Vegas, he declared he wanted to see 
the constitution enacted “the way it was meant to be”.
The murky nostalgia of this claim is obvious. 
This is less a matter of moving forwards and 
more recovering something lost. That is why 
Trump doesn’t really need to explain what his 
policies would actually be: the presumption is that 
Americans will know their former greatness when 
they see it. Campaigns like his bypass the arduous 
path of reasoning and set us on the easier but more 
treacherous terrain of instinct and emotion.
What we’re seeing is a turn away from 
optimism, a vivid feeling among vast swathes of 
the electorate that the future no longer implies 
improvement, if indeed it ever did. This brand of 
politics has a long lineage – and Trump’s national-
ism is the direct descendant of a much older strand 
of far-right nationalism.
Just like old times
By the end of the 19th century, nationalist ideology 
was mutating, shedding its universalist skin and 
its often liberating intentions. In the 1890s it took 
on an inward-looking, essentialist incarnation: ra-
cialised, fearful, belligerent. This change is usually 
described as a shift from left to right, but that 
doesn’t entirely grasp what was going on.
Such a change required nationalism to 
conceive the future in a fundamentally different 
way: it stopped representing opportunity and 
progress and started to connote threat and danger. 
Nationalists began to campaign on the promise 
they would protect their people from the ravages 
of modernity, whether in the form of increasing 
immigration or exploitation at work.
The resurgence of this scared, suspicious 
eyeing of the future is at the heart of the Trump 
campaign. As Will Davies argued, we have entered 
not only an age of post-truth politics but also an 
age of post-future politics. This is an argument that 
Davies convincingly applies to Brexit, too. Post-
truth and post-future politics feed off one another: 
they form two sides of a coin whose only currency 
is fear and despair.
And what of Hillary Clinton? Did she offer an 
alternative vision, a future that stands for newness 
and progress? Not at all. Perhaps this isn’t sur-
prising given the amount of time she has spent 
in politics — it’s unlikely that she would propose 
a complete break with a past in which she is so 
thoroughly embedded. Her emphasis on her expe-
rience, meticulously detailed in all three debates, 
trapped her in a bygone era.
Clinton’s willingness to reference a direct return 
to or continuity of the other Clinton era was on full 
display in the first debate: “I think my husband did 
a pretty good job in the 1990s. I think a lot about 
what worked and how we can make it work again.”
Sure enough, there’s very little new about her 
proposed programme. Essentially, she advocates 
a return to a carefully delineated recent past of 
prosperity. It’s a big contrast with Trump’s fantasy 
of an all-encompassing paradise lost – but Clinton’s 
is a recreation of the past nonetheless.
Past our prime
Politicians of all stripes have long invoked what 
they see as the glorious aspects of their countries’ 
histories to bolster visions of the future. But the 
past is typically inspiration, not prescription. 
The revolutionaries of late-18th century France 
might have vaunted classical symbols and archi-
tecture, but they didn’t use them to assemble a 
strict template for a return to a bygone age; they 
incorporated the aesthetic into a radical vision 
of the future. That is not the case in this year’s 
presidential election.
What we are witnessing is a profound shift 
in the Western political landscape, a transforma-
tion by no means limited to the US. Sections of 
many electorates are losing faith in the idea of the 
future as we know it – something distinct from the 
past and the present alike, and which usually repre-
sents change for the better. Traditional establish-
ment politicians have been all but paralysed by this 
development, while insurgent populists are eagerly 
fuelling it.
All the while, we’re faced with problems of a 
new urgency and scale: widespread disenchant-
ment, marginalisation, and division; the threat 
of jobs lost to automation; antibiotic resistance; 
climate change; displaced populations. It is unlikely 
that looking back to any past, however seductive, 
will help us solve these problems.
Donald Trump’s slogan betrays a renewed 
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How do politicians appeal to a constituency 
over things that must not be mentioned in polite 
company? Things like racism, sexism, violence, and 
other forms of hatred?
They call in the dogs. Or, to be more precise, 
they blow dog whistles. 
Zac Goldsmith was accused of blowing the 
whistle often during his unsuccessful campaign 
for the London mayoralty against Sadiq Khan. The 
tactics attributed to him, the Mirror said, “included 
writing to people whose surname was ‘Singh’ in the 
address book and warning Mr Khan was coming 
for their jewellery.”
In the United States, Donald Trump, now the 
President-elect, was accused of blowing it fre-
quently, as in when he suggested that “the Second 
Amendment people” could do something about 
Hillary Clinton’s Supreme Court selections. If you 
believe in guns, the implication was, you could use 
them against a political opponent.
As elections get less civil, it’s interesting to see 
how popular those “dog whistles” have become. 
This seemed to be the year that the “dog whistle” 
was heard the loudest.
A real dog whistle, of course, produces an ul-
trasonic sound that is too high for human hearing, 
but can be heard by dogs, cats, and other animals. 
That it was invented in 1876 by Sir Francis Galton 
seems appropriate, given that he also coined the 
term “eugenics,” breeding selectively to produce 
preferred human traits. 
Much human “dog whistling” seems aimed at 
people who would be interested in eugenics as well.
The Oxford English Dictionary says a dog 
whistle is “A statement or expression which in 
addition to its ostensible meaning has a further 
interpretation or connotation intended to be un-
derstood only by a specific target audience.”
Urban Dictionary, entirely user generated 
and thus less “formal,” is more direct, in a 2006 
entry on “dog whistle comment”: “A surreptitious 
inclusion of code words or phrases that will be 
heard by some of those listening, while not dis-
turbing the other listeners, who may not appreciate 
the hidden message(s).”
As a political term, “dog whistle” has been 
around for a while, but no one is sure exactly how 
long. William Safire wrote about it in 2005, noting 
that The Economist attributed the expression to a 
political consultant in Australia. Safire found “dog 
whistle” in a March 1997 issue of The Australian 
newspaper, which attributed the phrase to, 
um, Americans.
But both the Americans and the Australians 
may have been late to the party. As the Merri-
am-Webster Words at Play blog notes, a columnist 
for the Ottawa Citizen, Jim Coyle, wrote in 
October 1995 that the term “special interest” was 
“an all-purpose dog-whistle that those fed up with 
feminists, minorities, the undeserving poor hear 
loud and clear.” Eleven months later, Coyle wrote: 
“It would be nice to think the premier was merely 
being thoughtless, rather than calculating, that 
he was not blowing on that dog whistle that only 
racists hear.”
As a political Twitter meme, “dog whistle” is 
right up there with “dumpster fire,” referring to a 
spectacular failure, a cockup, a bloody mess.
A dumpster is a mobile trash container, 
introduced in the United States in the 1930s by 
the Dempster brothers, who coined the term. 
(“Dumpster” was a trademark until 2008.) For 
some reason, dumpsters catch on fire a lot. Though 
those fires usually are contained to the dumpster, 
they can be pretty spectacular, sending up lots of 
smoke and flames.
The term “dumpster fire” was added to the 
Oxford Dictionaries this year, with the definition 
“informal A chaotic or disastrously mishandled 
situation: last season was a dumpster fire, and it 
didn’t get that way overnight.”
As that definition seems to indicate, “dumpster 
fire” as a metaphor may have had its roots in sports.
The Language Log blog says the earliest met-
aphorical use was in 2009 by the Washington Post 
sports writer Mike Wise, who told the Huffington 
Post that he’d heard it from a traffic reporter he 
used to work with. But “dumpster fires” appear in 
sports reports starting in November 2008, in such 
places as The Arizona Star (“The season that began 
as a dumpster fire…”). But many “dumpster fires” 
followed Wise’s use as well, proving again how a 
good idiom (or cliché) can spread like wildfire.
The first political reference to a “dumpster 
fire” that we can find is even earlier, in a July 2008 
post by Scott Smith on the Scholars and Rogues 
blog: “maybe, satire aside, this whole dumpster fire 
is bad for progressives fighting their way toward 
November.” Smith says he heard the term on 
sports radio.
The term is becoming all-consuming. As the 
Oxford words blog noted:
“Although we see a fairly steady rise and fall 
in frequency through 2013 and 2014, usage runs 
unusually high between the beginning of last 
summer and the end of 2015. Curiously enough, 
Donald Trump just happened to announce his 
campaign for the presidency on June 16th of 
last year.” 
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As Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump ramp up 
for their third and final televised debate, people 
are still trying to make sense of what happened at 
their second one. It was an odd sort of presiden-
tial debate, maybe the oddest ever – and it was 
certainly the ugliest and most tawdry.
Mere days after the release of a video in which 
Trump bragged about using his celebrity status to 
grab women by their genitals without consent, he 
was already collapsing in the polls. He responded 
by parading a number of women who have accused 
Bill Clinton of inappropriate sexual behaviour in 
the past, then bringing them along to the debate 
in an effort to both embarrass him and unsettle 
Hillary Clinton.
At first, at least, it seemed to work. You didn’t 
need to be a body language expert to see the dis-
comfort on Bill Clinton’s face when he was led into 
the auditorium and seated in the front row.
Now Trump is seeing his numbers slide into 
the terminal zone, he’s increasingly resorting to the 
psychological tricks of the pugilistic. All boxers 
have little games they like to play to unsettle their 
opponents. They don’t see it as cheating; it’s just 
part of the game. That’s how Trump seems to think.
But Trump also has a penchant for name-call-
ing, something boxers only resort to when they’re 
desperate. He’s called Clinton “Crooked Hillary” 
hundreds of times before on Twitter and in 
speeches to sympathetic crowds, but at the second 
debate he went so far as to call her a liar to her 
face multiple times. Anything for an advantage. 
Anything to rattle your opponent.
Their latest encounter was debating as street 
fighting, a metaphor widely used in the run-up to 
the debate. The idea was so pervasive it turned into 
a metaphorical frame that affected what we saw 
and what we noticed, and even how we judged the 
outcome of this battle.
Various commentators summed up Trump’s 
debate performances by speculating that he might 
have “stopped the bleeding” from the Republican 
faithful, despite his comments about how he views 
and treats women (“locker room talk, folks”).
Trump’s body language went through several 
periods of transition in the debate. Having to 
hold a microphone interferes with the natural 
two-handed gestures on which he relies heavily. We 
can all recognise them: arms outstretched, arms 
pointing downwards, palms forward, characteris-
tically signalling his connection with the common 
man through the distinctive, demonstrative 
gestures of New York – gestures that work because 
they speak straight to the usually unconscious 
nonverbal system.
Trump is quite expert at using some gestures 
and sequences of gestures in particular. First comes 
a barrier signal: arms up, palms out. ‘Beware’, 
it says. ‘Danger’. Then he uses a precision hand 
gesture – a distinctive thumb-and-forefinger 
position – which alternates with an L-shaped 
gesture. The danger signal produces an immediate 
emotional effect, then he reassures the audience 
with his precision gesture. “I’ve got a plan,” he says 
nonverbally, “a precise plan. It’s time for a change.”
Slicing and pointing, that’s what Trump can 
do, at least when he’s not forced to hold a micro-
phone in one hand as he was at the second debate. 
I was surprised he didn’t complain about this, since 
he complained about everything else: the “bias” of 
the moderators, “it’s three against one”, the fact that 
Clinton got more time – anything, like a child who 
thinks that the world isn’t fair.
Looking tired, he started quietly rocking on 
his feet as Clinton spoke, a telltale sign of negative 
emotion leaking out nonverbally. Clearly he wasn’t 
comfortable with the fallout from the leaked 
tape. He started sniffing when he talked, as he did 
throughout the first debate. It’s a distraction, and 
it noticeably gets more pronounced when he’s on 
the spot.
He started gesturing demonstratively for 
the first time when he talked about his wealth. 
‘Batonic’ gestures – stress-timed gestures that 
have no iconic content, such as the up-and-down 
beat of a hand – tend to mark out content that’s 
highly significant for the speaker, but when Trump 
begins his personal attacks, the more complex and 
abstract metaphoric gestures start up in earnest. 
These are a core part of Trump’s implicit message, 
and they have an immediate effect. Their meaning 
is processed simultaneously with his speech.
As he went on the attack in the debate, his use 
of beat gestures duly increased. He chopped, he 
pointed, he sliced. Trump was now fully armed. 
He heckled, he interrupted, he glowered as Clinton 
talked, issuing a nonverbal running commentary 
on what she was saying.
All in all, this was a bully’s performance, a 
physical attempt to dominate Clinton and ma-
nipulate our interpretation of her words. Clinton 
quoted Michelle Obama’s “When they go low, we 
go high”, but with Trump expressing himself as he 
did – stalking her as she talked, prowling behind 
her like a big beast of the jungle – the tone of the 
encounter remained firmly at the lower end of the scale.
The American linguist George Lakoff has 
commented that Trump “uses your brain against 
you”. Much of everyday thought is unconscious, 
and it’s that psychological spot that Trump targets, 
much as a boxer or street fighter does.
The fact that he got us all thinking that only 
a ‘knockout’ would constitute success for Hillary 
Clinton was therefore a victory of sorts. He was on 
the ropes that night, and he knew it; in the end he 
bobbed and weaved to fight another day, despite 
everything we now know about this most unpres-
idential of men. Nonetheless, his poll ratings slid 
after each performance.
How Donald Trump bullies with his 
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Analysing debate questions: is it time to rethink 
the town hall?
Moderators Anderson Cooper of CNN and Martha 
Raddatz of ABC News spent the second presi-
dential debate wrestling gamely with the candi-
dates and a vociferous audience for control of the 
evening, leaving the undecided voters on the stage 
largely redundant. A feature of the election cycle 
since 1992, the town-hall style was judged by some 
to be “the biggest loser of last night’s debate.” 
Fewer questions, fewer good ones
The intention behind the town hall format is to 
bring candidates into closer contact with voters. 
At times that has proved insightful, as in 1992, 
when Bill Clinton won plaudits for his empa-
thetic response to a question about the personal 
impact of the national debt. In the three cycles that 
followed, audience members peppered candidates 
with at least 15 questions per debate. However, the 
scattershot nature of their queries led to an adjust-
ment of the rules in 2008.
Beginning with the Obama-McCain town 
hall, moderators were granted leeway to follow up 
on points raised by the candidates’ responses to 
voters, resulting in an average five fewer audience 
questions. The goal was to foster a more sustained 
discussion, but with moderators taking a more 
active role, the audience becomes ancillary to 
the proceedings.
The power transfer, from audience to mod-
erators, was particularly acute during the second 
presidential debate, with Cooper and Raddatz 
forcefully asserting themselves - and the audience 
fading into the background. That night, eight of the 
11 questions came from undecided voters on the 
stage, with the remaining questions chosen from 
those submitted online. Cooper and Raddatz were 
aggressive with their follow-ups, piggybacking on 
every question until the final minutes, when they 
attempted to fit in as many audience members as 
possible. When the moderators did turn to the 
voters, those questions largely seemed lacking both 
in scope and substance. “Do you believe you can be 
a devoted President to all the people in the United 
States?” isn’t exactly probing, and it allowed both 
candidates to shift into versions of their stump 
speeches. However, viral sensation Ken Bone did 
ask insightfully and concisely about energy policy, 
and Gorbah Hamed forced Donald Trump to 
directly confront the Islamophobia in which his 
campaign has trafficked.
Topics missed
The town hall debate normally serves as an oppor-
tunity for citizens to address personal issues they 
are grappling with, but after two debates this cycle 
a number of topics remained unaddressed. Equal 
pay and the minimum wage, for example, were not 
mentioned in either of the first two presidential 
debates. The issue was last asked during a question 
once during the 2012 debates. Additionally, many 
social issues remained on the sidelines, including 
LGBTQ rights, abortion, and the war on drugs.
Most noticeable in their absence were immigra-
tion and gun control. Trump and Clinton both 
managed to sneak in some talk about their stance 
on immigration following a question posed by 
a woman who identified herself as a Muslim 
American. The core of her question, however, was 
about feeling safe given the islamophobia in this 
country. Both nominees used it as an opportunity 
to address their thoughts and policies on immigration.
As for gun control, the topic was not broached 
throughout the course of the 90-minute debate 
– despite 55% of Americans favouring stricter
gun laws, according to a CNN/ORC poll. In the
Twittersphere, many people were upset that no
questions about policing surfaced during this
debate.
Personal characteristics again in focus
The main topic of the night, as in the first debate, 
was the candidates themselves. Perhaps unavoid-
ably, the voters wanted to hear the candidates 
defend their character, and attack their opponent’s, 
following a week that saw revelations about Donald 
Trump’s tax holiday, Hillary Clinton’s public versus 
private stances, and—most disturbingly—a newly 
released recording of Trump asserting he is entitled 
to sexually assault women. 
The first two questions, along with several 
follow-ups from the moderators, focused on 
the candidates’ behaviour, past statements, and 
judgment. It was not until more than 24 minutes 
into the evening that a question was asked about 
policy, when an audience member asked about 
healthcare.
Overall, five of the 11 questions posed by the 
audience in the hall and those culled from the web 
touched on aspects of temperament. With more 
than 40 percent of the questions from this year’s 
two debates coming on the topic, 2016 has seen an 
unprecedented focus on character.
A longer version of this article originally appeared 
in Columbia Journalism Review, reproduced with 
permission.
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At the outset of this analysis, let’s be clear about 
one thing: there are dark reasons for Donald 
Trump’s rise. Among these, a nativist, sexist, patri-
archal, and ethnocentrist view of the country, and 
a campaign based on fanciful promises beyond the 
power of any President to make good on—jobs, 
walls, trade agreements, repeal of established laws, 
and abandonment of strategic global alliances. 
Lack of specifics and news media complacency 
in pressing Trump about policy, potential cabinet 
appointments, and plans to investigate Clinton also 
worked to his advantage, as his candidacy became 
an ill-defined canvas onto which disgruntled and 
fearful voters could project their hopes and assuage 
their anxieties. 
Beyond his campaign promises, which were 
among the least defined and coherent in con-
temporary political history, Trump’s nonverbal 
communication was quite consistent: angry, 
defiant, outraged, and disgusted with the political 
status quo. Although he was undisciplined in his 
use of facial displays and gestures, fulminating one 
minute and flailing the next, Trump managed to 
project ample amounts of outrage in his nonverbal 
behavior and that clear display of anger gave dis-
contented voters who were not on board with the 
Clinton agenda something to rally around. 
By contrast, Clinton’s expressions were much 
more controlled, diplomatic, reassuring, and polite. 
During the debates, which she by all accounts won, 
Clinton outlasted Trump’s antics by exuding a calm 
determination that was buttressed by sharp retorts. 
It was a diplomatic style with little populist appeal. 
Except for small glimpses of genuine emotion—the 
much-heralded “shimmy” towards the end of the 
first debate, a delightful rallying cry in the rain 
at the very end of the campaign—her expressive 
behavior was not a great ally. She strove to project 
likeability and competence but her high negatives 
in opinion polls demanded a much more empa-
thetic and still forceful approach. 
Clinton did go on the attack at times during 
the campaign, notably during the third presidential 
debate against Trump, but she did so more in the 
condescending mode of an attorney cross-examin-
ing a witness than a champion of the people. That 
subtle but discernible contempt, which perhaps 
serves as a competence cue for supporters, was 
likely read as arrogance by Independents and weak 
partisans and could have hurt her in the end. In an 
election process that rests on turnout, as this one 
so agonizingly did, enthusiasm—which gets people 
to the polls—trumps competence. 
While Clinton generated sufficient enthu-
siasm for a lower volume election (she did win 
the popular vote, after all) she had less success 
holding together the coalition of Black, Hispanic, 
and younger voters that Obama built in previous 
elections—even with the president and Michelle 
Obama campaigning on her behalf. In part, she 
struggled to convince because she struggled to 
effectively emote. 
Meanwhile, Trump emoted in loud attacks, 
wild accusations, empty promises, and outrageous 
nonverbal antics. He energized his base enough to 
get out and vote in states that mattered. Key to his 
success: Trump’s expressions were unambiguous. 
His message of defiance and threat came across 
blunt and clear, even with the sound off. Whether 
by design or happenstance, Trump’s confrontational 
style of campaigning bonded supporters to his cause. 
Trump’s “go to” expression is an anger/threat 
display—a menacing expression characterized by 
fixed stares and visible anger that signals com-
petitive or hostile intent. Research has shown 
that threat displays are particularly effective with 
supporters but anathema to critics and unde-
cideds. We witnessed this firsthand in dial tests 
conducted during the presidential debates with 
dozens of Texas voters. Republican Party identifiers 
expressed much more enthusiasm for Trump than 
Democrats ever did for Clinton. 
The screen captures opposite illustrate the 
high level of positive sentiment that Trump sup-
porters felt while watching their candidate go on 
the attack against Clinton during the first debate 
(see top panel, Figure 1). In this moment, Trump 
deflects a question about releasing his taxes and 
focuses instead on the thousands of emails that 
Clinton purportedly deleted before handing over 
her private server to the FBI. The blue line, which 
peaks over 90 points on a 100-point sentiment 
scale, represents not just Republican support but 
genuine voter enthusiasm. 
By contrast, Democratic voters never 
surpassed the 70-point mark in response to 
Clinton, and on average felt less positively toward 
her than Republicans felt towards Trump (see 
yellow line, bottom panel). Interestingly, Inde-
pendent voters responded negatively and critically 
to Trump’s anger/threat displays (see purple line, 
top panel), a trend that was reflected in polls 
following the first debate that showed weakening 
support among Independents.
But defections among weak partisans were 
not in numbers sufficient enough to derail his 
campaign, although Trump appeared to be all but 
finished until the late October surprise of the FBI’s 
discovery of yet more emails from Clinton’s private 
server. Clinton was exonerated a week later, just a 
few days before the election, but the FBI director’s 
reminder was all the opening Trump needed to 
reanimate his attacks, energize his base for one 
last push, and infuse his tirades against her alleged 
untrustworthiness with a sense of renewed force. 
Image bites, voter enthusiasm, and the 2016 
Presidential Election
Figure 1. Peak ratings of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton during the first 
presidential debate. 
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In many respects, the 2016 Presidential Election 
was unlike any other. One particularly unique 
feature of the campaign was a sizable asymmetry 
in the number of advertisements aired on behalf of 
each of the major party candidates. 
Despite being vastly outspent on the airwaves, 
President-Elect Donald Trump won more than 
300 votes in the Electoral College. However, his 
victory should not imply that political advertise-
ments are ineffective at winning votes. Instead, the 
final election tally begs scholars and observers of 
American politics to rethink conventional wisdom 
about campaigning on television. 
In what follows, I raise (and attempt to 
answer) several questions about the state of 
advertising in 2016 and its implications for what 
scholars know about their effectiveness.
A War on the Airwaves?
If the 2016 campaign was a battle for control of 
the airwaves, the fight was one sided (at best). 
While both sides saw fewer advertisements aired 
on their behalf than did each respective party 
nominee in 2012, data from the Wesleyan Media 
Project (WMP) suggests that pro-Clinton airings 
(489,142 from June 8 - October 30, 2016) were 
about three times greater than pro-Trump airings 
(99,441). Clinton’s dominance on the airwaves 
held fairly steady throughout the campaign. In 
contrast to the view that Trump might make a late 
push to flood the airwaves with advertisements 
before the campaign concluded, WMP data show 
that pro-Clinton advertisements outnumbered 
pro-Trump ads by nearly 2:1 in the final two weeks 
of the campaign. 
There were also several important asym-
metries in the sponsorship of advertisements 
on both sides. While candidates sponsored the 
majority of all ads aired in their favor, Clinton 
received substantial help from interest groups 
(more than ninety thousand airings in her favor), 
whereas Donald Trump received absolutely none 
(although several interest groups were actively 
involved in airing anti-Clinton advertisements). 
Interestingly, Donald Trump aired fewer adver-
tisements overall than did Bernie Sanders in the 
Democratic Primary, and the overall tone of ads 
aired were somewhat more positive than those 
aired in 2012.
Does Campaign Advertising Change Minds?
In the past, political scientists have found that 
asymmetries in advertising totals have important 
consequences for candidates’ electoral fates. 
Several scholars have demonstrated that ad-
vertising advantages can increase support for a 
candidate, even independently of mobilization 
efforts “on the ground.” Political scientists John 
Sides and Lynn Vavreck find that support tends 
to respond to short-term airing advantages. But, 
because candidates typically keep pace with each 
others’ advertising spending, these effects usually 
cancel out. 
The 2016 election offers a unique opportunity 
for scholars to study a campaign in which adver-
tising was more one-sided, and may prove to turn 
conventional wisdom on its head. Consistent with 
conventional wisdom, Donald Trump picked up 
narrow, and unanticipated, victories in Wisconsin 
and Michigan; states where he held moderate to 
high advertising advantages in the final two weeks 
of the campaign, in some media markets. Further, 
the candidate with the most advertisements aired 
on her behalf also won the popular vote. 
Yet, there is also reason to rethink the con-
ventional wisdom. In some states where Clinton 
held heavy advertising advantages in the final 
weeks of the campaign (e.g., Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
and Florida), she ultimately lost. Further, Trump’s 
advertising edges in Virginia and Colorado during 
the same timeframe ultimately did not win him 
either state. 
How will Scholars Make Sense of 2016?
We can never truly know what the popular and 
state vote totals would have looked like had 
political advertising not been present. One way to 
ascertain the effectiveness will be to turn to public 
opinion surveys collected after the final vote 
was tallied. 
Political advertisements create “naturally 
occurring” experiments on a daily basis, because 
media markets often cross state boundaries. If 
voters live in markets that receive substantial ad-
vertising because they overlap with a battleground 
state (where candidates will also have strong 
ground games), but do not actually live in a battle-
ground state themselves, it is possible to isolate the 
effect of advertising independently of other factors 
that might also shape vote choice. 
For example, the Erie market in Pennsylvania 
(a battleground state) overlaps with New York (a 
strongly Democratic state). In the final two weeks 
of the campaign, Trump held a significant adver-
tising advantage in Erie. If voters in that part of 
New York became more likely to vote for Trump at 
the election’s conclusion, advertisements may have 
indeed shaped their vote choice. 
Advertisements also have the potential to do 
more than alter citizens’ vote intentions. Exposure 
to campaign advertising has been shown to boost 
citizens’ knowledge about ,and interest in, the 
presidential campaign, for example. 
The 2016 Election will almost certainly 
challenge conventional wisdom about presiden-
tial campaign advertising. Scholars now have 
an opportunity to empirically which aspects of 
conventional wisdom were upheld, and which need 
further attention.
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US election: what impact do celebrity 
endorsements really have?
In one of the most astonishing U.S. elections in 
modern political history, Donald Trump became 
the 45th President of the United States. Relying 
largely on opinion polls and over 1,000 celebrity 
endorsers, including Beyoncé and Katy Perry, 
election forecasters put Hilary Clinton’s chance of 
winning at 70% to 99%. Oprah Winfrey’s endorse-
ment of Obama in 2008 increased the contri-
butions received by Obama, and an estimated 1 
million additional votes. So what role did celebrity 
endorsement play?
Use of Celebrities in Politics
Historians have traced the role of celebrities in 
politics back to the 1920 U.S. election, when Lillian 
Russell and other film stars endorsed Warren 
Harding. In 1960, John F. Kennedy was endorsed 
by Rat Pack members Sammy Davis junior and 
Dean Martin. More recently, Oprah Winfrey 
and George Clooney supported Barack Obama. 
Actor Clint Eastwood, endorsed Republicans John 
McCain in 2008 and Donald Trump this time 
around.
Who endorsed who?
Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have 
been endorsed by an army of celebrity support-
ers. Some of Clinton’s high-profile endorsers 
were LeBron James, Meryl Streep, Lady Gaga, 
Lena Dunham, and Snoop Dogg. In contrast, 
Trump’s supporters were less well-known and 
included Azealia Banks, Tom Brady, Mike Tyson, 
Hulk Hogan, and Scott Baio.
Hilary’s celebrity endorsers had a greater 
social media reach and made powerful state-
ments such as Elizabeth Banks’ Fight Song or 
the star-studded Avengers cast’s oblique but 
powerful statement against Trump.
Celebrities sell
One in five ads globally features a celebrity. 
Marketers spend millions on celebrity endorsers to 
leverage “secondary brand associations” – that is, 
people transfer their opinions and feelings about 
a celebrity to the brand (e.g., Beyonce and Pepsi – 
worth US$50 million).
In a cluttered world where myriad messages 
fight for the attention of time-starved consumers, 
celebrity endorsers serve as arbiters of public 
opinion. Marketers rely on symbolic and emotional 
features to generate “sociopsychological associ-
ations”. Some celebrities are so aspirational that 
even a glimpse of them in an ad conveys positive 
meaning (e.g., Cristiano Ronaldo).
In order to transfer positive meaning, the 
celebrity, should have the following traits: 
• attractiveness (physique, intellect, athleticism,
lifestyle);
• credibility (expertise, trustworthiness); and
• meaning transfer (compatibility between
brand and celebrity).
Quite often, celebrities use their high profile 
to promote causes, like singer Bono’s One 
campaign against poverty. 
Celebrity endorsements in politics makes sense
We know celebrities grab and hold consumer 
attention. Yet, expertise and credibility are 
important elements when wanting to influence 
consumers. Interestingly, people consider celebrities 
to be more credible and trustworthy than politi-
cians.
Young people believe celebrities have an effect 
on the way people think – more than politicians, 
scientists or academics. Exit polls of 24,537 re-
spondents in the 2016 U.S. election showed that 
the 18-29 year old segment was the smallest (12%) 
with 55% voting for Clinton, while 53% of 45-64 
year olds, the largest segment (40%) voted for 
Trump. Outside of age, ethnicity and gender affect 
celebrity endorsement influence. Of the surveyed 
women, 54% voted for Clinton, and 53% of men 
voted for Trump. Most of the surveyed voters 
were White (70%) and of those, 58% voted for 
Trump, while most of the Black (88%), Latino 
(65%) and Asian voters (65%) voted for Clinton. 
On the whole, Clinton received a higher number of 
overall votes (47.8%), however, due to the Electoral 
College system, Trump was elected president.
Effectiveness and audience
A key difference in the 2016 U.S. election was 
that Trump was also a celebrity in his own right. 
People’s experience of his public persona through 
his roles on TV has over time instilled a specific 
meaning which was transferred to his political 
campaign. Furthermore, Trump had a clear 
message centred on change, with an anti-estab-
lishment bent. In contrast, Clinton embodied the 
establishment and was considered untrustworthy 
due to accusations during her time as Secretary of 
State and her family’s charity the Clinton Foundation. 
So what’s the final verdict?
Having the endorsement of celebrities is not 
enough. There has to be a match-up (or compati-
bility) between the celebrity and the brand (or poli-
tician). For instance the Hu collection, by Pharrell 
Williams and Adidas Originals, has the necessary 
credible context. On the other hand, Scarlett 
Johannson’s endorsement of Sodastream failed to 
solidify the relationship while losing Johannson 
her Oxfam ambassador position.
With the right celebrity endorsements, 
political campaigns can do quite well. However, 
they need to establish a clear connection between 
the politician and celebrity endorsing them. 
Otherwise, the message comes across as disingenu-
ous and irrelevant at best. 
Email: nzubcevic@swin.edu.au
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The backlash of the loose cannon: musicians 
and the celebrity cleavage
Back in February 2016 The Guardian published 
an article claiming that if the US were ‘a rockocra-
cy’ then the 2016 election would already be over, 
with Hillary and Bill back in the White House. 
This pretty much sums up the tune of the 2016 
US presidential election. Musicians overwhelm-
ingly aligned with Clinton and trumpeted against 
Trump. Yet, with what effect? 
While the power of music in politics is a 
well-established fact, the actual influence of celeb-
rities in election campaigns is not that straight-for-
ward. Nonetheless, the assumed ability of the stars 
to harvest voters’ support offered reason enough 
for US politicians to recruit celebrities to their 
campaigns. While this is historically true for both 
Democrats and Republicans, it was only with Bill 
Clinton and especially with Barack Obama that 
celebrity endorsement has become more massive 
and potentially more influential. 
Obama’s relationship with celebrity musicians 
has been especially creative, outgrowing the 
usual ‘photo ops and rally performances’ mix and 
moving into a number of new formats. Songs of 
appreciation for Obama (e.g. Young Jeezy ‘My 
President’), the Emmy-winning music video ‘Yes 
We Can’ produced by the will.i.am, the frontman 
of the Black Eyed Peas and Bruce Springsteen’s epic 
Obama-endorsing tours are most paradigmatic. 
Hilary Clinton continued the trend of celebrity 
crowding in 2016. The names she gathered in her 
music camp were impressive: Jay-Z, Kanye West, 
Beyoncé, Katie Perry, Christina Aguilera, Cher, Jon 
Bon Jovi, Mariah Carey, Ice-T, Elton John, Lady 
Gaga, Jennifer Lopez, Ricky Martin, Madonna, 
Morrissey, Snoop Dogg, 50 Cent, Sting, Barbra 
Streisand, Bruce Springsteen and many others. 
However, the musicians’ endorsement for 
Clinton for the most part lacked the devotion and 
energy that accompanied their support for Obama. 
Support for Clinton seemed largely a corollary of 
campaigning against Trump - it was the ‘right thing 
to do’, rather than a passionate act of advocacy.  Los 
Angeles rapper Ty Dolla $ign, probably nailed it by 
saying that while ‘nobody is excited’ about Clinton, 
she has his vote.
Donald Trump, on the other hand, gathered 
a scant group of celebrity supporters, with Clint 
Eastwood, Hulk Hogan and the country singer 
Loretta Lynn being the most renowned. However, 
Trump was extremely successful in mobilising the 
‘don’t let Trump win’ campaign.
A number of musicians refused to allow him 
to play their songs in his campaign (Adele, Neil 
Young, Rolling Stones) or were utterly irritated 
by Trump asking permission to use their music 
(REM’s Michael Stipe). Pink Floyd’s Roger Waters 
held a concert with the ‘Trump is a pig’ sign on 
the stage while Springsteen called him ‘a moron’. 
Particularly interesting is the ambiguous rela-
tionship between hip hop musicians and Trump. 
Once hailed in the rap songs as a symbol of wealth, 
Trump turned into a loathed figure. Next to YD’s 
FDT (F**k Donald Trump), Eminem’s Campaign 
Speech was probably the strongest anti-Trump rap 
song in the campaign: ‘and that’s what you wanted, 
a f**kin’ loose cannon who’s blunt with his hand on 
the button, who doesn’t have to answer to no one – 
great idea!’ 
What then are the key music lessons of the 
2016 election?
First, the 2016 campaign suggests that 
celebrity musicians’ endorsement has irreversibly 
penetrated the political mainstream. The rise of 
social media accelerated this process by upgrading 
musicians from potentially prominent points of 
influence into powerful channels of reach. For 
example, on the day preceding the Election Day a 
version of the Beyoncé’s video I am with her that 
endorsed Clinton had 757 thousand views (and 
7300 shares) on the official Clinton’s Facebook fan 
page but 2.3 million views (and 16 700 shares) on 
the singer’s fan page. The views and shares were 
gathered in only one day and although Clinton and 
Beyoncé posted somewhat different versions of 
the video, the discrepancy is apparent and points 
to a challenging conclusion: through musicians’ 
social media platforms politicians can potentially 
reach an audience they can only dream of reaching 
through conventional political communication 
platforms or traditional media.  
Secondly, no candidate in recent US history 
has been as successful in mobilising the anti-can-
didate campaign as Donald Trump. Musicians 
(including the usual ‘rage against the machine’ 
hip hop crew) massively aligned against Trump 
and consequently, supported Hilary Clinton. 
Therefore, musicians’ support for Clinton was 
rather a movement against Trump’s aggressive, 
insulting and chauvinist populism than the typical 
candidate endorsement. The Manichean rift 
between bearable Clinton and unacceptable Trump 
was the key base of musicians’ mobilisation. Still, 
despite massive recruitment against him, Donald 
Trump won the election. The ‘celebrity cleavage’ 
that is becoming an ever more prominent variable 
in campaign studies was in this election heavily 
biased towards Clinton, but did not reflect the 
actual political cleavages. Moreover, by becoming 
part of ‘the mainstream’, music was defeated by 
enraged populism, clearly the biggest winner of the 
2016 election.  
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The curious case of Jill Stein 
Americans value environmentalism and want 
to see more of it. But Jill Stein, the Green Party 
presidential candidate, drew only 1 percent 
of the popular vote, even in an election where 
many voters disliked the major candidates. Stein 
certainly differentiated herself from the two major 
party candidates. She asserted that electing Clinton 
would be as bad as electing Trump. 
While Stein makes anti-establishment 
statements, her German counterparts have been 
advancing a green agenda for the past 30 years. 
There are two reasons why the U.S. Green Party 
remains so marginal. Structurally, the American 
electoral system is heavily weighted against 
small political parties. But U.S. Greens also harm 
themselves by failing to understand that governing 
requires compromise. 
Both European and North American Green 
Parties evolved from activist movements in the 
1960s that focused on causes including environ-
mentalism, disarmament, nuclear power, nonvi-
olence, reproductive rights and gender equality. 
The German Green Party’s rise owed much to the 
country’s electoral system. Proportional rep-
resentation makes it possible for small parties to 
gain a toehold and build a presence in government 
over time. In contrast, U.S. elections award seats on 
a winner-takes-all basis. Third parties often have 
trouble even getting their candidates’ names onto 
ballots. 
U.S. Greens have won only a handful of 
state-level races, and have never won a congres-
sional seat. Their greatest success came in 2000, 
when Ralph Nader won 2.7 percent of the popular 
vote in the presidential election. Many argued that 
Nader’s only real impact was to throw the election 
to George W. Bush, but Nader and many of his 
supporters strongly disagreed, and the question 
of whether Stein impacted the election’s outcome 
remains controversial today. 
In order to graduate from an opposition party 
to a ruling party, German Greens had to develop a 
capacity for compromise and form coalitions with 
center-left Social Democrats. But coalitions require 
consensus. Interacting with centrist politicians, 
unionists, church representatives and the media 
taught greens to act less like activists and more 
like politicians. In 1998 the Green Party formed 
a so-called red-green coalition with the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) and won a large majority 
in the Bundestag. 
Working through this alliance, former activists 
implemented an environmentally driven tax 
code and brokered a deal with the nuclear energy 
industry to cancel projects for new plants and 
phase out nuclear power by 2022.  
Although the Green Party has not regained 
control of Germany’s federal government since 
2005, its positions have become part of the nation’s 
mainstream political culture. Notably, after the 
2011 nuclear plant meltdown in Fukushima, Japan, 
a center-right German government decided to 
accelerate the phaseout of nuclear power. To reach 
this goal, Angela Merkel’s centrist government 
has implemented a policy bundle known as the 
Energiewende that seeks to transition Germany to 
a nonnuclear, low-carbon energy future. 
Massive governmental support for alternative 
energy sources has encouraged Germans, espe-
cially in rural areas, to invest in solar power, wind 
turbines and biomass plants. These green policies 
did not harm, and may have buoyed, Merkel’s 
status as one of the most popular German chancel-
lors prior to this year’s controversies over immi-
gration. 
 There is no easy way for the U.S. Green Party 
to emulate its German counterparts. Because the 
American political system makes it difficult for 
third parties to participate, Green Party candidates 
do not have opportunities to learn the trade of 
politics. They have remained activists who are true 
to their base instead of developing policy positions 
that would appeal to a broader audience. By doing 
so, they weaken their chances of winning major 
races even in liberal strongholds. 
As a result, green ideas enter American 
political debates only when Democrats and 
Republicans take up these issues. It is telling that 
major U.S. environmental groups started endorsing 
Clinton even before she had clinched the Dem-
ocratic presidential nomination over Bernie 
Sanders, who took more aggressive positions on 
some environmental and energy issues during their 
primary contest. And although Sanders identifies 
as an environmentalist, he sought the Democratic 
Party nomination instead of running as the Green 
Party candidate. 
Running on a third-party ticket in the United 
States remains a flawed strategy to shaping a green 
message aimed at a broad electorate. Instead, 
climate change, dwindling energy resources and 
growing human and economic costs from natural 
disasters will do more to promote ecological 
consciousness and political change in mainstream 
America than the radical rhetoric of the U.S. Green 
Party. 
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In the long shadow of Donald Trump’s victory 
in the November 8th election, Jill Stein’s bid as 
Green Party Presidential candidate is likely to be a 
forgotten footnote to a momentous turning point 
in US history. 
Polling at around two percent before the 
election the Greens had campaigned hard through 
social media and alternative news sources to build 
on the radical, anti-establishment popularity of 
Bernie Sanders, especially amongst young voters. 
They hoped to win five percent of the vote which 
would have unlocked automatic ballot access in 
many states and much needed campaign funding 
worth up to $10 million. However, while over a 
million people voted Green on November 8th, 
an improvement on the last election, this still 
only represented around one percent of the 
popular vote.
Yet that one percent may have been decisive. 
In the key battleground states of Wisconsin and 
Michigan, Stein’s vote total was more than Trump’s 
margin of victory. Of course, this does not mean 
Green voters would have turned up to vote for 
Clinton had Stein not been on the ballot. As Jessica 
McBride notes in a state by state analysis for Heavy.
com the combined third party vote in Florida and 
Pennsylvania was also more than Trump’s margin of 
victory, but Gary Johnson’s appeal was more likely 
with Republicans than Democrats. Second guessing 
US voters’ intentions retrospectively is impossi-
ble, but the perceived threat that Stein might pull 
enough Democrat voters away from Hillary Clinton 
– in the way that Ralph Nader did in the 2000
Bush-Gore contest - never really materialised.
This was not the nail-bitingly close election 
result of 2000 where the Green vote arguably cost 
the Al Gore the Presidency. Instead, pollsters 
watched their predictions of a Clinton win reduced 
to worthless confetti (yet again). Trump picked 
up white working-class votes former Democrat 
strongholds, and benefitted from relatively low 
enthusiasm and Democrat turnout, especially in 
the so-called rustbelt states afflicted by economic 
decline and poverty. 
A poll recently published in The Independent 
claimed that Bernie Sanders would have ‘crushed’ 
Trump by 56-44 had he been the Democrat Pres-
idential candidate. While the poll, commissioned 
by Sanders supporting Democratic Congressman 
Alan Grayson, is almost certainly over-optimistic, 
it is certainly the case that Millennial enthusiasm 
for Bernie’s socialist message – identical in many 
key respects to that of the Greens – did not easily 
translate into support for Hillary Clinton. It also 
did not translate into the kind of mass enthusiasm 
for Green Party policies that might have trans-
formed the Party into a major player.
The next four years could see a progressive 
alliance of Democrats and Greens fighting Trump 
on issues of social and environmental justice 
– enthusing young voters to come out and defeat
Trump in 2020. However, Green antipathy to the
Democratic Party means that this is unlikely even
with a left-leaning environmentalist at the head
of the party. Much depends on the direction of
the Democrats – either behind more progressive
figures such as Elizabeth Warren or back towards
more ‘establishment’ leaders such as Andrew
Cuomo. Either way, the Greens may prove big
enough to dent Democrat fortunes again, but not
big enough to make the break through needed to
challenge America’s two party stranglehold on
politics.
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The procedure for selecting a candidate to run for 
president is a convoluted system. The process of 
candidate selection is organised through either 
caucuses or primaries, states choose either one of 
these systems to decide on their nominee. Essen-
tially, the nominee is slowly narrowed from a list of 
prospective candidates. After an extensive process 
of campaigning, debates and public exposure, the 
candidate will have been selected through a series 
of votes. 
Hilary has become the candidate for the 
Democrats because of her electability over Sanders, 
Sanders being too different, and radical for many. 
She has also been a key member of the American 
governing system for many years, taking roles such 
as senator and secretary of state. On many issues, 
Clinton has shown herself to be the more moderate 
of the two, choosing to take quite a soft line on the 
legal position of marijuana by reducing its status 
as an illegal substance, where Sanders believed in 
letting the states decide whether it should be legal 
or not. Sanders also believed that the death penalty 
should be abolished, where Clinton believed in just 
a reduction in its use. 
Donald Trump has become the candidate 
for the republicans because of his views on the 
failings of the American system in the past, and 
the rhetoric with which he has lead his campaign, 
feeding the fears of immigration, and basically 
being in opposition to the past American system. 
He promises a strong America, one that focuses 
on the strengths of American people. He has said 
on many occasions that he wants to build a wall in 
order to provide more separation between America 
and Mexico. Furthermore, he claims he will be 
able to make Mexico pay for it. Cruz, one-time 
frontrunner, was, among other candidates, fairly 
uncharismatic, being unable to expand his support 
base in the way Trump was. Like with Sanders, 
Cruz was just too far off centre to consider for 
nomination being too much of a staunch conserva-
tive. People also found Cruz to be too boring to be 
nominee, being unable to relate to voters enough to 
garner significant voting support. Other candidates 
surpassed by Trump include Marco Rubio and 
Jeb Bush. Trump proved throughout the contest 
to be particularly skilful in the way he presented 
his image and the emotive way he delivered his 
speeches. His charismatic speaking and public 
image make him anything but boring, which drew 
the attention of the media and the public. 
Unfortunately, neither are particularly at-
tractive candidates, many voters are argued to be 
simplifying the election to being a contest to find 
the lesser of two evils. This dissatisfaction with the 
way the presidential elections are going is reflected 
by the choice of many to opt for a third vote. 
This is mentioned in the Guardian (2016), which 
details the names of the Green Party’s Jill Stein 
and Libertarian’s Gary Johnson. Even as the choice 
polarises many voters declare their choice is driven 
by antipathy or opposition to the alternative than 
strong support for the presidential candidate they 
have chosen. 
Now that we have these two candidates, they 
will enter a more competitive process of trying to 
win over states. Certain states have been his-
torically set in their ways, always voting for the 
same party, so campaigning is not so intense in 
these areas although both candidates appear to 
be creating new battlegrounds despite historical 
patterns. Finally, now that Donald Trump has 
been elected president, he will be fully in office the 
following January. This is called the presidential 
inauguration which is the specific start date for 
the elected president’s term. So by the end of the 
coming January, the most powerful nation in the 
world will have to establish a new leader, Donald 
Trump, in an environment of unstable interna-
tional affairs. Many are feeling disenfranchised 
by the two presidential candidates, because of the 
way that the system currently works, bringing 
into the question whether reform of the electoral 
system should be considered. All in all, the new 
president has been voted as Donald Trump, so we 
now have four years to see the effect that he will have 
on America.
US presidential candidate selection
Policy
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Conventional wisdom is that fringe candidates get 
repudiated, à la 1964 and 1972. The story isn’t so 
simple.
While Hillary Clinton is the consensus of 
most Democrats, from activists on up to the es-
tablishment, Donald Trump was the Republican 
candidate whom many Republicans wanted to 
avoid. From this perspective, Trump’s position 
resembled that of Barry Goldwater in 1964 and 
George McGovern in 1972, two ideologically 
extreme candidates—Goldwater on the right and 
McGovern on the left—who were handicapped 
by strong opposition within their parties, limped 
through their campaigns, and got destroyed 
by over 20 percentage points in the general 
election. To add to the analogy, these candi-
dates’ opponents—Presidents Lyndon Johnson 
and Richard Nixon—were, like Hillary Clinton, 
viewed by many voters as cynical, calculating 
politicians rather than inspiring leaders. Those 
two years, 1964 and 1972, still stand as cautionary 
lessons about the fate of any fringe candidate who 
manages to grab the presidential nomination 
without having secured the backing of his 
party’s establishment.
But Donald Trump defied political gravity. 
How could this be?
The biggest difference between 2016 and 
1964/1972 has nothing to do with the candidates 
or the conventions or ideology or endorsements or 
the fracturing of political parties. It turns out that, 
according to many years of research from political 
scientists, the most important determinants of 
presidential elections in the past half-century 
or more have not been the character or political 
ideology of candidates, or even the strengths 
of their parties, but rather the state of the economy. 
To emphasize the key role of the economy in 
setting the stage for presidential elections is not to 
be an economic determinist. Regression models 
predicting the election outcome from the economy 
have large error terms. But the economics-based 
forecast is a good starting point.
And here’s what was special about 1964 and 
1972: These were two of the three strongest years 
for the economy in the postwar era, with per-cap-
ita income growth in the 4 percent range, and the 
candidates running for re-election—Johnson and 
Nixon—won in landslides, as would be predicted 
(the other strong election year in terms of 
economic growth was 1984, when Ronald Reagan 
reaped the electoral benefit).
But 2016 was not like 1964 or 1972. The 
economy was slowly recovering, no longer 
in recession, but it was not booming as in those 
earlier years. According to the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, per-capita personal income 
grew at an annual rate of about 2.5 percent during 
the past year and 1.2 percent averaged over the 
past four years. These numbers are OK but not 
stunning and did not foretell an electoral landslide, 
in either direction. Going by economic indica-
tors, we were looking at a close election, perhaps 
slightly favouring the incumbent party’s candidate, 
depending on how strongly one weights the most 
recent economic performance.
One could jiggle this further by adjusting 
for presidential popularity (a slight plus for the 
Democrats), incumbent not running for re-elec-
tion (a slight plus for the Republicans), and party 
balancing (a slight plus for the Democrats), but I 
buy the general point of political scientist Doug 
Hibbs and others, not that the Democrats were 
guaranteed to win but that the fundamentals 
predicted a close election with a slight edge to 
the Democrats and enough uncertainty to make 
the campaign interesting. So, yes the campaign 
mattered but given what we know about elections 
it’s no surprise the election was close.
In the event, Clinton won the popular vote, 
Trump won the electoral vote, and there were 
some changes in vote coalitions (most notably, 
college-educated women moving to Clinton and 
non-college-educated men moving to Trump) and 
a drop in turnout of key Democratic groups, and 
that made all the difference. All from a baseline of 
a close election, as predicted based on economic 
conditions and the stability induced by political 
polarization.
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Picking up the pieces: the 2016 US Presidential 
Election and immigration
Like many, I watched the US presidential election 
unfold with a sense of disbelief. In an election that 
most pundits had predicted would be a victory for 
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, state after 
state went to Republican candidate Donald Trump. 
By the next morning, a new political geography 
was apparent: large blue dots for major US cities 
and smaller red dots throughout the rest of the 
country. What will Trump’s America hold for im-
migration, beyond promises of a wall between the 
US and Mexico and mass deportations?
An equally dreary picture. First, the US is 
likely to see the return of state and local anti-im-
migrant legislation. Beginning around 2006, 
many states and local communities, especially in 
the South, began passing laws designed to make 
life for undocumented immigrants unbearable.
The 2012 presidential election and recognition of 
the ‘Hispanic vote’ largely stopped this legislative 
trend, but Trump’s election will reinvigorate local 
efforts to make undocumented immigrants – and, 
by extension, their US-born children – unwelcome 
in local communities. The fact that Jeff Sessions, a 
Republican Senator from Alabama, will play a key 
role in Trump’s administration only strengthens 
this possibility. 
Second, the US is likely to (continue to) see 
much more vitriolic public discourse around im-
migration. Again, this will be a change from trends 
in recent years. After 2012, many Republicans 
who had been ‘tough’ on immigration softened 
their tones. State-level anti-immigrant laws were 
dismantled, and executive orders eased the fears 
of undocumented immigrants who were brought 
to the US as young children or who had US-born 
children. Trump’s entry into the election in July 
2015 bucked that trend with his declaration that 
Mexico sent rapists, drug-runners, and criminals 
to the US and that a ‘beautiful’ wall between 
Mexico and the US (and paid for by Mexico) was 
a necessary solution to the ‘problem of immigra-
tion. His subsequent campaign only intensified 
xenophobic claims about immigrants, the crime 
they brought with them, and the need to deport 
‘bad hombres’ and end birthright citizenship. For 
Trump, making America great again meant taking 
it back to the 1950s era of mass deportations and 
less ethnic and racial diversity. Immigration, for 
him, was a hurdle to being great. 
Third, we are likely to see more misinforma-
tion about immigration. Trump’s campaign not 
only sanctioned racist statements about immi-
grants but also legitimated specious claims about 
immigration itself. Trump, of course, is not the 
first politician to make up claims, but he took this 
practice to a new level. He repeatedly claimed 
that immigrants commit crimes at greater rates 
than ‘Americans’, an argument that has been 
repeatedly refuted by a large body of research.1 
Trump, however, ignored that empirical reality 
and highlighted the actions of a few immigrants 
to damn them all. Despite no grounding in reality, 
this linking of immigrants to crime played a 
central role in Trump’s campaign.
Trump also repeatedly claimed that undocu-
mented immigrants “pour” across the US-Mexico 
border. Again, there is no empirical basis to 
this claim. The flow of undocumented Mexican 
immigrants has been decreasing since 2007, and 
by 2013, more Americans were moving to Mexico 
than Mexicans moving to the US Trump’s language 
about immigrants pouring into the US tapped 
long-standing xenophobic discourses about a 
“flood” of immigrants overwhelming the country. 
By ignoring empirical trends and tapping into such 
stereotypes, Trump created his own truths, which 
then took on a life of their own.
Perhaps most damningly for those of us inter-
ested in progressive approaches to immigration, 
Trump transformed what immigration means and 
is understood to cause, allowing it to proxy for a 
range of other forces – like neoliberal globaliza-
tion – shaping people’s lives, especially the lives of 
white, working-class households. Trump posi-
tioned immigrants as causing the losses that large 
swaths of the US have experienced and, perhaps 
most frighteningly, as fixing those feelings of mar-
ginalization by their absence – making America 
great again by removing immigrants from it.
Where do we go from here? A key part of 
picking up the pieces from this election is figuring 
out how to change public discourse around immi-
gration. Despite what Trump says, immigration is 
not going anywhere, no matter what kind of walls 
you build. It is built into local, national, and global 
economies and into the American social fabric. 
The question before us is how to find productive 
ways to talk about and act on the complexity of 
immigration and its centrality to American life. I 
have built my career around studying the politics 
of immigration. At least in the short term, the tone 
of my research will be much darker.
1 For a summary, see Sampson, Robert J. 2008. 
“Rethinking Crime and Immigration.” Contexts 7.1: 
28-33.
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A bilingual campaign: clinton’s latino political 
communication
Throughout the 2016 United States campaigns, 
candidates, politicians, journalists and laypersons 
discussed issues about national identity, class, 
gender, and race. Among these matters, there was 
an intense conversation about Latinos as a growing 
minority group that is gaining political, economic, 
social and cultural power in the United States. In 
this electoral cycle, 27.3 millions of Latinos were 
eligible to vote, and according to the exit polls, 
Latinos cast 11% of the total votes. At the end of 
the election, Hillary Clinton received 62% of the 
Latino vote and Donald Trump 29%.
The Latino issue was part of the national 
political agenda before the presidential campaigns 
started. Scholars, journalists, and commenta-
tors characterized the Hispanic/Latino voters as 
a ‘sleeping giant,’ and they tried to predict the 
power of this group to shape the United States 
electoral map. However, the issue became more 
relevant because Trump spent a significant part 
of his campaign attacking and criticizing Latinos. 
In June of 2015, when he announced his pres-
idential candidacy, Trump referred to Latinos 
and Mexicans in particular as “criminals and 
rapists” and expressed that he had the intention of 
building a wall on the Southern border. In contrast, 
Clinton developed a campaign that advocated 
for defending minorities. She reacted to many of 
Trump’s attacks against Latinos but also built an 
enormous political communication machine to 
outreach these communities across America.
The Clinton campaign created national and 
local teams for Latino outreach. These teams 
deployed a bilingual campaign in English and 
Spanish to inform Latinos about Clinton’s policy 
proposals, campaign activities, media appearances, 
and reactions to political junctures. By and large, 
the Latino outreach team created a communicative 
structure to spread the political messages through 
interpersonal, group, mass, and digital communi-
cation. Some of these political messages were part 
of the general campaign, and others were crafted 
specifically for Latinos (i.e., immigration reform, 
education, and employment).
Four central mechanisms informed Clinton’s 
Latino political communication machinery. 
First, this campaign created a large ground 
game structure through all the country. Clinton 
had dozens of offices that were in charge of two 
communication processes: phone-banking and 
canvassing. Clinton’s staff recruited volunteers who 
made millions of phone calls and had bilingual 
face-to-face conversations with potential voters. 
This strategy had the goal of persuading citizens 
to register to vote, to explain the basic information 
about the elections (i.e., voting day and polling 
locations), and to convince undecided voters to 
support Clinton.
Second, during the campaigns Clinton had 
rallies in different towns and cities across the 
country. In these events, the candidate commu-
nicated her policy proposals, her opinions about 
the political campaign, and attacked the plans 
and ideas of the Republican candidate. Clinton 
rallied several times in states with a strong Latino 
presence such as Florida, Nevada, and Arizona. 
Moreover, Clinton used her running mate, Tim 
Kaine, to outreach Latinos during the rallies. Tim 
Kaine knows how to speak Spanish and he used 
this language to deliver public speeches to Latino 
audiences—for example, in Arizona, he gave the 
first Spanish language speech in an American election.
Third, the campaign had a strong presence on 
mass media—especially on television. Throughout 
the Primaries and the General Election, Clinton’s 
campaign produced and broadcasted radio and 
TV ads that stressed the importance of the Latino 
voters, and that narrated the stories of Latino 
children, students, millennials, and soldiers in the 
United States. Also, Clinton’s campaign relied on 
Telemundo and Univision, two Spanish-speaking 
national television networks. Clinton and Kaine 
were interviewed by journalists of these networks 
and appeared on entertainment shows such as 
Buenos Días América and El Gordo y la Flaca. 
Fourth, the campaign used digital media 
for spreading political messages to the youngest 
segments of the Latino population. Clinton had 
English and Spanish versions of her web page and 
Twitter accounts in both languages. The campaign 
used emails and newsletters for fundraising and 
spreading information about local rallies and 
events. Additionally, the campaign used text 
messages to inform, organize, and protect the vote 
of Latinos. Finally, digital media platforms were 
useful communication channels to replicate and 
broadcast the messages and interactions produced 
in the other parts of the political communication 
machinery (e.g., TV and radio ads, interviews, 
training kits for phone bankers and canvassers, etc.).
The aforementioned paragraphs contain a 
description of how Hillary Clinton addressed 
the Latino population. However, this academic 
endeavor needs to go further. As The Atlantic 
political reporter, Molly Ball suggested, the 2016 
Untied States campaigns were not an electoral cycle 
about policy, but about identity and culture. In this 
sense, the 2016 Unites States election analysis asks 
to go beyond a descriptive phase and dig into a 
cultural understanding of political campaigns. 
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One of the boldest proposals put forward in the 
2016 US presidential electoral campaign was 
Trump’s plan to erect a wall on the US-Mexico 
border to keep out illegal immigrants. Although at 
first sight nonsensical, Trump repeatedly claimed 
he indeed wants to build the wall, insisting the 
Mexican government would pay for the construc-
tion of this border protection device.
The proposal, and the way it has been received 
by the Trump supporters, poses a challenge for 
professional observers of electoral campaigns. The 
broadsheet media quickly pointed out the proposal 
was not feasible. Not only would it be cost prohibi-
tive, the US federal government does not even own 
the land where the wall would be built. Further-
more no reasonable person actually imagines the 
Mexican government would be inclined to pay. 
During his visit to Mexico, then candidate Trump 
carefully avoided talking about the wall and its 
financing, allowing commentators to assume 
these problems effectively killed the entire idea. 
However, surprise, surprise: candidate Trump 
went on to repeat the proposal, and crowds at his 
rallies cheered. Commentators already flabber-
gasted by the proposal were even more surprised 
that their serious criticisms had no tangible 
impact, as they were simply ignored by a vast 
majority of the Trump supporters. In fact exit polls 
suggest concerns about immigration had been an 
important mobilizing factor for Trump voters, and 
‘the wall’ had been very successful in symbolizing 
fears while offering a solution.
Research offers clues for why. Firstly, most 
US voters are not well informed about politics. So 
we cannot assume median Trump voters read or 
understood criticisms. Second, partisans tend to 
disregard information that runs counter to their 
own beliefs, so would be inclined to question the 
reliability of this information. 
More importantly we turn to understanding 
populism, which rejects this kind of reality check. 
Populist proposals typically appeal to emotional 
sentiments, rather than standard institutional 
mechanisms. Populism offers the opportunity 
to escape the incremental muddling through so 
typical of institutional politics - by definition 
it feeds on radical proposals and questions of 
feasibility runs against the basic emotional appeal 
of populist rhetoric. ‘The wall’ symbolizes the 
longing for a closed society, as Popper would label 
it. Has there ever been a more powerful symbol for 
closure than a wall?
The wall is not meant as a realistic proposal, 
and may not be judged that way by all Trump 
supporters. The wall is a utopian metaphor for 
an ideal society. For those concerned about 
crime, drugs, unemployment, the rise of Spanish 
language rights, and increasing diversity, the wall 
offers a perfect metaphor. It keeps dangers out of 
the perfectly tranquil small town American life. 
The wall offers a return to a way of life that has 
disappeared, because of increasing globalization, 
economic flows and demographic change. The wall 
symbolizes the promise of happiness in a closed 
society under threat. One could hardly think of a 
better metaphor for a closed society than simply 
building a wall around that secluded piece of land, 
where one can continue to live free from globali-
zation, diversity and other causes of fear. Within 
rural, rather homogeneous communities, Trump 
succeeded in mobilizing most voters.
Any ideal society can be labelled a utopia. 
A utopia is the reification of a concept that is 
considered to be ideal. Intellectuals generally like 
the ‘I have a dream’ rhetoric about white and black 
children going hand and hand together to school. 
But there are alternative dreams. 
The wall signifies the exact opposite utopian 
project. If Trump had more rhetorical talent, 
he might defend his proposal with exactly the 
opposite words of that famous speech of more than 
half a century ago. 
“I have a dream that one day, up in New York 
State, with its governor having his lips dripping 
with the words of multiculturalism and minority 
rights – one day right there in New York, little 
white boys and girls will be left alone, with other 
white boys and white girls as only sisters and 
brothers. I have a dream that one day every valley 
will be closed, and that on every hill and mountain 
there will be a wall, and that we can just live the life 
we have lost”.
Some will be appalled at reading this, but we 
should realize that for some the appeal of a homo-
geneous society is just as strong as the appeal of a 
society without prejudice is for others. 
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After the election: Trump’s wall
Last week citizens of the United States elected as 
President someone who is openly racist, misog-
ynist, and xenophobic. We elected someone who 
chose a vice presidential running mate who as 
governor of Indiana sought to enact homophobic 
and openly discriminatory state policies. Addi-
tionally, our incoming President has claimed he 
will retreat from a host of international agreements 
and relationships, from NAFTA and NATO to 
climate mitigatwion treaties. He does not believe in 
science, at least when it offers inconvenient truths.
Fear, disbelief, and horror are rippling through 
part of the American public (here I include citizens 
as well as legal and unauthorized residents), while 
another part of this public is jubilant and feeling 
entitled to express more openly prejudice and 
hate. The Southern Poverty Law Center received 
400 incidents of hateful harassment between 
November 9th and November 14th—including 136 
anti-immigrant, 89 anti-black, 43 anti-LGBTQ and 
26 anti-woman incidents. As this wave of white na-
tionalism and hate ripple across the country, many 
wonder what the incoming President will actually 
do on a range of fronts. Policy details do not fit 
into 140-character limits.
My commentary here focuses on one specific 
policy Donald Trump has repeated over and over: 
his promise to build a wall between Mexico and 
the United States, which he couples with massive 
deportation of undocumented residents. A Pew 
Research survey shows his supporters are united 
by, perhaps more than any other issue, anti-immi-
grant sentiment. While this extends to Muslim im-
migrants, a key group in the line of fire are undocu-
mented Mexican and Latin American immigrants.
The intuitive appeal of a wall on the southern 
border stems in part from the idea that the ‘cause’ 
of this labor migration lies outside of the United 
States. Build it high enough and the flow will stop. 
The appeal of the wall also lies in racist language 
that frames all Latino immigrants as invading 
“criminals” who represent a dire threat to the nation. 
The wall as a solution presumes the origins 
of cross-border labor flows lie outside the United 
States rather than within it, ignoring the funda-
mental dynamics of low-wage labor markets in 
the United States, which have recruited low-wage 
workers to cross the border. My research, like that 
of others, sheds light on the day-to-day incentives 
employers have for recruiting undocumented 
workers. The cumulative effect of these recruitment 
practices, which occur in nearly every geograph-
ic region of the country, is to invite large-scale 
migration across the US-Mexico border. From this 
perspective, the origins of the current situation, in 
which 6.4 percent of our workforce lacks doc-
umentation, lie north of the border as much as 
south of it.
The economic power of this process is 
resistant to border control and physical barriers 
installed over the last two decades – precursors to 
the fantasy of an impenetrable wall. It is telling that 
the steady growth of the undocumented workforce 
between the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s 
happened despite a nearly constant growth of 
spending on border patrol, new barriers and sur-
veillance. Only in the wake of the 2008 economic 
crash, which dramatically slowed recruitment 
processes, did the unauthorized Mexican 
workforce in the United State start to decline.
While there is a clear economic logic to the 
presence of millions of undocumented workers in 
the United States, a logic that I believe we mis-
understand at our peril, the current system does 
not provide justice nor a decent life for low-wage 
immigrant or non-immigrant workers. The 
demand for the undocumented is rooted squarely 
in their undocumented status. Living in fear of 
deportation on a daily basis inspire many to tie 
themselves closely to their employer—becoming 
compliant workaholics who become the ‘ideal 
worker’ from the employer’s perspective.
It seems likely that the dream one week ago of 
comprehensive immigration reform has been lost 
to the nightmare of a deportation nation surround-
ed by a very expensive even if easily breached wall. 
Comprehensive immigration reform held out the 
potential for undocumented workers to legalize, a 
place from which they could demand better wages 
and working conditions. Their improved situation 
would actually have helped level the playing field 
for non-immigrant workers, perhaps easing some 
of the economic anxieties that contributed to the 
rise of Trump.
This week the future looks bleak—for 
economic growth, for social peace and justice. 
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Many things seem obvious in retrospect, including 
the US presidential election of Donald Trump, who 
campaigned on the same populist energy driving 
political movements in the UK. and elsewhere. 
One thing that becomes more clear in light of 
post-election surveys is the role of terrorism as 
an issue, and how it can be exploited to generate 
and direct fear among citizens. Trump was able 
to effectively incorporate this fear into his “Make 
America Great” masterframe. In this respect, he 
built on a rhetorical foundation established 15 
years earlier.
After September 11, 2001, the administration 
of George Bush announced its Global War on 
Terrorism, a framing that has shown remarkable 
resilience since then in spite of its shortcomings as 
a way to organize foreign policy responses (How 
does one fight against a tactic?). Since that time the 
frame has become deeply embedded in political 
discourse. An organization called the ‘Global War 
on Terror Memorial Foundation’ has even recently 
advocated building a suitable monument in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Scruggs, 2016). 
Although President Obama avoided the frame 
himself, Trump capitalized on it (even recruiting 
‘Mayor of 9/11’ Rudy Giuliani as one of his closest 
advisers). Surveys showed that among voters 
listing ‘terrorism’ as an important issue, Trump 
was the significantly preferred candidate. Why was 
he deemed more effective than Hillary Clinton, in 
spite of much of the foreign policy establishment 
supporting her?
Trump more effectively appealed to fear, 
linking fear of terrorism to fear of the Other, 
specifically Muslims. His Republican conven-
tion acceptance address, already noted by other 
observers, underscored the dark tone of his appeal. 
In this respect, his anti-terrorism strategy (“We 
will destroy ISIS.”) lined up with his nationalist 
protectionism and related xenophobia. A proposed 
ban on Muslims entering the US was a natural 
extension of those policies and served to further 
diagnose the problem in the minds of the voters. 
My interviews several years ago with 
American journalists showed they had a hard time 
defining the War on Terror frame when Bush was 
invoking it to justify Afghanistan and later Iraq. 
They said, “We all know what it means.” Moving 
into that ambiguous space Trump was able to 
equate it with ‘Radical Islam’, providing reason 
enough for his supporters to be wary of Muslims. 
In linking terrorism with a major world religion 
Obama had declared that phrase to be an unhelpful 
analysis, and one that even helped confirm the ex-
tremists’ ideology. He was attacked accordingly by 
Trump and Giuliani, who were able to promote a 
more simple diagnosis—one that regrettably risked 
playing into the hands of extremist groups. 
Of course, a simplistic solution to a complex 
problem is always seductive. In the face of 
unvarnished, shoot-from-the-hip Republican 
rhetoric, the multi-factor and contextualized 
explanation for extremism risks sounding not 
‘authentic’, a deadly sin in current political com-
munication, failing to fit the rapid-fire social media 
and 24/7 news environment. Thus, the institutional 
press had a difficult time engaging with a more 
complex but realistic approach to the problem 
of terrorism. 
I was concerned that perhaps a late-campaign 
terrorist attack—either in the US or abroad--would 
benefit Trump’s messaging and distort the election, 
but, as it turned out, the fear had been there all 
along. For Americans, 9/11 breached their ex-
pectations that the government would keep them 
safe, and that breach has not been fully resolved. 
Ultimately, however, security is not a sustainable 
national value, so eventually — as with promises to 
bring back the coal mines, steel mills, and a world 
gone by — voters will soon see that Trump will not 
be able to deliver.
US journalism has been faulted for decades for 
its preoccupation with campaign tactics and lack of 
policy coverage, but in this election more thought-
ful analysis was desperately needed to counteract 
Trump’s xenophobic extension of Bush’s War on 
Terror. We will need it even more during the next 
four years.
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A contentious point in President Obama’s legacy, 
as Kindervater highlights, is the dramatically 
increased drone activity under his leadership. 
Interest in drones increased post 9/11 because of 
the threat and hysteria surrounding terrorism. 
The topic of drones has been rarely discussed in 
the 2016 presidential election campaign. Trump 
has not referred to drones specifically, but has 
commented on ISIS who has often been the targets 
of drone strikes: “I would bomb the Hell out of 
them.” More concerning is when Trump suggested 
killing the families of ISIS terrorists. Drones have 
already killed anywhere from 46 to 116 civilians 
according to the Obama administration. However, 
the Bureau of Investigative Journalism refute these 
numbers and state that they are only a fraction of 
the 380 to 801 civilian casualties as the result of 
drones. One important aspect of drones has been 
the safety of civilian lives. As Kindervater notes, 
both Obama and Hillary Clinton have promoted 
their effectiveness at not only killing terrorist 
leaders, but also providing protection to civilians 
through their targeted use.
While the usage of drones has increased under 
the Obama administration, the concept of drones 
has been under consideration even as far back as 
the World War II. Other countries in the past have 
experimented with this concept such as the UK 
creating the Larynx and Ram during World War 
II. There was already strong support for building 
drones during the 2012 US Presidential campaign. 
Barack Obama, Mitt Romney and the majority of 
the public supported targeted drone strikes at 
the time. 
The public perceptions and history can give 
insight into the future of drone strikes. The public 
has yet to turn against drones in a significant way. 
A poll by the Pew research centre and published 
in the Huffington Post last year indicated that the 
majority of Americans still supported drone strikes.
From Trump’s aggressive rhetoric towards 
ISIS, it can be expected that he will fully utilise 
drone strikes. While targeted drone strikes are 
meant to reduce civilian casualties, Trump doesn’t 
appear to have much concern for the lives of 
civilians. In his own words “The other thing with 
the terrorists is you have to take out their families.” 
It is impossible to say at this stage whether Trump 
will increase or even decrease the use of drones, 
although they have proven to be an effective 
method according to the Obama administration. 
What is clear is that if Trump does use them, he is 
likely to adopt a more aggressive approach, free of 
fears for civilian safety. This is suggested by his dis-
missive attitude towards the current US generals. 
Mark Thompson quotes him as suggesting that 
he would replace them with generals more in line 
with his way of thinking. 
Trump can act on his own on some levels 
when it comes to war without direct interference 
from Congress. As Freeman notes, “The executive 
has long asserted that the President has independ-
ent authority to conduct at least some military 
operations in the absence of an authorizing act 
of Congress.” More concerning is a ‘history of ac-
quiescence’ within the Congress when it comes to 
past President’s more questionable acts of war. This 
is not to say that Congress will sit quietly while 
Trump carries out his plans, but it is an area of 
concern. Trump isn’t under any pressure to restrict 
drone strikes in the current climate, but this may 
change if he were to carry out what would amount 
to war crimes using them. It is unclear what Trump 
will do militarily over the next four years, but if he 
does continue the Obama policy of drone strikes, 
it seems unlikely he will use targeting functionality 
to its fullest to reduce civilian casualties and this 
may lead to growing public opposition to their use. 
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Loose cannons: or the silent debate on drones
In a news story indicative of the anxieties fueling 
a bizarre, vitriolic, and seemingly interminable 
campaign season, Fortune magazine reported 
that prior to the third and final debate between 
Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, 
and his Democratic rival, Hillary Clinton, the Las 
Vegas Police Department hired a private security 
firm to set up a drone detection system in the skies 
above the debate venue. While fear of rogue drone 
operators wreaking havoc at this high-profile event 
compelled local law enforcement to take dramatic 
security measures, questions surrounding the legal, 
strategic, and ethical implications of the US drone 
program were conspicuously absent from the 
evening’s debate. 
Four years earlier, when asked about his views 
on the targeted killing program during their final 
debate, GOP hopeful Mitt Romney unequivo-
cally endorsed President Obama’s drone strategy. 
Republican and Democratic consensus effectively 
made drones a non-issue in the 2012 presidential 
race: a sharp contrast to international condem-
nation of America’s drone wars. Since that time, 
journalists rarely questioned presidential candi-
dates about drones: Obama’s ‘weapon of choice  in 
the decades-long war on terror. What was once an 
open, albeit controversial secret has become 
a matter of routine for both the political estab-
lishment and the US press corps. Obama’s lasting 
foreign policy legacy is neither the historic multi-
lateral nuclear deal with Iran, nor the diplomatic 
overtures to Cuba, but rather the normalization of 
drone warfare. 
As a result, during the 2016 campaign political 
debate focused instead on the wisdom of entrust-
ing Donald Trump – the personification of a loose 
cannon – with America’s nuclear arsenal. Trump’s 
bellicose rhetoric and his penchant for unnerving 
statements about nuclear weapons demanded such 
coverage. Not since Richard Nixon’s ‘madman 
strategy’ has a presidential candidate evoked 
fears of an unstable and irrational leader with his 
(or her) finger on the button. As Hillary Clinton 
observed, it would be foolish to underestimate 
Donald Trump’s ‘hair-trigger’ temperament in this 
regard. Nevertheless, throughout the campaign, 
the focus on Trump’s foreign policy bluster over-
shadowed Clinton’s well-documented appetite for 
regime change and anti-Russian hysteria. Small 
wonder, then, that in the final days of the 2016 
election Trump doubled down on the nuclear 
nightmare scenario, telling reporters that Clinton’s 
sabre rattling against Russia could lead to World 
War III. 
By design, fear-based campaigns of this sort 
generate more heat than light. Still, questions over 
the next president’s willingness to use nuclear 
weapons remain a salient issue. So too does the 
prospect of President-elect Trump commanding 
the drone program – what is essentially a hi-tech 
hit squad. And yet, despite President Obama’s 
Executive Order calling for greater transparency 
and improved safeguards against civilian causalities 
in America’s drone wars, neither the candidates nor 
the press corps saw fit to address targeted killing in 
any substantive fashion. Instead, rumor, innuendo 
and speculation constituted an otherwise silent 
debate over the future of the US drone program.
Throughout the campaign Trump was un-
characteristically reticent regarding weaponized 
drones. Reading between the lines of some of 
his most egregious statements about fighting the 
Islamic State, Trump’s declaration that he would 
“bomb the hell out of them” suggests a prominent 
role for drone aircraft. More ominously, Trump’s 
assertions that he would target terrorists and their 
families, presumably using drones, was met with 
consternation across the political spectrum. All 
told, however, Trump rarely shared his thoughts 
on the drone program. Journalists obliged and 
likewise avoided the subject.
Similarly, Clinton scarcely mentioned the 
drone program. Unlike Trump however, Clinton’s 
service as Secretary of State suggests implicit 
approval of the expansion of the targeted killing 
program under President Obama. And given her 
hawkish views on foreign policy, Clinton likely 
foresees an even greater role for drones in US 
military and paramilitary operations. Curiously, 
drones did figure in one of the more sensational 
accusations leveled at Mrs. Clinton throughout 
the entire, sordid campaign. In late October, True 
Pundit, a conservative website, reported that when 
pressed to do something about WikiLeaks founder 
Julian Assange in the wake of the anti-secrecy 
group’s release of a cache of State Department com-
muniqués (what came to be known as Cablegate), 
Secretary Clinton asked, “Can’t we just drone this 
guy?” The unsubstantiated story led to a series of 
non-denial denials from the Clinton camp, effec-
tively ending any further discussion of the targeted 
killing program.
In March 2016, columnist Trevor Timm 
argued the US press corps was letting presidential 
candidates off the hook on five vital foreign policy 
questions. Citing the worldwide proliferation of 
drones, Timm suggested robotic warfare consti-
tutes a critical challenge to international security, 
and as such demands robust debate. That debate 
never materialized. Nonetheless, come January 
20, 2017, Donald Trump, one of the most feared 
and reviled candidates in the history of American 
politics, will take the reins of the US drone 
program.
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At the start of the 2016 election campaign, 
Democrat Hillary Clinton did something that no 
major presidential candidate had done since 2000: 
she brought the issue of gun violence into the 
contest. Touting her support for stronger gun laws, 
she used it to criticize her chief opponent, Vermont 
Democratic Socialist Senator Bernie Sanders. This 
issue proved useful for Clinton partly because it 
was one where she could criticize her ultra-liberal 
opponent from the left, given Sanders’ record of 
support against stronger gun laws – an anomaly 
explained by the fact that Sanders’ home state is 
strongly pro-gun.
In the fall race, Clinton hammered her Re-
publican opponent Donald Trump on the issue, 
lending her support for universal gun purchase 
background checks, reimposition of the assault 
weapons ban, and better mental health screening 
to filter out those who should not have access to 
guns – all measures supported by most Americans. 
Trump has returned fire, extolling his embrace 
of gun rights – a reversal of opinion for him, as 
Trump had previously supported gun regulations. 
During the campaign, Trump, endorsed by the 
National Rifle Association, opposed the assault 
weapons ban and supported civilian gun carrying 
as a way of improving personal self-defence and 
thwarting crime.
 But this leaves a larger question: why have 
presidential candidates been silent on guns for the 
last 16 years, and what changed?
 Flash back to the 2000 elections. Democratic 
presidential candidate Al Gore actively touted 
support for new gun measures, but in losing the 
race, Democrats concluded (wrongly, later research 
revealed) that the issue hurt them. They mostly 
proceeded to avoid the issue and to appeal more 
aggressively to moderates and even conserva-
tives—so-called ‘Blue Dog’ Democrats—which 
all but eliminated from the national debate any 
systematic advocacy for tougher gun laws. In turn, 
the gun-friendly presidency of George W. Bush 
quietly pressed for and won most of the NRA’s 
pro-gun wish list. 
 For the next three presidential elections, little 
was heard on guns. Even liberal president Barack 
Obama avoided the subject despite a past record 
of support for tougher gun laws. In fact, one gun 
safety organization gave him a failing grade in his 
first term for his failure to advance the issue, and 
for signing in to law two minor measures making 
gun carrying easier in national parks and on trains.
 But then three key events changed everything.
 First, the December 2012 senseless mass 
shooting of 26 school children and staff at Sandy 
Hook elementary school in Connecticut shocked 
the nation in a way not felt since the 1990s. Second, 
that event motivated Pres. Obama, fresh off his 
re-election, to do an about face. He appointed a 
commission to develop legislative and other policy 
recommendations, and took them to Congress 
in the Spring of 2013. While Congress ultimate-
ly failed to act, Obama wouldn’t let the issue go. 
Every time a new mass shooting occurred, Obama 
used his bully pulpit to abhor the violence, deplore 
the lack of even elementary new gun measures like 
universal background checks for all gun purchases, 
and chastise Congress for its failure to act. These 
repetitive rhetorical moments didn’t change 
policy, but did help push the issue back into the 
national debate.
 Third, the Sandy Hook shooting spurred 
the formation and growth of new gun safety 
groups bent on breaking the NRA’s stranglehold 
on gun policy. Former New York City Mayor 
Michel Bloomberg’s group, Mayors Against Illegal 
Guns, was reorganized when it combined with a 
recently formed grassroots gun safety group to 
form Everytown for Gun Safety. Bloomberg and 
allies doubled down on their efforts, pouring more 
money and resources into selected state races and 
referenda, among other actions. Another new 
Sandy Hook-inspired group, Americans for Re-
sponsible Solutions, was formed by former Arizona 
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, who survived 
being shot in the head by a deranged man in 2011, 
and her husband, former astronaut Mark Kelly. 
They, too, garnered significant national attention 
and considerable resources to press for improved 
gun safety. (Both are also gun owners.)
 These new groups did something never before 
seen: they outspent the NRA. The watershed 
moment came when they engineered the passage 
of a referendum in Washington State in 2014 to 
provide for universal background checks for all 
gun purchases, and defeated a competing measure 
that would have blocked such checks. In the 
2016 election cycle, four states voted on new gun 
measures, and the issue played a key role in state 
elections including Missouri, New Hampshire, 
and Pennsylvania.
 The upsurge in gun politics suggests that, if 
these new gun safety groups stay in the gun policy 
fight, the issue won’t go away. There may even 
come a day when the country’s clear preference 
for stronger gun laws may actually come to be 
reflected in policy. 
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President Trump and limate hange
As  scientists become more gloomy about keeping 
global warming below the allegedly ‘safe’ limit of 2 
°C, the issue is disappearing from the US presi-
dential debates. There was a brief mention in the 
second Trump/Clinton debate, with climate change 
treated as an ‘afterthought’.
Trump has previously (in 2012) suggested 
climate change “was created by and for the 
Chinese”. His original ‘first 100’ days plan for 
climate and energy got pulled from his website, 
archived at ‘wayback machine’. It makes for 
depressing reading, with promises to “cancel the 
Paris Climate Agreement and stop all payments of 
U.S. tax dollars to U.N. global warming programs” 
accompanied by a bonfire of domestic regulations. 
How much of that will happen remains to be 
seen.
Early days
Awareness of the threat of climate change goes 
back decades, well before its arrival on public 
policy agendas in 1988. While John F. Kennedy 
was aware of environmental problems generally 
(he’d read Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring), it was 
his successor Lyndon Johnson who made the 
first presidential statement about climate change, 
written for him by pioneering climate scientist 
Roger Revelle. Following a warning on the topic 
from Democratic senator Daniel Moynihan in 
September 1969, Nixon created the US Envi-
ronmental Protection Authority in an age when 
conservatism meant conserving things, but climate 
change was still very niche. Ronald Reagan’s 
hostility to all matters environmental is infamous, 
with attempts to abolish both the Department of 
Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency, 
but with the credibility of atmospheric scientists 
high thanks to their discovery of the ozone hole, 
moves towards a climate agreement could not be 
completely resisted.
1988 and beyond
A combination of growing scientific alarm about 
the growth of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
and a long hot summer in 1988 made climate 
change an election issue. On the campaign trail, 
then-Vice President George H. W. Bush announced 
in his presidential campaign:
“Those who think we’re powerless to do 
anything about the “greenhouse effect” are for-
getting about the “White House effect”… I will 
convene a global conference on the environment 
at the White House… We will talk about global 
warming… And we will act”
He didn’t act, of course, successfully insisting 
targets and timetables for emissions reductions be 
removed from the proposed climate treaty to be 
agreed at the Rio Earth Summit, before he would 
agree to attend. 
It was 2000 before presidential candidates 
debated the issue. George W. Bush (2000-09) said:
“I think it’s an issue that we need to take very 
seriously. But I don’t think we know the solution to 
global warming yet. And I don’t think we’ve got all 
the facts before we make decisions”. 
The peak year for climate concern was 2008, 
with climate rating a mention in all three presiden-
tial debates”. Obama framed climate change as an 
energy independence issue, arguing that: “we’ve 
got to walk the walk and not just talk the talk 
when it comes to energy independence”. Despite a 
petition with 160,000 signatures, the debate mod-
erators for the 2012 debate did not put the issue 
on the agenda, with the Republican nominee, Mitt 
Romney, accused of recanting early climate change 
positions.
Why the silence?
There are two reasons. One is simply down to 
the politicisation around the issue. As shown 
above, as recently as 2008 Republicans admitted 
climate change was happening. In 2012 only one 
contender, Jon Huntsman, was willing to do so, 
he soon dropped out, with his views dramatical-
ly unpopular among Republican voters. What 
happened? In two words: Tea Party. The emergence 
of the hyper-conservative Tea Party Republican 
faction was the culmination of a longer-term trend 
of “anti-reflexivity”.
The second reason is more gloomy, because 
it is more intractable. Those who have denied 
climate change for so very long will find it very 
costly – both politically and psychologically – to 
reverse their position and admit that they have 
been wrong. Climate change denial has become a 
cultural position.
What next?
In the day since Trump won, there has been a 
flurry of commentary. Joe Romm asks’ Will Trump 
go down in history as the man who pulled the plug 
on a liveable climate?’
“The shocking election of Donald Trump on 
Tuesday night is a turning point in the history of 
climate action, and therefore the history of homo 
sapiens. That’s because whatever warming, sea level 
rise, ocean acidification, and Dust-Bowlification 
we commit to is irreversible on a timescale of a 
thousand years.”
For David Roberts “Trump’s election marks 
the end of any serious hope of limiting climate 
change to 2 degrees”, with “widespread suffering 
and misery from climate change now effectively 
inevitable.”
Meanwhile, the carbon dioxide accumulates, 
and the impacts pile up.
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Dark days ahead for our climate
As the second largest emitter of carbon dioxide 
and historically the largest contributor to observed 
climate change, the United States has a unique 
responsibility to lead the effort to avoid increased 
damage caused by rising global temperatures. The 
political climate in the US, however, has proven 
hostile to significant movement towards a com-
prehensive solution. In the previous Congress, 
known climate skeptics and deniers (all of whom 
are Republican) made up 38% of the House of 
Representatives and 33% of the Senate. Partisan 
polarization among voters is also extreme: in 2016, 
85% of Democrats agreed that the rise in Earth’s 
temperature in the last century was mainly due to 
human activities, while only 38% of Republicans 
shared this view. 
Confronted with these political barriers, the 
Obama Administration decided from early on 
to treat climate change as a legacy issue. Despite 
initial setbacks such as the blocking of cap-and-
trade legislation in 2010 (including opposition 
from some maximalist Democrats), President 
Obama redoubled efforts to alter the country’s 
course on both domestic and international miti-
gation policy. American leadership, for instance, 
was crucial for the successful signing of the Paris 
Agreement last December and its entering into 
force earlier this year. On the domestic front, 
Obama has leveraged his executive powers to 
circumvent Congress in order to take action. 
Among other initiatives, the President put in 
place the Clean Power Plan (CPP) which is 
understood as the cornerstone of current Federal 
emissions reduction policy. The plan seeks to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions from coal and natural 
gas power plants, with an overall target of 32% 
emissions reductions in the American electricity 
sector by 2030. 
The Presidential and Congressional elections 
this year were decisive for the future of our global 
climate. Although the Paris Agreement was an 
historic moment for international cooperation on 
climate change, climate scientists have strongly 
questioned the notion that current national 
emissions reduction pledges will see average global 
temperature rise, relative to pre-industrial levels, 
below the dreaded 2C threshold by 2100. At the 
moment, what is in place is not enough to protect 
our climate; much more effort is needed to ensure 
a stable future. American leadership is seen as a 
necessary condition for increased ambition by 
other major emitters, notably China and India. 
Similarly, domestic mitigation efforts have also 
proven to be on shaky ground. The CPP, for 
instance, is currently being challenged in Federal 
court by 28 states and a slew of energy interests 
on the grounds that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has overstepped its legal authority. 
While many analysts believe that the court will 
uphold the CPP, it may not matter at this point.
A Republican-led Congress along with 
an outspoken climate denier President is the 
nightmare scenario for our climate. It is beyond 
question that we will experience severe backsliding 
on climate change policy both internationally and 
domestically once this unified Republican govern-
ment comes to power. 
President-elect Trump has already sent 
credible signals on how he intends to honor his 
promises to radically upend existing environmen-
tal policies. The first shock was the announcement 
that Myron Ebell, a veteran climate denier, will lead 
the EPA transition team and may even be tapped as 
its Administrator. It is also clear that Trump plans 
to rescind the CPP and all other environmental 
executive orders that are against the interests of the 
fossil fuel industry. Further, the new administra-
tion is more than likely to re-open oil, gas and coal 
production efforts - all in the name of increased 
income and energy independence. 
At the international level, the threat seems to 
be even more severe. Discussions emerging from 
the Trump camp are not focused on whether the 
United States should withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement, but how quickly this can be done. 
Observers were horrified to learn that one of the 
tactics that might be used is to withdraw from 
the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) which is the founda-
tion agreement on global climate cooperation and 
also the parent treaty to the Paris Agreement. Such 
a move would be beyond devastating for global 
cooperation on climate and would also severely 
diminish American reputation and standing in 
the world. 
 Unfortunately, there is not much room for 
optimism moving forward. Out of all the campaign 
pledges Donald Trump put forth, attacking the 
environment ranks as one of the least politically 
costly promises that he can deliver. Internationally, 
withdrawal from existing climate agreements or 
even simple non-compliance bear no real conse-
quence to his political survival. Also, we should 
not forget the overwhelming support that he 
received from fossil fuel producing districts. And 
while major conservative funders such as the Koch 
family were surprisingly hostile to Trump in this 
election, a dismemberment of Obama’s climate 
change policies might help open the money taps as 
reelection time approaches.
Diversity and 
Division
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Hillary Clinton’s evolving gender appeals
In 2008, Hillary Clinton made her first bid for 
the US presidency and did not overly emphasize 
her gender. Senior adviser Ann Lewis called this 
decision the “biggest missed opportunity” of the 
primaries and said Clinton “ceded the mantle of 
barrier-breaker entirely to Barack Obama”. Prior 
to and during the 2016 Democratic primaries, 
Clinton sought to reclaim that mantle. In 
December 2015, Clinton released the ‘44 boys is 
too many!’ ad, featuring little girls reading aspi-
rational letters written to Clinton. In a September 
2015 interview and again in a primary debate 
in February 2016, Clinton pushed back on the 
idea that she was an establishment candidate by 
saying, “I cannot imagine anyone being more of an 
outsider than the first woman president”. In April 
2016, Donald Trump said, “If Hillary Clinton were 
a man, I don’t think she’d get 5% of the vote. The 
only thing she’s got going is the woman’s card”; in 
response, Clinton sold physical “women cards” and 
raised $2.4 million in 3 days. Clinton capitalized 
on her gender.  
Moving into the general election, there was a 
shift in Clinton’s gendered appeals. Clinton focused 
less on what was new about her, and focused more 
on what had been there all along: a persistent focus 
on children, women, and families—issues women 
voters typically place a higher value on than men. 
Her history of work on the Children’s Defense 
Fund and Children’s Health Insurance Program, 
a celebration of her proclamation in China of 
“human rights are women’s rights and women’s 
rights are human rights,” and her other endeavors 
were echoed in advertisements, rallies, and 
numerous DNC speeches, including in running 
mate Tim Kaine’s speech: “When you want to 
know something about the character of somebody 
in public life, look to see if they have a passion that 
began long before they were in office, and that they 
have consistently held it throughout their career…
Hillary has a passion for kids and families.” During 
the third presidential debate, Clinton also went 
arguably further than any presidential candidate 
has in defending women’s reproductive rights. 
All of this reframed the gendered focus away 
from Clinton’s personal gender and toward direct 
appeals to women.
When it came to attacking her opponent’s 
record on his treatment of women, Clinton did 
not shy away. During the third debate she attacked 
Trump’s character and sent a clear appeal to 
women, “Donald thinks belittling women makes 
him bigger. He goes after their dignity, their 
self-worth, and I don’t think there is a woman 
anywhere that doesn’t know what that feels like.” 
A key culprit in undermining Trump’s pull 
with women was Trump himself, and Clinton 
capitalized on Trump’s words. Her ‘Mirrors’ ad 
and the super PAC ad ‘Quotes’ featured Trump’s 
past derogatory comments on women, paired 
with shots of women of various ages and races. 
The ‘Quotes’ ad was particularly effective with 
women. After watching the ad, Trump’s unfavora-
ble ratings among women went up by 19 points 
relative to those who did not see the ad; for men, 
the shift was 1 point. During the third debate 
Trump said, “Nobody has more respect for women 
than I do,” and minutes later called Clinton “such 
a nasty woman.” Clinton supporters reappropriat-
ed the label by wearing “Nasty Woman” T-shirts, 
flooding social media, and Clinton surrogate Sen. 
Elizabeth Warren used it as a rallying cry during 
her speeches. 
Perhaps Trump’s most damaging moment 
with women came with the Access Hollywood 
recording, in which he described kissing and 
grabbing women without their consent because, 
“when you’re a star…You can do anything.” During 
a rally, Michelle Obama delivered the most direct 
response from the Clinton team to the “Trump 
Tapes.” Having Obama deliver this attack, instead 
of Clinton, was necessary to some extent. Bill 
Clinton was not running for president, but Hillary 
is nonetheless his wife and his legacy in this area 
carries baggage. By having a strong surrogate 
who has no baggage in this domain make the 
attack, Clinton’s campaign could more safely land 
an effective blow. In response, Glenn Beck said 
Obama’s speech was “the most effective political 
speech since Ronald Reagan”. 
Clinton appealed to women, but only some 
embraced her appeals. According to CNN exit 
polls, Clinton had a sizeable 12-point gender gap, 
and she had an advantage over Trump with women 
of color, married and unmarried women, and 
Democratic and Independent women. However, 
she did not win over white women and there was 
no surge in women voters. Despite this, Clinton 
stayed the course and focused on women in her 
concession speech, stating: “to all the women…
who put their faith in this campaign and in me: 
I want you to know that nothing has made me 
prouder than to be your champion.” 
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Empirical research regarding the role of gender 
in positions of leadership (either corporate or 
political) has shown consistently over time the 
glass ceiling that many women face, and Hillary 
Clinton’s 2016 Race has stirred the controversy 
regarding the gender dynamics of high office 
even further.
However, despite the growing success of 
women at the highest level of political power in 
recent times, gender – and in Hillary’s case, age, 
too – continues to impact heavily upon women’s 
opportunities to run for office (and win), and it 
would seem that the US is lagging behind other 
nations of the developed and the not-so-devel-
oped world on this. In fact, long before her, there 
have been other American women who paved the 
way for Hillary 2016. To name but a few, Victoria 
Woodhull was a suffragette who ran for the 
American presidency in 1872, Geraldine Ferraro 
ran for vice president with the Democrats in 
1984, Pat Schroeder had a brief time as a Dem-
ocratic nominee in 1988 before her subsequent 
‘emotional’ withdrawal from the race, and Sarah 
Palin was nominated for the Republican V.P in 
2008. In short, the US political history is littered 
with women who started off to run for national 
leadership but withdrew along the way. Having 
served as secretary of state, it’s true that Hillary is 
not being questioned on her toughness – surely 
not as Ferraro was challenged about her capacity 
to defend the United States from the Soviets and 
‘push the nuclear button’ on account of her gender. 
If nothing else, Hillary offers herself as the more 
measured, but no less tough, candidate and invokes 
Trump’s trigger-happy attitude as a warning 
against his candidacy. In one advertisement she 
actually employed Trump’s unsettling image near 
the nuclear red button to press this point. What 
she is being criticized, and sometimes ridiculed, 
about is her looks, body shape, attire, being ‘men-
opausal’ and fragile – in essence all those things 
that tap into stereotypical gender characteristics 
the presidential candidate Hillary does not have 
in abundance: youth, health, stamina, sexiness. 
For her critics, Hilary is a ‘flawed’ candidate for 
national political leadership not just because the 
US presidency is perceived as a ‘masculine’ task, to 
be carried out by a male leader; but also because 
she is seen to betray ‘traditional’ female charac-
teristics, while having acquired more ‘masculine’ 
ones along the way (decisiveness, toughness) 
– hence we understand why ‘Bitch’ has stuck in
the popular imagination. In fact, the way we’ve
moved on from the more ‘cool’ context of HBIC
(Head Bitch in Charge) as depicted in the ‘Texts
from Hillary’ tumblr in 2012, where we saw a busy
Hillary texting from an airplane hangar, posing
as a real-life Anna Wintour, running the world
behind her dark glasses, to ‘Life’s a Bitch—don’t
vote for one’ tees, indicates the profound gender
asymmetries surrounding female presidency in 
America.
The question remains though: why is this 
happening? Part of the answer may lay in the 
Protestant culture of the US, which is an outlier 
especially when compared to Protestant Europe. 
Jennifer Merolla and colleagues suggest that 
although the Reformation brought increased 
female participation in the sacred across Protes-
tant countries in Europe, afforded through Bible 
reading and interpretation, and thus prepared 
the ground for more tolerant attitudes towards 
female leadership in all realms, such practices 
did not extend to the US where Protestantism 
took a socially conservative turn. This kind of 
socially conservative Protestantism, which sees 
female submission to male leadership as appro-
priate within the political realm, the church and 
family, is seen to have had a dampening effect on 
women’s political engagement in America and 
explains low female representation, especially in 
the highest level of political office. Accounts of a 
woman president of the United States surfaced in 
the early 20th century, along with the rise of the 
suffragette movement and technological futurism. 
However, the notion of a woman president was 
seen to run counter to technological progress and 
several headlines warned against the ‘danger of a 
woman becoming president of the United States’ . 
At a more nuanced level, such thinking challenged 
deeply entrenched ideas about women’s place in 
American society at a time when the dominant 
perception of white, middle class ‘appropriate’ fem-
ininity contextualized women in the private sphere 
of the domesticity. Drawing from Joanne Hollows’ 
work on ‘Domestic Cultures’, I argue that the 
gendered controversy surrounding Hillary’s 2016 
nomination, and whether or not she is fit to lead, is 
the culmination of a century-long social con-
struction of white, urban, middle-class American 
womanhood in modernity, which assumed that 
women’s ‘natural’ place in the world was exhausted 
at home, while working class, black and immigrant 
femininities reserved a more ‘public’ perception of 
womanhood. Τhe election outcome of 8 November 
goes to show the latent sexism American society 
is entrenched with, as well as Hillary’s inability 
to engage convincingly with public sentiments of 
anger about a rigged economy and government.
‘Madam President’ and the need for a historical 
contextualization of the 2016 race
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The ‘nasty’ politics of risk, gender and the 
emotional body in the US Presidential election
So, the worst has happened and Hillary Clinton 
was defeated by Donald Trump. From a feminist 
perspective, Trump’s much documented misogyny 
and its apparent acceptance by some commenta-
tors as ‘banter’, represents a real risk to women’s 
rights and to the self-esteem of girls growing up 
in the US. In Trump-land, retro-sexism becomes 
normalised, as women and their bodies are defined 
as risky objects of either desire or disgust. Thus, 
unpacking the psychosocial dynamics of the rela-
tionship between risk, gender and the body takes 
on a political urgency in a context where fantasies 
of femininity become aligned with notions of risk 
within the cultural and political imagination, as we 
saw in the campaign through representations of 
Clinton’s body. So, whilst Trump represents a risk 
to women and to US civil rights more broadly, it is 
powerful women such as Clinton (who ironically, 
are said to be from the political establishment) who 
are nonetheless often presented as the risk, and 
who therefore cannot be trusted. 
The wider socio-political context of ‘risk 
society’ has been discussed at length by Ulrich 
Beck and Giddens, who argue globalisation, 
economic crises and social fragmentation are 
linked to a heightened fear of risk and a dread of 
impending catastrophe. One can apply these ideas 
to the psychosocial and political dynamics of the 
US Presidential Election campaign and its media 
coverage, where widespread anxiety about risk 
was dealt with through the defensive mechanisms 
of splitting candidates into ‘good and bad’ and 
by projecting fears and anxieties onto them. The 
election has thrown into sharp relief the different 
ways that men and women are represented in the 
public sphere through the embodied attributes and 
emotions ascribed to each candidate. In Clinton’s 
case, it was as if the fragmented political body (the 
electorate) dealt with their fears by projecting them 
onto the image of a corrupt and abject political 
body that she, as a woman, seemed to represent, 
and her body thus became the focus for their 
anxiety and sense of risk.
These psychosocial processes are linked to 
gendered divisions of emotion, and perceptions 
of the body that are prevalent in contempo-
rary politics and society more widely. Against 
a backdrop of personality-driven mediated 
politics, the emotional personality has now taken 
centre-stage in political campaigns (Richards, 
2007; Yates, 2015). This development is shaped 
by perceptions of gender, and men and women 
have a different relationship to the public in this 
respect, reflecting the double standards that exist 
around emotion and gender more widely. As is well 
known, women on the political stage are often en-
couraged to look as assertive as men, and yet must 
also be cautious about appearing too domineering. 
Although Trump’s antics left many feeling that he 
is overly narcissistic and emotionally unstable, for 
swathes of the American electorate and in certain 
sections of the media, it was Hillary who was 
nonetheless represented as the riskier candidate. 
For decades, Clinton has been described as cold, 
unfeeling and somehow unnatural for failing to 
comply with feminine stereotypes. And yet we 
know if she ‘softened’ her image, she ran the risk 
of appearing too weak. Throughout the campaign, 
Clinton maintained a cool persona, but what was 
emphasised was her health and the potential frailty 
of her aging female body as being somehow inher-
ently risky, thereby shoring up older discourses of 
femininity, emotion and embodiment. 
Although many aspects of the news reporting 
– here and in the US – could serve to illustrate
the implicit and explicit sexism within news and
societal discourses, the repeated reporting on the
two candidates’ relative health uniquely illustrates
the gendered double standard. The impact of the
rigours of campaigning was heightened when
Clinton contracted pneumonia in September and
reportedly ‘fainted’, according to US and UK front
pages, coupled with the coverage of health con-
spiracy theories related to Clinton and speculation
after the release of her medical records. The double
standard around gender, health and risk in relation
to political competency and performance is evident
if we look at the reporting around the candidates’
health records. In contrast to press reports of
Clinton’s vulnerability, the self-professed ‘high
testosterone’ levels of Trump reported in the news
appears to celebrate his potency as a man despite
the well-publicised sexual assault complaints from
women. Despite the unease from within his own
party and amongst some voters, the critical focus
around trust and risk returned to Clinton, whose
status as a woman appeared - at least in fantasy - to
encapsulate anxieties about the dangers of feminin-
ity and women as political leaders.
As the political rhetoric and its new reporting 
would have it, Hillary Clinton’s emotions and 
gendered body – and by extension those of all 
women – serve to heighten perceptions of her as 
an inevitable risk, therefore making her apparently 
untrustworthy as a leader. The fear and anxiety 
about the possibility of a ‘nasty woman’ president 
was so great that Clinton lost the election. As 
a result, we all lose because women and their 
leadership potential continue to be undermined 
within everyday settings such as media, politics 
and society. 
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Why Trump’s male chauvinism appeals to some 
voters more than others
Even after mounting evidence of Donald Trump’s 
exploitative and demeaning treatment of women, 
his standing in the polls still hovers above 40%. 
On the face of it that’s more than a little shocking 
– but less surprising is the gender split among
his supporters.
A recent summary of gender differences in 
the polls compiled by FiveThirtyEight found that 
women favour Trump’s female opponent, Hillary 
Clinton, by 15 percentage points overall; men, 
on the other hand, favour Trump by five. It’s true 
that many Republican women are standing by 
their man, but that’s not enough for Trump to win 
women’s vote overall.
No surprise at all to gender researchers, 
though, is that the first time a woman threatens to 
break through what Clinton called the “highest, 
hardest glass ceiling” of the US presidency, her 
nominated opponent is the embodiment of the 
“male chauvinist pig” – a man, usually in a position 
of power, who publicly expresses the opinion that 
women are by nature inferior to men and best 
relegated to the kitchen and the bedroom.
The term male chauvinism first emerged 
after World War II as more women entered paid 
employment. This threatened the self-esteem many 
men derive from their dominance over women in 
the family, the economy, and society at large.
The use of the term chauvinist pig became 
more widespread as women in the US demanded 
not just employment, but the employment equality 
supported by affirmative action and Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The epithet was in vogue 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, at the height 
of second wave feminism.
Since then, many American men have adapted 
to women’s economic gains. They are much more 
likely to be married to employed women than to 
women who aren’t in the labour force. Men spend 
twice as much time doing unpaid housework and 
childcare as they did in the 1960s, and generally 
report more egalitarian attitudes to survey researchers.
Yet these gender equality gains are modest and 
fragile. Men’s masculine identity is still linked to 
their economic role, and a man’s chauvinist pig can 
resurface if this is threatened. But not all men are 
equally vulnerable to this threat.
All workers shared in the prosperity of the 
post-war era – but things began to change in the 
late 1970s, when wage inequality among men 
rose sharply in ways that affect their economic 
advantage over women.
Wage returns on a university degree steadily 
increased for both women and men, but the gender 
gap remains largest at the top of the wage distribu-
tion. In other words, the wage gains of high-skilled 
women are not likely to threaten the masculinity 
of high-skilled men. In contrast, the gender wage 
gap has almost disappeared among the least-skilled 
men and women.
Low-skilled men’s wages stagnated as the 
US de-industrialised and the real value of the 
minimum wage declined. Collectively-bargained, 
high-wage manufacturing jobs evaporated; they 
were replaced by precarious, low-wage service 
sector positions. The upshot is that a couple or 
family could not survive for long on a low-skilled 
husband’s income alone.
The men most affected by this transformation 
are now lining up for Trump like no other segment 
of the electorate. As reported by The Atlantic back 
in March 2016, white men without a college degree 
form the core of Trump’s supporters.
Without economic advantage, a man’s 
inner chauvinistic pig can break out to reassert 
dominance over women in another way. One way 
is to objectify women, as Trump was recorded 
doing with Billy Bush in 2005. Trump’s coarse 
comments may have scared away some of the Re-
publican mainstream, but plenty of his supporters 
have dismissed them as typical masculine ‘lock-
er-room talk’ (a defence even shock-jock Howard 
Stern rejected).
Male chauvinists also use the state to assert 
their dominance over women. An example of this 
among a fair number of Trump supporters is the 
Twitter feed #repealthe19th – a cry to repeal the 
amendment that gave women the right to vote.
But women did not principally cause the 
economic woes that have left some voters so 
desperate as to think a chauvinist like Trump can 
save them. Indeed, it’s precisely men like Trump 
who have used their power and privilege to widen 
the gap between the haves and have nots.
Trump’s chauvinism will never make America 
greater than it is right now. Instead, his campaign 
has revealed just how damaging male chauvin-
ism can be. And now, with his hyper-masculinity 
threatened by Clinton’s edge in the polls, Trump is 
attacking the very democratic process a presiden-
tial candidate should passionately defend.
Assuming that not even Donald Trump can 
destroy American democracy, the real challenge 
begins for whoever is sworn in as president on 
January 20 2017. Americans need more economic 
security for their enlightened sides to shine 
through again. This means more good jobs at 
living wages for men as well as women. Only then 
can the country begin to close the social chasms 
revealed and fuelled by Trump’s campaign – and 
only then can we banish chauvinism to the past, 
where it belongs.
57
Populist campaign rhetoric is about making 
grandiose and demagogic statements. The more 
ambitious and adaptive a candidate’s message is, 
the more it resonates with different kinds of voters. 
Donald Trump’s successful campaign relied on 
his famous slogan ‘Make America Great Again’. 
Its power is in the temporal scope of its promises, 
which invited white Americans to access their 
‘happy place’ in the past, when America was 
great, and promised them that he would make 
that imagined past their future. Trump’s past and 
future, I suggest, summon a promised land of 
white masculine economic productivity. 
While Hillary Clinton was not a ‘big promises’ 
candidate and sought to keep the conversation 
about the present, Donald Trump tapped into 
bygone pasts and a future still to come. He told 
Americans how the greatness they yearn for, and 
they know to have existed in history, was stolen 
from them by ‘the establishment’— Washington 
insiders who do not care about ordinary people. 
Trump fixated on the message that Americans were 
once great and can be great tomorrow. 
This mirroring of past and future was at the 
centre of Trump’s populist campaign message. 
In form, Trump’s strategy seems reminiscent to 
Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign, which owned 
the future as a promised site of hope and change. 
Obama, however, promised only a new and better 
future and did not continuously link it to the 
past. Obama himself as a Black man embodied 
change and did not look or sound like any previous 
president. However, Trump’s promise was that of a 
return. It is a ‘return’ to a serene past however one 
imagines it.
That promise of a future return to a great 
America made sense because, without being 
explicit, it portrayed a white, economically-robust, 
and socially conservative America. The power 
in the use of this temporal and nostalgic trope is 
that it inspired white people across class lines. The 
strategic vagueness of the content of the message, 
such as ‘Make America Great Again’, was concealed 
by the intimacy of its nostalgic intonation.  Trump’s 
slogan painted images of a serene past of simpler 
politics and economics. Trump did not specify 
what period in history America was great. What 
exactly should be resurrected? This ambiguity 
was demonstrated in a Daily Show skit , in which 
Trump supporters were asked: when was America 
last great? Answers ranged from 1776, 1913, 1950s, 
to the 1980s. Of course, as the Daily Show pre-
senters insinuated, those imagined pasts erase the 
political struggles of women and people of colour. 
The past that Trump invoked is one where the 
factories hummed. White men made stuff and were 
content with their day’s work. White family values 
prevailed. White men could say what they wanted. 
There was no political correctness. No one made a 
fuss about racism and misogyny. And men acted as 
men, and women as women. It is an imagined past 
before the first Black president and before Black 
protesters cried out in the streets of US cities about 
how their lives matter. 
This is not to say that all Trump voters had 
the same vision of that past that included all these 
images. Rather, this is to make the point that the 
ambiguity of what kind of past and future Trump 
means is appealing to voters whether in relation to 
present-day economic stress and/ or racism and/ 
or misogyny. 
The poetic invocations implied and enabled 
by Trump’s message are a good reminder that 
voter choice is often difficult to verbalize. It is not 
a simple rational choice. Voters respond to what 
inspires them. Trump had a message of change 
to voters with a scope rooted in an imagined past 
and projected onto a new future. His success is 
in the populist mirroring of the past and future, 
both of which gave a vision of white masculine 
economic productivity.  
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Attempting to understand Hillary Clinton’s 
favourability ratings
In every election since 1992 the candidate with 
the highest favourability rating has won the US 
election, with Gallop polls showing every victor 
polling above fifty percent favourability before 
the election. Hillary Clinton has struggled to get 
anywhere close to the fifty percent mark since 
announcing her candidacy in April 2015, a failure 
that may have cost her the presidency?
Her ratings collapse coincided with her 
entering the race. Gallop poll data shows that 
in April 2013 she had a 64% favourability rating 
among likely voters and 91% among Democrats, 
and she had been consistently sustaining ratings 
in the mid 60%’s from 2009-2012 while serving as 
Secretary of State. She maintained these ratings 
throughout the initial Senate investigation on 
Benghazi in January 2013 and the strong media 
personal media criticism that went alongside it. 
However, by 2015 Hillary Clinton’s favourability 
ratings had slowly fallen to 50% as focus shifted 
towards an expected presidential campaign, and 
by June 2015 they had dropped sharply down nine 
points to 41% with a 44% unfavorability rating 
just months after launching her campaign for to 
become President of the United States in April. Re-
alclearPolitics.com’s average favourability polling 
over the last 18 months’ tracks how her personal 
polling has continued to remain in the 40% range, 
but her unfavorability ratings have continued to 
climb reaching nearly 55% by November 2016.
In the media, this negative favourability 
towards Hillary’s candidacy has been consistently 
framed as being self-inflicted damage caused by 
both the Benghazi and email scandals that have 
affected her campaign, and others during her 
husband’s presidency. But this narrative does 
not correlate, there is a mismatch between the 
mediation of these events and the impacts on her 
favourability poll ratings. For example, the scandal 
about her emails only went public in July 2015 a 
month after her favourability rating had already 
fallen to a level which has been consistent ever 
since, and the same lack of correlation is reflected 
in timelines of the Benghazi investigation and 
polling. Political scandals often have short time 
frames and impacts with the media moving onto 
new stories with little lasting impact, with intense 
and sustained media interest required to keep the 
scandal in the front of people’s minds. While in 
the media frenzy of a US election these scandals 
sustained media interest and were perhaps 
reflected in the increases in unfavourability over 
the election period they might not tell the whole story.
An alternative explanation was put forward by 
Nelson that Hillary’s changing favourability ratings 
is directly related to how well she is conforming to 
gender expectations:
“When she was a traditional First Lady, she 
was popular; when she was gracious in defeat, 
accepting the Secretary of State job, she was 
popular; and when she was a Cabinet official who 
generally stayed out of the day-to-day political 
fights of Obama’s first term, she was at her most 
popular ever (Nelson 2016).”
However as soon as Hillary starts to step 
outside those boundaries of accepted behaviour 
and tries to be more politically active her favour-
ability ratings plummet. Brescoll and Okimoto 
support these observations. Their study found 
female political candidates face significant negative 
perceptions for the act of seeking power, while 
male candidates do not. Cultural stereotypes of 
women expect them to be communal, support-
ive and sensitive; when women break outside of 
these stereotypes they are framed as deviant and 
power obsessed. When female politicians try to 
take a more emotive approach they receive media 
coverage of a consistently different tone, being 
framed as demonstrating emotional irrationality 
and a lack of leadership and control. Hillary is 
aware of this process; Nelson quotes her observation:
“When I’m actually doing the work, I get 
re-elected with 67 percent of the vote running for 
re-election in the Senate. When I’m secretary of 
state, I have [a] 66 percent approval rating. And 
then I seek a job, I run for a job, and all of the 
discredited negativity comes out again”.
Psychological accessibility of political judge-
ments is more important in building favourability 
towards a candidate than the quantity or quality of 
those attributes, with the simplest core emotional 
response to a candidacy being more important 
and impactful than more detailed and nuanced 
reflections. This seems reflected in Hillary’s 
personal polling. Likely voters suggest they think 
she is qualified (55%) and has the temperament 
(53%) to be US President, only 29% of people trust 
her, fundamentally undermining her legitimacy 
and favourability. In a presidential race that is as 
complex and as divisive as this one there are many 
factors that affect an outcome. Gender and the 
voting publics perceptions of female politicians 
may have played a more important role than is 
often discussed in public and media discourse.
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This is a ‘feel’ piece that includes some thinking. 
I have deliberately avoided using sources or 
checking the facts. Instead I have reflected on living 
through the campaign and what that has meant to 
me. I have generated what might be considered an 
‘approximate analysis’ partly inspired by reading 
Proxies: Essays in near knowing (2016) and by 
being in close proximity to a hate crime during the 
campaign. In a queer way, I owe a very different 
form of appreciation to both.
“The gays will be better off under me” so stated 
Trump with the bluster and lack of consideration 
for words we got used to in this campaign! Was 
Hilary much better? Conventionally yes; uttering 
consistently supportive noises about LGBT issues, 
but crucially, she represented the mainstream in 
her approach to issues of gender and sexuality. 
Repeating the mantra “gay rights are human rights” 
to the point where one started to ponder, so did 
she once doubt this truism? 
Whilst there was much queer about this 
campaign; that hair, her emails, the FBI, a Re-
publican candidate who the last two Republican 
Presidents did not publically support and the first 
female candidate for ‘high office’… Despite all of 
this, from an LGBT perspective it was actually 
rather conventional. The most affirmative reading 
of the two main candidates engagement with 
LGBT issues was little more than permission to 
join the mainstream is partially granted…but on 
our terms. 
The notion that is was an electoral liability to 
be ‘anti-gay’ appeared to take hold in both camps, 
though this sentiment was clearly not shared 
amongst many Trump supporters. This position 
was superficially welcoming. However, it contrib-
uted to a re-presentation of the politics of sexuality 
that hid ambiguity, denied critique and excluded 
challenge to hetronormativity. In effect we had 
two versions of shallow inclusivity; queer cultural 
worldviews remained off limits. 
Specifically I recall:
• Trump being ‘accepting’ of an NFL player 
kissing his boyfriend in public but complain-
ing on behalf of ‘rednecks’ about how hard it 
is for them to express their true thoughts on 
this subject. 
• Hilary complaining that gay rights had 
moved faster than women’s rights in recent 
history (of course about half those identifying 
as LGBT are indeed women!).
• Trump reminding us that he lives in New 
York and actually knows some gay people, 
referring to them as ‘tremendous lovely 
people’… how sweet. 
• Clinton asserting support for transgender 
people who should not be held back from 
participating fully in ‘our great American 
society’. An act of welcoming them ‘inside’, 
rather than confronting structures that 
constitute ‘insider status’. 
• Trump talking about how he will protect ‘the 
gays’ by hating another group. In this case 
‘Muslims’ held responsible for the shooting in 
an Orlando nightclub that led to 29 deaths. 
• Trump was keen to show just how ‘red 
blooded’ he was referring on several 
occasions to transgender people with feign 
disappointment; “she’d certainly be attractive 
as a real woman” and how being a lesbian was 
“a waste of raw talent”. 
• In several interviews where LGBT rights were 
raised Trump retorted to answering with a 
rhetorical question along the lines of “what 
do I know about gay men, I was bought up 
in a family to think differently about what we 
are supposed to do in our beds”.
Our ability to put words into play creates what is 
possible (see the philosophies of Wittgenstein or 
Barthes). Words associated with LGBT were never 
queer, always orthodox. These were campaigns of 
containment, of ‘holding in’. This view may seem 
perverse given this has been labelled the vilest 
campaign in history. But just think, what would 
Trump have really liked to say about vulnerable 
groups (we caught a pathetic glimpse with the ‘bus 
tape’). Clinton too acted with reserve on hot queer 
topics such as fairness of health treatment access 
and religious bigotry under the banner of free 
speech. This containment was literal in relation to 
the candidates’ past lives and misdemeanors and 
was metaphorical in relation to LGBT experiences; 
where ‘what it is to live a secret’ was kept concealed. 
How could a presidential candidate ever speak 
from or for the margins? Obama whitened up, 
Hilary manned up, and any future LGBT candidate 
will no doubt straighten up. Given this, what 
meaningful contribution might this queering lens 
of the 2016 campaign offer? Firstly, that whilst 
political calculation defines candidate’s engage-
ment with LGBT issues it will perpetuate the 
construction of LGBT subjectivity within neolib-
eral forms of governance. Perform productively, 
distance yourself from deviance and you too can 
share our American dream. 
Secondly, it speaks to a sense of cultural 
corrosion. Bringing to mind Norbert Elias’s 1939 
magnificently articulated ‘The Civilising Process’. 
Trump’s campaign in particular was shameless, 
unreflective and deliberately immodest. Elias 
explained the process that resulted in widespread 
distaste of dirt, danger, and disregard for others; 
Trump has legitimised bullying, bigotry and 
ignorance. Narcissistic delight was manifest in 
‘social cruelty’ directed at anybody in his way. An 
almost medieval concept of gender relations and 
sexuality has thus reemerged in the public sphere. 
Even if a Trump presidency differs qualitatively to 
the campaign, the de-civilising affects will remain. 
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Love didn’t trump hate: Intolerance in the 
campaign and beyond
Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 Presidential 
Election defied more than the polls; it also chal-
lenged feel-good assumptions about the inevitable 
triumph of progressive democratic ideals. In his 
campaign for the White House in 2008, Barack 
Obama invoked the saying that “the arc of the 
moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” 
In 2016, Hillary Clinton asserted, “Love trumps hate.”
We now know such lines are more prayer 
than prediction. In spite of a steady stream of 
hateful rhetoric and policy positions against 
weaker sections of society—or, more chillingly, 
because of it—Trump scored major upsets in key 
states. How large a role hate played in Trump’s 
ascent is disputed. His detractors say it defined his 
campaign; his defenders claim that it’s not really 
what he is about. 
The truth may lie in between. On the one 
hand, the new leader of the free world is not 
wedded to his positions. He is a lower order chau-
vinist than, say, Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi, who is committed to a Hindu nationalist 
agenda bent on dismantling India’s post-independ-
ence multicultural order.
On the other hand, Trump’s attacks on 
Mexicans and Muslims did amount to key election 
promises. They were not throwaway remarks like 
those of former Singapore Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew. Lee never let political correctness curb 
his indulgence for cultural and gender stereotypes, 
but he was also a defender of racial and religious 
equality—and would have eliminated without hes-
itation any would-be Modis and Trumps dabbling 
in incendiary communal politics in Singapore.
Immediate post-election analyses suggest 
that Trump bore into an underground cavern 
of seething hostility against the governing class. 
Post-election commentators say voters’ animosity 
toward the establishment is understandable, con-
sidering how many Americans justifiably feel let 
down and left behind by policymakers. What this 
does not explain, though, is why minority-bashing 
had to be incorporated into an agenda for change. 
This is probably because more rational 
responses were ideologically unpalatable. A social 
democratic revolution, as championed by Bernie 
Sanders and Elizabeth Warren on the left, was 
anathema to the powerful 1 per cent that it aimed 
to dethrone, and even too unsettling for many 
among the 99 per cent that it was meant to help. It 
proved simpler to scapegoat minorities.
It is a tactic that has been used by demagogues 
around the world for generations: construct stark 
divides between ‘us’ and ‘them’; blame them for 
our problems; and present oneself as the only 
leader clear-sighted enough to recognise them 
for what they are, and strong enough to deal with 
them. In the United States, such messages found 
a receptive audience among the many white 
Americans who are uneasy about the shift in 
their country’s cultural centre of gravity toward 
greater diversity. 
If you are seeking glimmers of hope, you 
might argue that Trump’s bigotry did not run 
deep; that it was just a performance for short-term 
electoral gain. Even if this is true of Trump the 
man, it overlooks the fact that his campaign—
contrary to some media portrayals—was not 
run solo. The movement included long-running, 
organised hate groups, none of which are going 
to change their spots now that they are on the 
winning side. 
Most of the alarm has focused on the endorse-
ments he received from David Duke and the Ku 
Klux Klan. There are lesser-known, but more influ-
ential, merchants of hate that have systematically 
and successfully inserted paranoid intolerance into 
US political discourse over the years. Anti-Muslim 
sentiment, for example, was cultivated by a fringe 
group of misinformation experts who claimed 
that Barack Obama is a Muslim, that American 
Muslims want to introduce Islamic law or sharia, 
and that their mosques preach violent jihad. 
One of these think tanks was behind a 
debunked study that Trump cited to justify his 
proposed ban on Muslims entering the country. 
Anti-Muslim ideologues were named as Trump 
advisors. Even if Trump the candidate was merely 
putting on a show purely for campaign purposes, 
there is every risk that the bigotry espoused by his 
aides and advisors will be institutionalised within 
the Trump Presidency.
But if the 2016 campaign was full of warning 
sirens, it also contained signs of hope. The 
pushback against hateful rhetoric was not insig-
nificant, and the fact that Trump won the White 
House does not mean he won the argument or 
silenced counterviews. 
The mainstream news media, for all their 
failures, regularly factchecked his wild claims and 
called him out on his invective. Civil rights or-
ganisations like the Southern Poverty Law Center 
and the American Civil Liberties Union did their 
part. The military and national security establish-
ment hinted at potential resistance against rabid 
Trumpism engaging in all-out war against Muslims.
Less noticed, but possibly more impactful 
in the long run, is opposition from within the 
Religious Right. Younger Christian Evangelicals 
who will inherit the movement appear comforta-
ble with America’s growing diversity and ready to 
resist against Trump’s amoral demagoguery. 
Perhaps it is still the case that the arc of history 
will bend toward justice. 
Just not yet.
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The blue-collar billionaire: explaining the Trump 
phenomenon
So, how did it happen? How did a self-aggrandizing 
billionaire real estate magnate, reality TV star who 
never held elected office capture the White House 
in 2016? How did a man who offered a regular 
spate of verbal aggression while articulating a series 
of grievances that resonated with disenfranchised 
white voters, emerge as the 45th U.S. President? A 
multitude of reasons, derived from social science 
research, explain the Trump phenomenon.
First, self-interest: the notion that working class 
voters gravitated to Trump because he promised 
to allay their economic misfortune. While there is 
evidence that some communities afflicted by unem-
ployment trended Trump, self-interest has trouble 
explaining why many sectors not affected adversely 
by economic forces, as well as individuals not 
touched by trade or immigration, favored Trump. 
Self-interest, as political scientists know, is frequent-
ly overshadowed by symbolic politics.
Flowing from a symbolic politics framework 
is a second explanation of Trump’s popularity: his 
law and order-based message that stirred concerns 
about ‘them’, the generalized other, a thematic 
(harking back to Nixon’s 1968 campaign) that 
seemed to require the stern punitive presence of 
“the strict father,” as George Lakoff has referred to 
it, accessing conservatives’ preference for a morality 
dominated by strength and loyalty to the majority 
in-group: an America that enforces immigration 
laws and bars Muslims from entering the U.S.  
Third, and more significantly, Trump adapted 
time-honored populism to fit the present histor-
ical moment, cleverly, compassionately – some 
would say exploitatively – calling on time-honored 
working class concerns with trade and immigra-
tion, packing them into a coherent populist frame 
(a la Brexit) that emphasized how elites exploited 
workers for their own benefit in foolhardy trade 
deals that took jobs away from workers, as well 
as job-crushing illegal immigration that put 
Americans at the mercy of  ‘criminal aliens’. 
His ‘Make America Great Again’ served as 
a condensational symbol that called to mind 
recollections of past glories, perceived indignities, 
projected anger at presumed unfairly-achieved at-
tainments of other groups, and a painful, poignant 
reminder that America was not ‘good’ or ‘great’ 
anymore, but could be if Trump were elected. The 
facts on trade, immigration and crime did not 
comport with his rhetoric (they were flat-out false), 
but his frame captured an emotional truth.
Trump’s narrative resonated with the white 
working class because it addressed the powerless-
ness and frustration many workers felt in the midst 
of crushing technological and economic change, 
experienced tangibly in  communities facing 
joblessness and attendant social decay, manifest in 
drug addiction and marital strife. He tapped into 
real fears Americans had, offering policy alterna-
tives that Republican elites had conveniently elided, 
telling people who felt they were at the bottom of the 
heap their needs mattered. He was their blue-collar 
billionaire. But he also was a canny communicator, 
exploiting their anxieties for political gain. 
Fourth, as cognitive scientific research 
indicates, Trump’s focus on how much workers had 
lost, as a result (he claimed) of global trade deals, 
immigration, and a ‘rigged’ economic system, 
propelled people to take a chance. Although one 
might intuitively guess that blue-collar workers 
would be reluctant to risk it all, given all they had 
lost, research suggests individuals can experience 
more pain over losses than pleasure over gains, and 
as a consequence were willing to gamble because 
Trump offered the last hope that change could be 
wrested from a stagnant status quo.
A fifth factor, the most insidious, is racial 
prejudice, exemplified by evidence that voters most 
likely to support Trump in the primaries had a 
history of voting for segregationists and seemed 
to forgive his morally culpable statements, such as 
refusal to disavow support from a white nationalist 
leader. We need to be careful in making inferences 
of cause and effect. There were many Trump voters 
who voted for Obama. Yet tribal identification with 
‘whiteness’ (augmented by a feeling that class-based 
bias against whites, shown in affirmative action, is 
insufficiently discussed) swelled his ranks.
Sixth, the Trump brand, showcased across the 
country with glitter and panache, linked with the 
ability to execute economic success, appealed to 
some Americans, who are more willing to forgive 
the ethical lapses of private sector executives (“it’s 
business”) than those committed by political 
leaders, from whom more is expected, and whose 
ethical scrapes (use of a private email server) are 
viewed as more metaphysically consequential than 
stiffing contractors. 
Seventh, he exuded credibility. Although 
fact-checks showed he told more falsehoods than 
Clinton, he was perceived to be more trustworthy 
because he spoke boisterously and with much 
confidence (which research has shown enhances 
persuasion), in contrast to Clinton’s seemingly dis-
ingenuous, careful speech, all of which congealed 
with the narrative media had woven for years 
about her lack of transparency, some parts rooted 
in her personality, others in gender bias.
Eighth, the news, hungering for ratings, gave 
Trump immense press, significantly more than 
other candidates. The exposure helped legitimize 
his candidacy when it was perceived as a circus 
performance, helping to build his campaign.
Finally, Clinton, for all her experience, failed 
to develop a believable brand image. She did not 
forge a connection, nor campaign heavily, with 
working class whites ambivalent about Trump, thus 
gifting to Trump votes she might have captured. In 
the abyss of her missteps was borne the ultimate 
media-age president.
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Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential 
election has been attributed to disaffection among 
the American populace and its disengagement 
with the US political system, leading to a seismic 
shift towards populism. However, in common with 
Brexit, dominant discourses in Trump’s campaign 
centred on issues around belonging and identity 
with clearly marked boundaries of inclusion 
and exclusion. 
As Matthew Hughey argued in 2012, a 
hierarchy of Whiteness determines levels of 
belonging and citizenship in America, with Whites 
enjoying a privileged status. The othering of non-
Whites echoed throughout the Trump campaign – 
which some argue is the key to his political success.
However, Hilary Clinton marginally won a 
greater share of votes than Trump – despite his 
presidential win. According to Pew Research 
Center (PRC), Clinton received 59.6m votes, 
compared to Trump’s 59.4m. Trump’s victory was 
secured through a larger number of Electoral 
College votes. 
Former Ohio State Senator Nina Turner, 
stated in a CNN interview earlier this year, that 
America was built on racism and sexism where the 
all-White ‘founding fathers’ drafted the US Consti-
tution that excluded Blacks, since they were legally 
defined as 3/5ths of a human being, or mere chattel 
to be owned and enslaved by Whites. 
Slavery is the reason the Electoral College 
voting system was established under the 12th 
amendment in 1787 - to protect slave states that 
had more slaves than free men who were eligible 
to vote. The 12th Amendment permitted the South 
to include slaves in its electoral count, giving the 
region an advantage over the north, that would 
otherwise outnumber the south in eligible free voters. 
The Democrat and Republican parties have 
always been racially divided. Throughout the 
recent history of presidential elections, 90 per 
cent of African Americans have voted for the 
Democrats, while most Whites have voted Repub-
lican. In last week’s Presidential Election, 58% of 
Whites voted for Trump, while 65% of Hispanics 
and 88% of African Americans voted for Clinton (PRC).
While people of colour in the US overwhelm-
ingly voted Democrat, Clinton was unable to 
replicate the spectacular Democrat gains in the 
2012 Presidential campaign. Back then 71% of 
Hispanics voted for Obama, along with 93% of 
African Americans (PRC). But in 2016, notwith-
standing her general unpopularity with American 
voters - Clinton had to contend with a forceful 
White backlash.
As Mathew Hughey explained, the recent 
White backlash can be traced back to 2008 when 
Barack Obama became the first Black president 
of the US. It found expression through the public 
questioning of Obama’s American nationality legit-
imised through mainstream media coverage, and 
through the Tea Party movement with its links to 
the Klu Klux Klan and other far right groups. Their 
mission statement to ‘take our country back’ (from 
non-Whites presumably), resonated throughout 
the Trump campaign.
Let us not forget Trump’s ‘promise’ to ban 
Muslims from entry to the US, increase surveil-
lance of them and create a national register – nor 
his reference to Mexican immigrants as ‘rapists’ 
and ‘criminals’. 
Bruce Bartlett argues that Trump’s political 
success can be attributed to his dexterity in feeding 
White perceptions of ‘reverse racism’ – the belief 
that Whites are more racially disadvantaged than 
people of colour – who are also perceived as 
responsible for their ‘discrimination’. The growth 
of the non-White population in the US has driven 
more Whites to the Republican party, to the point 
where it has become a racial interest group that 
exists to protect and maintain White supremacy, 
with Trump at its helm. 
Cyberpsychologist Mary Aiken describes 
Trump as ‘a troll who has jumped off the internet 
and into the real world’, leading to a cyber-migra-
tion of extreme racism that encourages people to 
act on their racist beliefs. The increase in racial 
abuse and violence towards people of colour 
post-election, suggests that America is on a 
dangerous path. 
But there is a glimmer of hope that this path 
is a temporary one. First is the reality that while 
America is possibly more racially divided than 
ever, almost 60 million Americans voted against 
Trump. Voter turnout was the lowest in 20 years, it 
is argued, because neither Trump nor Clinton were 
regarded as progressive candidates. The personal-
ised, vitriolic, debates between Trump and Clinton 
took American politics to an all-time low. 
However, mainstream America is already 
looking for a future beyond Trump and the most 
popular person in politics right now according to a 
WSJ/NBC poll on 9 November is former First Lady 
Michelle Obama. Her momentous speech in the 
wake of the sexual abuse revelations about Trump, 
addressed both raced and gendered inequalities in 
a manner that promotes cultural democracy and 
unites a divided nation around a common humanity.
Despite the calls for Michelle Obama to run 
for president in 2020, as the Guardian reports 
on 11 November, this is most unlikely. But the 
popularity of Michelle Obama is the clearest 
indication that progressive politics can be a reality 
again, when the right candidate delivers the right 
message. The question now is, if not Michelle 
Obama, then who?
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Every four years America has a national revival, 
where candidates traverse the nation preaching 
about what it means to be American and the 
nation’s future. While these candidates’ sermons 
may differ, they agree that the US is exceptional; it 
should lead the world. Commonly, they justify this 
esteemed image of the nation by arguing that its 
exalted status is a divine endowment. 
The theology of American exceptionalism 
has its origins in the rhetoric of the New England 
Puritans who viewed their development in 
America as divine will. John Winthrop famously 
argued that America is a “City upon a hill” that had 
gained God’s favor. However, these divine blessings 
are not unconditional, America’s moral direction is 
under constant judgement. The nation is always at 
risk of losing its heavenly grace if it violates God’s 
will. This theology has buttressed our definition 
of America and dictated its behavior. Recognizing 
the power of the theology of American exception-
alism, political leaders create their version of the 
American gospel within this framework. 
During the 2016 presidential election, Hillary 
Clinton evangelized that staying course would 
ensure divine blessings. Conversely, Donald Trump 
preached that the nation had lost its divine favor. 
Much like the rhetoric of the “Lost Cause”, a theme 
articulated by former Confederates in response 
to their defeat by the Union, Mr. Trump argued 
that incompetent and corrupt leadership caused 
the nation to lose its glory. Specifically, Mr. Trump 
tapped into an American gospel which focused 
on purity and called for the nation to rid itself 
of infidels and heretics. Political correctness and 
diversity had stripped the rightful leaders of the 
nation from their prominence and taken the nation 
off its divine path. For the nation to re-ascend 
in the divine hierarchy, it must reverse its course 
of action, and only he could save the nation’s 
corrupted soul.
Unlike past presidential candidates, who 
used implicit language, Mr. Trump was overt. In 
announcing his candidacy, he painted Mexican 
immigrants as the infidels who tainted the nation’s 
soul with their immoral behavior. Later he argued 
that the American Muslim community was 
actively subverting the nation from its divine path. 
While Hillary Clinton sermonized that America’s 
blessings come from religious and racial diversity, 
he argued diversity brought in heretics that must 
be expunged. Only through this purge could the 
nation return to its divinely dictated path. 
Many questioned the sincerity of this rhetoric 
and attempted to advance a counter gospel. One 
need only look at the rhetoric of religious and 
political leaders at the Democratic National 
Convention to see the counter gospel in action. 
However, the outcome of the election demonstrates 
that Mr. Trump’s gospel is what resonated with the 
American public. Numerous studies demonstrate 
that Trump supporters were fearful of the 
nation’s racial and religious diversification. These 
Americans saw the dwindling presence of Whites 
and Christians as corrupting the nation’s soul.
This phenomenon of national soul cleansing 
is not limited to the United States. The United 
Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union 
along with other European nations pushing back 
against racial and religious diversity demonstrates 
that citizens in western industrialized nations feel 
threatened by globalization.
The American case is unique because of the 
continued insistence that the nation’s destiny 
is divinely inspired. Furthermore, American 
religious and racial identity are tightly inter-
twined. The highly segregated nature of America’s 
churches informs us that religious similarities 
cannot overcome racial dissimilarities. Because 
of this, White Americans perceive an assault on 
the nation’s religious identity as an attack on their 
racial identity.
Mr. Trump’s tapped into these fears and 
crafted a gospel that converted these citizens from 
passive to active. His speeches reassure them that 
they will be led out of the wilderness of racial and 
religious diversity. By advocating stricter immigra-
tion policies, instilling law and order in minority 
communities, and exorcising incompetent and 
corrupt politicians, he calls for returning control of 
the nation to those truly intended to be American. 
Much like the southern leaders who emerged after 
Reconstruction, his gospel promises national and 
global redemption.
Even with the success of Mr. Trump’s great 
revival, his American gospel is in a struggle 
with several others. Just as the gospel of slavery 
competed with the gospel of abolition and the 
gospel of segregation competed with the gospel 
of racial equality, the gospel of Trump will not go 
unchallenged. His combatants will be those who 
view diversity and protecting the marginalized as 
a divine edict. Individuals, such as Rev. William 
Barber and his Moral Mondays movement, will 
be tasked with converting the nation to this 
counter gospel. Soon we will see the effects of Mr. 
Trump’s great revival through policy and citizen 
action. Further, we will see the gospels crafted in 
response. But no matter what gospel is presented, 
it will be articulated in the theology of American 
exceptionalism.
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The 2016 Presidential election was far from 
ordinary for minorities in America. Following 
eight years of Obama administration, which placed 
a great deal of emphasis of inclusivity and empow-
erment for under-represented groups, the 2016 
campaign was characterized by a series of inflam-
matory statements about women, African-Ameri-
cans, immigrants, refugees, Muslims, and persons 
with disabilities by Republican nominee Donald 
Trump. In one particularly controversial episode, 
Trump openly mocked a disabled reporter 
during a campaign rally in South Carolina on 24 
November 2015. This moment was shared instantly 
by thousands of people on social media and later 
incorporated in a powerful TV ad by the Hillary 
Clinton campaign. At one point, opinion polls 
identified this episode as Trump’s “worst offense” 
during the course of the entire election campaign. 
Given the level of visibility that disability issues 
achieved in this election, it is useful to review the 
response of the disability community, the role of 
social media in mobilizing the disabled vote, and 
offer some insights into what the future may hold 
for grassroots disability organizing under a 
Trump presidency.
The disability community received an 
unprecedented amount of attention in the 2016 
election. The difference between the two major 
party campaigns in this area could not have been 
greater. While the controversial episode cited 
above was the only instance in which the Trump 
campaign ‘engaged’ with disability issues, Hillary 
Clinton proposed several policy initiatives on 
issues directly relevant to Americans with disabil-
ities and their families. Clinton’s website included 
specific pages dedicated to disability and health-
care issues, assistance programs such as Medicaid 
and the Affordable Care Act (colloquially known as 
‘Obamacare’), mental health, Alzheimer’s disease, 
and disabled veterans. The democratic convention 
in Philadelphia featured several speakers with 
disabilities. Clinton herself gave a major speech 
on disability policy on 21 September. Although 
this was described by some news outlets as an 
‘unusual push’ for a presidential candidate, it stood 
as testimony to the growing influence of a non-tra-
ditional constituency that, according to recent 
estimates, now includes 35.4 million registered US 
voters. In a close election such as this one, it was 
strategic for Clinton to connect with the disability 
community, which is much more politically diverse 
and not guaranteed to vote Democratic than 
many assume. 
Americans with disabilities were no spectators 
in the 2016 campaign and instead became involved 
directly in a wide range of initiatives to mobilize 
their peers. On the one hand, established disability 
rights organizations such as the American Associ-
ation of People with Disabilities (AAPD) and the 
National Council on Independent Living (NCIL) 
campaigned tirelessly to encourage voter regis-
tration among people with disabilities, including 
through a targeted social media outreach. On the 
other hand, young disabled activists used Facebook 
and Twitter to launch the #CripTheVote campaign, 
designed to engage both voters with disabilities 
and candidates in discussions about disability-re-
lated issues. This was an innovative and successful 
grassroots initiative driven by a new and emerging 
generation of disabled leaders who are familiar 
and comfortable with social media technologies, 
which they seem eager to use to further their 
advocacy goals.
On November 8, Donald Trump won the 
presidential election and will lead the US for the 
next four years. This surprise result has already 
generated a high level of concern in the American 
disability community, with prominent advocates 
pleading with the incoming administration to 
protect the rights of persons with disabilities. 
While it would be premature to speculate about 
what the future may hold for American with 
disabilities under a Trump presidency, the con-
ditions seem right for a new surge in disability 
rights activism supported by social and mobile 
media. As the experience of the welfare reform in 
the UK between 2010-12 taught us, crisis can be 
a powerful catalyst for change and mobilization 
revival among large and diverse groups such as 
the disability community. American disability 
rights advocates are preparing themselves to face a 
Republican White House and Congress, and soon a 
conservative-majority Supreme Court. Obamacare 
and its provisions for people with pre-existing 
health conditions may be on the line. Medicaid 
entitlements are likely to be threatened. It seems 
that innovative organizing efforts for the disability 
community did not stop on polling day, but instead 
will become ever more important once the dust has 
settled over the election result.
Organizing in Trump’s America: the perspective 
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Why are the German-Americans Trump’s most 
loyal supporters?
German-Americans paved Trumps road into 
the White House -- right through the rural 
and deindustrialized landscapes of Wisconsin, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. When talking 
about ethnicity and immigration background, 
we frequently use labels such as African-Amer-
ican, Asian-American, Italian-American and 
Mexican-American. But despite the fact that 
currently about 46 Million Americans claim 
German ancestry and therefore constitute the 
largest national heritage group in the United 
States, one hardly ever encounters the term Ger-
man-American. Who are the German-Americans, 
and why did they support Donald Trump?
Who are the German-Americans?
Millions of Germans arrived in the United States 
between 1850 and 1890. Many settled in the Great 
Lakes Region. As farmers and skilled workers 
they transformed the mid-western wilderness and 
fueled the industrialization with manpower and 
entrepreneurial spirit. Many German-Americans 
were freethinkers, fighting against slavery and for 
women’s suffrage. They founded newspapers and 
labor unions. Socialist mayors Emil Seidel and 
Frank Zeidler dominated Milwaukee politics in 
the first half of the 20th century. So, how did a 
mostly progressive immigrant group that shaped 
the progressive era and set the stage for liberalism 
turn conservative?
The German-American Trump Connection
After having initially claimed to be of Swed-
ish-American ancestry, Donald Trump later 
acknowledged his paternal grandfather’s birth-
place as Kallstadt, located in what had been the 
Kingdom of Bavaria in the 19th century. However, 
arguing that German-Americans were attracted to 
the president-elect based on his German-Ameri-
can heritage is missing the point. The pro-Trump 
swing vote occurred in states that had been solidly 
blue for a generation. This region, formerly known 
as the Blue-State Firewall, correlates with a high 
concentration of German immigrant settlements in 
the 19th century as the census map shows. 
Progressive German Immigrants turned Con-
servative German-Americans
 Today’s descendants of German immigrants in 
the American Midwest have lost an authentic link 
to the cultural heritage of their forefathers. This 
happened through rapid assimilation, partly to 
avoid stigmatization in the wake of two World 
Wars. German-Americans stopped using their 
language. Their newspapers disappeared. They 
anglicized their names to become more American 
more quickly than any other European immigrant 
population. Assimilation to conservativism was 
part of this process.
Indifferent towards their heritage, 
few German-Americans resumed after decades 
of hibernating a public articulation of their 
heritage. However, those who do connected to 
their heritage, have developed practices that bear 
little resemblance with what life looked like during 
the migration period. Cultural heritage events 
construct a coarse definition of Germanness that is 
centered around Beer, Bratwurst, and Lederhosen 
and silences the liberal and progressive ideas and 
actions of many ancestors.  
The shift from liberal to conservative views 
can also be attributed to occupational patterns 
typical among German immigrants. Agriculture 
and entrepreneurial craftsmanship generated 
wealth that sustained families and communities for 
more than a century until globalization under-
mined the economic sustainability of family farms 
and domestic manufacturing. Those who could, 
left their rural communities and deindustrialized 
cities. Those who remained suffered twofold as 
economic hardship coincided with the end of 
the lifestyle many German-Americans shared. 
Steady decline, the collapse of communal struc-
tures, and the loss of a rich cultural heritage that 
provided a sense of being, made people receptive 
for Trump’s anti-establishment gestures and his 
xenophobic messages.
German-Americans are not just the ‘White Vote’
Analyzing the electoral patterns in the Great 
Lakes Region merely in terms of a ‘whitelash’ 
underlines the helplessness of political commen-
tators in the efforts to explain the inaccuracy of 
polls, predictions, and probabilities. Despite the 
fact that political analysts routinely acknowledge 
diversity within the Hispanic vote and differenti-
ate between, for example, Mexican-Americans in 
Texas, Cuban-American in Florida, and Puerto 
Ricans in New York, they treat the ‘white vote’ as 
one monolithic block. Their models ignore specific 
voting behaviors and ideological that are 
particular to German-Americans and – for that 
matter -- any other national heritage group that is 
‘ethnical-
ly invisible’ in mainstream America. 
An undifferentiated perception on the 
‘white vote’ ignores the complex histories and the 
super-diversity among Caucasian Americans. 
Instead, pollsters and pundits must pay fine-
grained attention to migration experiences 
and voting motives of white Americans. They may 
realize that their predictions will become 
more accurate, if they analyze voters of European 
descent with a higher level of nuance. We may be 
in for many surprises - and be less surprised on 
election night.
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Media coverage of the US election in Arabic, 
Chinese, and Russian media
The US Presidential election typically draws signif-
icant interest from overseas, both among allies, like 
Germany or the UK, and among geopolitical rivals, 
such as Russia and the People’s Republic of China. 
There are multiple reasons for this, including the 
outsized impact of US economic, political, and 
cultural strengths. But beyond the obvious interest 
in how presidential policies might impact relations 
or interests of other countries, there are conse-
quences for how nations view US political values 
and processes as well. 
Given the obvious geopolitical tensions related 
to China, Russia, and the Arab world during the 
campaign, we studied media coverage in each of 
those regions to determine the dominant narrative 
about the election, and initial responses to the 
victory of Donald Trump from each country. We 
incorporated analysis of multiple news sources, tri-
angulating between official or government-aligned 
news sources, oppositional or independent news 
sites, and other sites without express political 
agenda, such as economics or business news sites. 
During the campaign, Arabic media expressed 
concern over both candidates, but especially 
Trump. His comments regarding potential bans on 
Muslims entering the United States were especial-
ly troubling throughout the region. Clinton was 
largely covered as a more ‘responsible’ candidate, 
but her association with Obama-era policies 
regarding non-intervention in the Syrian civil war 
and the rise of ISIL was also covered extensively. 
After the election, reporting on the outcome 
largely followed the narratives in major US news 
outlets that Trump won because of economic 
concerns, although some articles appeared that 
seemed to indicate that a Trump victory would 
lesson Jewish influence on US politics. Qatar’s Al 
Jazeera ran an extensive story on Trump’s victory, 
focusing especially on the role of the US media. 
The broadcaster cast Trump’s victory as a victory 
over US media, which had largely conspired to 
make sure that Clinton would win the race. 
 During the campaign period, Chinese media 
also covered the election prominently, focusing 
especially on Trump’s business experience and his 
outsider status to the political process. Although 
many Chinese on social media were very support-
ive of Trump, as an outsider and as an opponent 
of corruption, the main media outlets focused 
more on Trump’s criticisms of China as a currency 
manipulator, and warned that he might create a 
trade war with China. A number of Chinese media 
outlets repeated a claim that such a trade war 
would cost 5 million US jobs. These media outlets, 
however, refrained from showing an outright 
preference, usually masking criticism by citing the 
words of US academics or media figures. As the 
Trans Pacific Partnership is largely seen in China 
as an attempt to ‘contain’ China geopolitically, 
there was favorable coverage of Trump’s opposition 
to the agreement.
After the election, Chinese media focused 
on the challenges that Trump would face as a 
political novice and in repairing the damage done 
to his reputation and to the established political 
parties. Xinhua, China’s main news agency, ran an 
extensive article detailing the difficulties Trump 
would have in undoing the damage of his language 
during the campaign, which helped to lead to 
social disintegration and disarray. 
Russia’s involvement in the election was 
extraordinary, both from the fears that Russia was 
actively seeking to help Trump win, as well as the 
seeming mutual respect of Trump with Vladimir 
Putin. Russian media during the campaign focused 
on Trump’s business acumen, his strong leadership 
skills, and his willingness to pull away from NATO. 
Trump was portrayed as a ‘reasonable’ candidate, 
and contrasted sharply with Clinton, which 
Russian media tied to the numerous conflicts over 
Russian engagement in Syria, the Ukraine, and 
elsewhere. 
After the election, there was obvious satisfac-
tion with Trump’s election, with wide reports of the 
membership of the Duma breaking into applause 
once Trump’s victory was announced. An article 
in the Moskovskij Komsomolets, a Moscow-based 
daily, argued that Trump was like Gorbachev, 
revealing the internal fractures and weaknesses of 
what seemed like a strong and prosperous country. 
What was truly surprising about the Russian 
coverage was the number of articles reprinted from 
Western press outlets, such as the New York Times, 
the Independent, and other outlets, which argued 
that a Trump victory meant vindication for Russia. 
One such piece, which originated in the Daily 
Beast, published by Inopressa, was entitled “Now it 
is Putin’s world.” 
We found that global press coverage of the 
election was widespread and, although it took cues 
from prominent US outlets, shaped the coverage 
to reflect local or national concerns. These outlets 
reported on all of the scandals covered in the US 
press, but with an additional overlay of where US 
ties and relationships with the various countries 
would go under the next president. By and large, 
the coverage also became a way to criticize both 
US political values and geopolitical strength. The 
scandals of the election were used to illustrate 
the deficiencies of US democratic practice, and 
the outcome of the election was used to show the 
inherent contradictions and weaknesses of US society. 
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We live by metaphors. They help us understand 
the world around us, form opinions, represent the 
ideas cognized and digested. Many researchers 
argue that metaphors have always been the major 
way to conceptualize, categorize, and organize 
human experience. What is more important, these 
metaphors do not only shape our perception of the 
reality, but they also define the way we think and 
act. People behind the media know that very well 
and use metaphors as a powerful tool of persua-
sion used to manipulate public opinion. Thus, the 
media becomes a kind of metaphorical mirror, on 
the one hand, reflecting public views and experi-
ences, on the other hand, creating a certain attitude 
towards some key problems and events.
Every major development that happens in the 
world today gets its unique reflection in this meta-
phorical mirror. The US presidential campaign was 
not an exception. Russian media, as well as people 
all over Russia, were monitoring the situation 
with the United States presidential election of 
2016. This heightened interest in the results of the 
campaign is totally understandable: the outcome 
of the elections would have dramatically influ-
enced the relationships between Russia and the 
United States. So many people, despite not usually 
taking a keen interest in politics, were tracking the 
news, reading and discussing different prognoses, 
making assumptions and forecasts. So how was 
this campaign and the candidates reflected in the 
metaphorical mirror of the Russian media?
The whole campaign was referred to as an 
adventure TV-series, because everything happened 
very quickly, with many sensational revelations, 
and ended in an unexpected way. People were quite 
anxious to watch the next episode of this nail-bit-
ing sequel, waiting for its denouement. Sometimes 
the campaign was perceived as a circus, where 
each candidate, as a magician, pulled a new rabbit 
out of his or her hat. An interesting metaphor was 
used by Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 
Maria Zakharova, who metaphorically called the 
US presidential election “a tango of three”, because 
each time the candidates were talking to the elec-
torate they couldn’t help but mention Russia and 
Vladimir Putin.
Talking about the Democrat and Republi-
can presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton and 
Donald Trump, their metaphorical portrayals, 
created by the Russian media, were extremely con-
tradictory. On the one hand, Hillary Clinton was 
referred to as a lady, very stylish and self-assured, 
a role model for young and ambitious women who 
know what they want and how they can get it. She 
was also compared with a brood hen that takes 
care of her nation, especially children and women. 
On the other hand, her mixed feelings about 
Russia and open criticism of Vladimir Putin led to 
the formation of a negative metaphorical image in 
the Russian media. Hillary Clinton was portrayed 
as pig in a poke, a queen of chaos, a former teacher 
whom you still hate even being an adult. Her sharp 
rhetoric was responsible for picturing Hillary as a 
road roller, which devours everything in its path. 
She was even compared to a Russian fairy-tale 
character of Baba-Yaga, an old witch that steals, 
cooks, and eats her victims, usually children. 
However, in many papers the authors were trying 
to explain this kind of behavior and justify Hillary 
by using a metaphor of an honours student, a 
perfectionist who always struggles to be the first 
in everything.
As for Donald Trump, his metaphorical 
reflection was much more vivid and diverse. On 
the one hand, he was pictured as a narcissist who 
loves himself and is afraid to ‘loose face’, a Ko-
shei-the Immortal – a famous Russian fairy-tale 
character, who is extremely rich and spends all his 
time counting his treasures. On the other hand, 
many negative metaphors connected with Donald 
Trump were used in a positive way, for example, he 
was seen as a devil in a good way because he can 
convince anyone of anything. It is interesting, but 
the authors use mostly zoomorphic metaphors to 
describe Donald Trump and his campaign. He was 
often called a notorious and stubborn bull, putting 
the heat on his campaign, a rooster, who is loud, 
provoking and battailous, a red stallion, who is 
ready to win the American rodeo. The media also 
compared him to a Russian politician Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky, an outspoken party leader in Russia’s 
parliament, who is, in his turn, sometimes 
compared to Donald Trump. 
Nevertheless, let us hope that all these images 
will be perceived merely as reflections in the 
mirror. Are they true or distorted? Can Russians 
really judge a leader upon these metaphorical 
reflections? Only time will tell their accuracy. 
Though never forget that actions make the person, 
not his or her reflection in the mirror. 
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The Greek perspective
For many years, party identification was an 
intrinsic part of the social identity for the majority 
of Greek citizens, which identified themselves 
as supporters of the centre-right party New 
Democracy or of the centre-left party, PASOK. 
The last few years, as Greece struggled with the 
economic crisis and the country’s own identity, the 
citizens turned their backs on the political estab-
lishment that has been formed and in January 2015 
elected a new prime minister, who has promised 
them they would soon return to the ‘good old days’ 
of prosperity.  
The aftermath of that election is well known. 
The new prime minister and his party, SYRIZA 
formed a coalition with a small right-wing party, 
AN.EL., to ensure the parliamentary majority. 
That was followed by six months of govern-
ment negotiations with the EU, the referendum, 
the new bailout programme and new elections 
in September 2015, with the same two parties 
forming a government. 
The Greek public has been very vocal 
throughout this period expressing a wide range 
of emotions in social media. It has been widely 
recognised, and even former political allies of the 
current government have admitted, that social 
media have been an integral part of the promotion 
of the ruling party’s positions. For the past year, 
new political issues arise every day and it seems 
that new party dynamics are starting to develop 
and everything is shared and commented on 
online by everyone. Even though the digital divide 
is still high in Greece compared to other E.U. 
countries, social media are an important platform 
for information, especially since traditional Greek 
media are not considered trustworthy and impartial.
In the past few months, Greek social media 
users were commenting on the primaries and 
the presidential candidacies but it was the last 
few weeks before the elections that almost every 
single Greek Facebook user seemed to make a 
prediction on their outcome. A few days before 
the US election, the Greek public’s attention was 
side-tracked by a government reshuffle and the 
appointment of a very young, well-presented 
woman as new minister of labour, social security 
& social solidarity. Despite that, one day before the 
election’s result, almost all Greek Facebook users 
had shared a thought, a meme, a photo, an article 
about the US presidential candidates. It is quite 
interesting that especially before the elections, the 
majority of these people both from the centre-right 
and centre-left expressed their support for Hillary 
Clinton; others (that previously supported Bernie 
Sanders) were sceptical about the democratic 
candidate but would still consider her as the lesser 
of two evils; then, there were the Trump enthusi-
asts (there is even a Facebook group created by his 
Greek supporters) who related themselves with his 
anti-establishment and anti-immigration rhetoric. 
The majority of parties also favoured the demo-
cratic candidate, while the republican candidate 
was supported by the extreme-right party, Golden 
Dawn, and AN.EL.. Panos Kammenos, the leader 
of AN.EL. and Greek minister of defence, was one 
of the first Greek politicians that congratulated the 
new President-elect via Twitter. He is, after all, an 
avid social media user and has been criticised for 
many of his posts in the past. 
Minutes after the first results were published 
and it was obvious that Donald Trump would 
be the new President of the US, the Greek 
public seemed surprised but not shocked. At 
that moment, social media users focused on the 
common characteristics of the President-elect with 
the Greek Prime Minister and emphasised their 
shared tendency for populism and rhetoric about 
the ‘good people’ who need to unite against the 
governing and corrupt elites. In the following days 
the interest focused on the common characteristics 
of the two men and the effects of the new elected 
US government on the Greek interests. Presi-
dent-elect Donald Trump was no longer portrayed 
as being that bad, but as a man that values his 
Greek-American supporters and advisors.
For many Greek social media users, the results 
of the British E.U. referendum and the US elections 
gave them a sense of vindication. In their opinion, 
other nations make the same mistakes and even 
worse decisions than them. Political partisanship 
in Greece is more fluid than ever and the new 
political identity of the Greek citizens seems to 
shift the focus from parties to ideologies and 
specifically, to those who are against and those who 
support populism. 
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Presidential elections in United States are always 
in public eye, even in small and rather distant 
countries, such as Slovenia. However, in the case 
of 2016 US presidential election, Slovenian interest 
is much more personal. Republican candidate 
Donald Trump is currently married to a Slovenian 
wife; Melania Trump (nee Melanija Knavs and 
renamed to Melania Knauss). The interest in 
Trump in Slovenian media and public exists since 
the fact that Melania Knavs married what was a 
symbol of an American success story. Slovenian 
media were following Trump successes as well as 
failures due to this marriage. In this manner, the 
first reaction to Trump’s announcement he was 
running for the US presidency was concentrated 
on the fact that Slovenia might contribute a first 
lady for the first time in the American history. 
With the development of the Republican primaries 
optimism was increasing as well as the interest, not 
only in the development of the campaign as well 
as in the reality. The Slovenian community in the 
USA was strongly supportive towards the idea of 
a Slovenian first lady (even when they were more 
supportive to the Democratic party). 
With the Republican convention approaching 
and attempts of personal discreditation, Melania 
started to lose popularity in Slovenia. Naked 
photos were rather positively accepted, since it was 
known that her career was in modelling. However, 
the confusion with her education (with no official 
record publicly available) and her long-term 
reported refusal of Slovenia and the Slovenian 
language raised negative sentiments. Her pla-
giarized speech at the convention, together with 
poor performance in English made her a subject 
of fun, not only in American but also among the 
Slovenian public, which started to lean towards the 
position that her performances could be consid-
ered harmful for the image of Slovenia in the world. 
Trump’s sexual scandal, put Melania in the 
spotlight again. Her defence of her husband was 
reported predominantly as a subject of amusement, 
due to her language abilities as well as her 
obviously naive responses. Her story of success 
in the US became a story of the ‘gold-digger’ who 
caught a rich man. At the same time, occasional 
appearances of Ivanka Trump was seen as indi-
cating that the actual first lady will be Ivanka, 
due to her ability to perform effectively in public. 
Slovenian analysts declared the political death of 
Trump, and Melania was considered as irrelevant 
or even part of the problem, since she was unable 
to effectively support her man. Hence interest in 
the US presidential campaign reduced. 
However, Žižek supported the election 
of Trump as a way to initiate political change 
(similar to Brexit, which is considered a demand 
for a different politics and not necessary actual 
exit from the EU). Slovenian analysts/scientists 
predominantly agree that Trump’s election would 
be hazardous due to his lack of predictability in 
international relations, where competences of the 
US president are highest. In the same time Melania 
entered the spotlight once again, with the speech 
in Philadelphia. Which was again proved she could 
not perform appropriately as a first lady. She was 
unable to improve her strongly Slavic English in 
the course of 20 years (despite analysis showing 
her broken English is rather sign of her discomfort 
than anything else). 
After her constant glorification of the USA 
as the promised land she became subject of fun, 
not only in US talk shows, but also among the 
Slovenian public. Her success became disgrace and 
Slovenian media (regardless of political prefer-
ences) concentrated on the usual US presiden-
tial election reporting. It is possible to gain the 
impression that Slovenia excluded Melania due to 
her failure to present herself as a smart, adaptable 
and virtuous woman as well as due to her publicly 
reported rejection of Slovenian roots. Trump 
descended from richest Slovenian son-in-law to 
just another Republican presidential candidate, 
who can potentially harm unstable world peace, for 
which the USA are predominantly held responsible 
in critical circles of Slovenian intellectual elite. 
The election day brought new surprises, 
proving all analytics, certain Clinton’ victory as 
granted, wrong. Slovenian media reported the 
electoral result with enthusiasm and reset the 
reporting on Melania as the success story of a 
Slovenian woman who was to become the next first 
lady. Despite a certain level of (rather unjustified) 
pride, Slovenia will be much more affected by the 
American policies, than by the fact that first lady 
has Slovenian roots (which she misused in her 
political campaign, rejecting her fatherland and 
mother tongue). Media now speculate on whether 
Trump will perform well as President; Slovenia 
media are equally concerned if Melania is able to 
leave any meaningful impression as first lady.
The richest Slovenian son-in-law: the Slovenian 
perspective 
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Trying to avoid Trump: A Canadian experience
Unlike other contributors, I tried to avoid media 
exposure to the 2016 US election campaign. My 
reasoning for this unstructured social experiment? 
I was ineligible to vote, I live in Canada, I study 
Canadian politics, I am busy. I would loosely 
simulate the floating voters who pay little attention 
to politics, and who take information shortcuts to 
form basic impressions about leaders. My non-rep-
resentative sample of one constitutes something 
of a control to illustrate the omnipresence of the 
campaign and captivation with the demagoguery 
of Donald Trump.
I live in North America’s easternmost city, St. 
John’s. I also spend time in a tiny rural community, 
population 110 on Sundays before the church 
closed down. My media consumption was a strict 
diet of small portions of Canadian news television, 
local Newfoundland radio, and Canadian news 
websites and email listserves. I watched bits of the 
debates, and had some brief exposure to American 
networks ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox and CNN. I did 
not use social media or a smartphone, and avoided 
conversation with others about the topic.
Here are my observations as I tried to avoid Trump.
During the primaries, Trump’s use of 
Instagram showed how an inexpensive controlled 
mechanism can build a political brand. His posts 
were information subsidies for the global media 
– free content that is accessible and easy to reuse.
Provocative remarks and lewd behaviour fed an
appetite for dramatic storytelling. Critics’ ensuing
outrage was delicious theatre of heroes and villains.
Forget public policy: this was a never-ending story
arc involving public personas, with audiences
drawn to part soap opera, part sports contest.
As Trump’s celebrity and underdog story grew,
American politics became infotainment on an
international scale. By the time he accepted the Re-
publican nomination, Canadian news had spotted
a ratings winner, analogous to the escapades of Rob
Ford, Toronto’s infamous crack-smoking mayor
(on this, see Duncan Koerber’s 2014 article about
crisis communication in the Canadian Journal of
Communication). It became impossible to avoid
Trump because everyone wanted to talk about the
shocking behaviour of a populist who eschews
conventional wisdom.
It was soon a norm to evoke Trump in every 
social setting. Posters at Memorial University 
advertised public talks, ranging from a “Trump 
and Tacos” politics event to an English professor 
evoking Trumpian literary analogies. At a talk to 
discuss my book about Canadian political com-
munication, the first questions were about Trump. 
At a staff meeting, an apolitical woman confessed 
interest in the election, explaining “it makes 
me feel dirty.” People with no post-secondary 
education in households that are otherwise inter-
ested only in local Newfoundland news became 
glued to CNN, watching late into the night. As 
Election Day neared, the Canadian Television 
Network’s news channel and website featured a 
digital countdown. The St. John’s chapter of Equal 
Voice, an organization that seeks to elect Canadian 
women, hosted an election night event. On the 
morning of November 9, St. John’s CBC radio 
uncharacteristically held a local call-in show about 
the results.
As with Ford, the tone of Canadian news 
and the public sphere was a mixture of perplex-
ity, anxiety, morbid fascination and, above all, 
classism. Pollsters relayed that Canadians over-
whelmingly preferred Hillary Clinton. Americans 
would want to relocate to Canada in the event of 
a Trump victory and realtors were on standby. A 
website urged citizens to move to Cape Breton, an 
island in Atlantic Canada. After the vote was in, 
the Canadian immigration website crashed. There 
is both smugness and relief about Canada being 
led by Justin Trudeau, the dashing Liberal prime 
minister. Meanwhile, Conservative Party leader-
ship contestant Kellie Leitch is grabbing headlines 
by evoking Trump as she rallies against Canadian 
elites and calls for immigrants to be screened for 
Canadian values.
Why were so many Canadians caught up in 
the American election? The globalization of news 
and communications technology is one expla-
nation. Beat reporters have become multitaskers 
operating in a digital-first, mobile-first environ-
ment. In Newfoundland newsrooms, journalists 
stare at computer screens and smartphones, 
chasing whatever is trending on social media. 
Content comes in from Toronto and digital infor-
mation subsidies constitute clickbait. Canadian 
coverage of American politics constricted 
attention that might otherwise have been directed 
at resolving local issues, or perhaps Hurricane 
Matthew which in early October caused mass 
destruction and deaths in Haiti. 
My take-away is that a vote for Trump was 
likely a vote against elites concentrated in urban 
centres who are perceived as promoting metro-
politan righteousness and who frown upon rural 
citizens. Social activists’ moral condemnation of 
a plain-speaking populist stirred anger against an 
establishment seen to be advancing a politically 
correct orthodoxy. More broadly, Canadians and 
others should question the implications of a global 
media system that displaces coverage of local 
public policy and human disasters in the devel-
oping world in favour of infotainment originating 
from major media centres.
Digital 
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Did Russia just hand Donald Trump the 
presidency? 
Donald J. Trump is now the President-elect of the 
United States. Running on a platform of nation-
alist populism and anger at the status quo of the 
‘business as usual’ politics of Washington, DC, 
the New York billionaire shocked the world by 
defeating Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton. 
Winning perhaps one of the most divisive elections 
in recent memory, Trump will now be leader 
of the free world. One question that remains is 
whether Russian cyber and information operations 
launched during the campaign were a deciding 
factor in the outcome of this election. 
The US government has implicated the 
Russian government in being responsible for the 
hacks of the DNC, the DCCC, and the emails of 
Clinton’s campaign chair John Podesta. Hacking 
groups such as Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear as well 
as individuals such as Guccifer 2.0 were named 
as the culprits, and these groups have known ties 
to the Kremlin. The information contained in 
these data breaches was subsequently dumped to 
WikiLeaks for public consumption. A retaliatory 
response to these information campaigns has been 
promised by the Obama Administration, but this 
has yet to manifest. 
Russian President Vladimir Putin had good 
reason to prefer Trump over Clinton as president. 
Trump has entertained the idea of recognizing 
the Russian annexation of Crimea as legitimate, 
of weakening the bonds with NATO allies, and 
cooperating with Russia in Syria by withdraw-
ing support for US-backed rebels. Clinton is an 
ardent supporter of the ousting of Russia-backed 
Syrian President Assad, has been outspoken about 
continuing economic sanctions against Russia for 
its actions in Ukraine, and has not ruled out more 
NATO expansion. From a Russian national interest 
perspective, Trump is the preferred candidate 
of Russia. 
Returning to the question, did Russia just 
help elect their preferred candidate President of 
the United States? Such an accusation has huge 
implications for the integrity of the world’s oldest 
democracy. But this claim is dubious when one 
reflects on the campaigns and public opinion of the 
last few months. Beginning with the DNC hacks 
that were released at the beginning of the Demo-
cratic National Convention in July, this informa-
tion exposed by WikiLeaks showed that top party 
brass were biased toward Mrs. Clinton winning the 
nomination. Yet these leaks did not have an impact 
on public opinion; in fact, Clinton saw a post-con-
vention bounce that lasted for weeks. The subse-
quent DCCC leaks also a demonstrated minimal 
impact on opinions of the Democratic nominee 
and her chances for winning the White House.
WikiLeaks ‘October Surprise’ came in the 
form of the hacked emails of the Clinton campaign 
CEO John Podesta. These emails showed the 
inner workings of the Clinton campaign, with no 
real change in public opinion until the bombshell 
announcement by FBI Director James Comey that 
he will reopen investigation into Hillary Clinton’s 
use of a private email server during her tenure as 
Secretary of State. Her favorability dropped to a 
near tie with Donald Trump and never recovered 
up until election day. So, although Russian in-
formation campaigns on the American election 
is extremely troubling, it did not have a major 
impact on the result. What it did succeed in doing 
is sowing discontent and mistrust in American 
democratic institutions, an impact that cannot be 
measured accurately at this time. 
It would also be unfair to blame the Hillary 
Clinton loss on the actions of FBI director James 
Comey. It is now apparent that most of the polls 
were wrong throughout the campaign, and that 
Donald Trump tapped into a populist sentiment 
that resonated with many rural white voters who 
have been politically sidelined by both parties for 
decades. Hillary Clinton’s campaign was com-
placent and even cocky, thinking that it could 
win with the Obama coalition that propelled the 
current president to two terms by winning the 
coasts and the safe states of the upper Midwest. 
But Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin 
were taken for granted and went red. This was 
Clinton’s deathblow. She was a victim of a flawed 
campaign and the electoral college system, and this 
is the second time this has happened to a Demo-
cratic candidate in 16 years where the latter wins 
the popular vote but not the federal system of state 
to state voting. 
The United States and the world is now 
preparing for a President Trump; a man with 
no government experience who ran a divisive 
campaign built on anger. The effects of Russian 
cyber and information operations are negligible 
but troubling for future Western elections. The 
wave of anti-globalization is consuming the West. 
For good or bad, this is becoming the new normal. 
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In the final months of the US presidential 
campaign, Julian Assange returned to form, 
injecting into the election new questions about 
politics and politicians, and reigniting a discussion 
of WikiLeaks’ particular brand of digital journalism. 
At a time when attention was on what we 
hoped to know about Donald Trump – his tax 
releases, his income, his suitability for office – 
WikiLeaks presented us with a series of email 
releases about Clinton – from the Democrat-
ic National Committee (DNC) and campaign 
manager John Podesta – that instead posed new 
questions about Clinton in the late stages of a 
campaign that seemed increasingly heading 
for victory.
The first reaction was of conspiracy – 
targeting Clinton seemed anathema to the ‘general 
consensus’, such that it was. This risked a liberal 
order, where Trump represented a decline of 
Western democracy, and while fallible, Clinton 
could preserve such a world. Assange was seen 
as colluding with Russian hackers (casting doubt 
on the material), disrupting democratic norms 
(leading to a severing of his internet access while 
campaigns concluded), and of going after the 
wrong target (pining for as revelatory a release 
about Trump). This last accusation was made with 
such strength that WikiLeaks responded with its 
vision of journalism: “an open model of jour-
nalism that gatekeepers are uncomfortable with, 
but which is perfectly harmonious with the First 
Amendment.” 
To make sense of WikiLeaks in this context, 
however, requires understanding its dual mission: 
As journalism, and as a sharp critic of the same. 
Since its emergence, WikiLeaks sought to 
irritate dominant notions of journalism, attacking 
mainstream journalism as complacent, while advo-
cating that for the public which journalism should 
serve, WikiLeaks’ approach was in their interest. 
We are also reminded in these disclosures that 
Assange’s philosophy (as it can be discerned) has 
never fit ‘left’ versus ‘right’ ideologies easily, and 
rather is oriented sharply against the ‘powerful’. As 
an editor, Assange expresses this through familiar 
journalistic ideals as a watchdog, and a strong 
commitment to the public. Hillary Clinton, first as 
Secretary of State and then as candidate, has been 
a symbol of the way power has been consolidated 
within a small circle of actors, and frequent subject 
of WikiLeaks’ focus.
The late David Carr captured this well when 
he headlined a piece exploring WikiLeaks and 
compatriots in 2010 as “Journalists, Provoca-
teurs, maybe both?”. In its simplicity, this outlines 
the challenge WikiLeaks presents not only as a 
prominent voice in the news, but also as an organ-
ization that moves ably between journalistic and 
activist roles, with little consternation of whether 
that suits dominant persuasions of either.
This latest episode reminds us as well of the 
capability of digitally adept actors to be particular-
ly disruptive when donning a journalistic mantle: 
an embarrassed Debbie Wasserman-Schultz 
stepped down from DNC leadership after emails 
showed she favored Clinton over Bernie Sanders, 
leaks in the Podesta ‘tranche’ revealed Democratic 
operative Donna Brazile sharing a debate question 
with the campaign, prompting her resignation 
as an analyst for CNN, and long the subject of 
speculation the Podesta emails also gave the public 
its first glimpse of Clinton’s paid speeches to Wall 
Street (fittingly the focus was on maintaining 
‘private’ and ‘public’ positions on policy, something 
made difficult by new journalistic actors like 
Julian Assange).
Finally, for understanding the challenges 
WikiLeaks presents to journalism, one has to see 
that the reaction to disregard their approach to 
journalism indicates a tendency to valorize certain 
traditions of journalism that dictate what is per-
missible– a ‘good’ way to do journalism based on 
traditional norms. Yet when we look at journal-
ism’s socio-functional roles (news and journalism 
shaping, informing, and challenging our under-
standing of society) we can find in WikiLeaks’ 
work at least an embrace of these notions, even if it 
does so while irritating prominent visions of what 
journalism is or drifting towards conspiracy. 
A week after the US elections, a photo was 
posted online at Gizmodo.com of a cat, wearing a 
necktie, parading around in a window of the Ecua-
dorian Embassy. This cat is just the sort of clichéd 
image we have come to expect traipsing across the 
internet, but for the seriousness of the cat’s owner, 
Julian Assange, a man whose public persona 
exudes anything but frivolity, and whose embrace 
of digital technologies and media are anything but 
clichéd. 
Dismissed in the headline as “bored and 
irrelevant, Julian Assange…”, the tail end of the US 
campaign has shown that rather than irrelevant 
(though possibly still bored), Assange and his 
inclination to expose information continues to 
shape how we are able to view the world, and the 
way journalism is embraced by an increasingly vast 
set of actors working online. Irritating to some, 
uncomfortable to many, WikiLeaks’ approach 
to sharing news and information has once again 
placed on center stage provocative questions about 
what it is to ‘do’ journalism in the 21st century.
During and after the 2016 US presidential election, 
a number of commentators in the media and 
scholars of political communication and jour-
nalism embraced the notion that the ascent of 
president-elect Donald Trump as the Republi-
can nominee was, at least in significant part, the 
product of social media and media change more 
broadly. Even more broadly, commentators tell us 
that Trump was successful because the Internet 
has brought about a “post fact” or “post truth” era, 
and point to “filter bubbles” as a significant factor in 
his rise.
As illuminating as these accounts sometimes 
are, they fundamentally ignore larger historical, 
cultural, and institutional factors that have created 
the context for Trump’s rise, especially the precipi-
tous decline in citizen trust in government, profes-
sional journalism, and scientific expertise and the 
growing political importance of the white nation-
alist right in the United States. Attributing Donald 
Trump’s electoral success exclusively, or even 
primarily, to media and technological change is to 
dangerously abstract from the conditions that made 
it possible, even as new technologies have undoubt-
edly proved tactically effective for the candidate.
It is worth remembering that there have long 
been various strains of conservative movements 
that have embraced an amalgam of paranoid con-
spiracy theories, denied the existence of basic facts, 
adopted an anti-institutions posture, distrusted 
expertise, and embraced the uncompromising, 
anti-pragmatic politics stance that many com-
mentators and academics see in Trump’s rise. In 
the 1950s, the historian Richard Hofstadter called 
this the “paranoid style of American politics,” 
which was fueled by feelings of victimhood and 
nostalgia, the fear of political breakdown, status 
insecurity, and a persistent irrational fear of global 
conspiracy. The historian Lisa McGirr traces the 
history of the New Right since the 1960s among 
affluent and suburban Sun Belt men and women, 
who combined a religious emphasis on Protestant 
moral values with themes of anti-communism and 
small government, deregulation, and anti-union 
and public employee sentiment, all of which were 
driven by conspiracy theories propagated in right 
wing films, study groups, books, newsletters, and 
national media outlets.
Throughout this history, the Republican 
Party has been the institutional vehicle for these 
right wing movements, providing them with the 
infrastructure to engage in electoral politics and 
advance their policy aims. Political communication 
scholars have, ironically, not done a very good 
job studying ideas, favoring instead studies of 
their strategic presentation, what we call ‘frames’. 
But it is precisely ideas of religious purity, small 
government, and racial difference that lie at the 
heart of the conservative identity that has defined 
the Republican Party for four decades, although 
the expression of these ideas takes various forms. 
Decades of conservative movement identity work, 
in our own time through conservative media infra-
structure such as FOX news, has helped usher in 
the broad anti-institutional movement style of the 
right and the motivated reasoning that has shaped 
conservative views on everything from the denial 
of climate change to the distrust of legacy journal-
ism. Meanwhile, the moral narratives of good hard 
working white Americans who are being taken 
advantage of by government bureaucrats, illegal 
immigrants, and the liberal elite on FOX News and 
in the rhetoric of the Republican Party’s candi-
dates that Arlie Russell Hochschild documents in 
her fieldwork on the Tea Party, and that fuels the 
resentment Katherine Cramer documents, laid the 
groundwork for the white identity politics behind 
Trump’s run. 
The internet did not bring about a ‘post-fact’ 
or ‘post truth’ era, nor did it bring about con-
spiracy theories, white nationalism, conservative 
identity and its farcical villains, and the distrust 
of institutionalized ways of producing knowledge, 
from journalism to science. Conservative 
movements since the post World War II era did, 
alongside its institutional vehicle, the Republican 
Party, and its media apparatus, from conservative 
radio talk shows to FOX News. The uptake of 
social media likely has given broader exposure to 
the particular mix of racial resentment, conserv-
ative identity, populist rhetoric, and economic 
anxiousness that marked the 2016 US presidential 
election and afforded it greater visibility, but it did 
not cause them. The emergence of outlets such as 
Brietbart, primarily distributed through Facebook, 
and Trump’s Twitter rantings might have legitimat-
ed dispensing with the dog whistle in favor of a 
racial bullhorn, but the underlying idea that white 
Americans are under a unique threat from people 
of color, elites, and experts resonates with millions 
who have been told that for decades by members 
of the Republican Party. And, while social media 
might increase the speed of half-truths, rumors, 
and outright lies, it did not create the cynical 
public that does not understand, or care to, how 
knowledge producing institutions work. Conserv-
ative movements and the Republican Party did 
that too. 
Social media did not give us Donald Trump and 
it is not weakening democracy
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everyone is the media 
In 1961, the playwright Arthur Miller mused, “a 
good newspaper, I suppose, is a nation talking to 
itself.” The assertion seems oddly quaint at a time 
when the US elected a president who was continu-
ally at odds with the press. Donald Trump inten-
tionally positioned himself as an outsider of the 
established institutions of democratic deliberation. 
He bypassed the media to connect directly with his 
supporters, while simultaneously benefiting from 
the media to spread his message. Supporters and 
opponents became the media themselves, spreading 
and amplifying subjective and emotional affective 
news designed to provoke passion, not inform.
The triumph of Trump signals the contested 
nature of the media due to tectonic shifts in the 
mechanisms and pathways for news. The once 
privileged position of media organisations as the 
primary gatekeepers of news flows to the public 
has been undermined by the industry’s economic 
woes, the emergence of digital information 
merchants, shifting audience practices and the 
spread of social media platforms. The ability to 
decide “all the news that’s fit to print” is shared 
between traditional and new media outlets, activist 
groups, celebrities, citizens and computer code. 
News exists in a contested, chaotic and circular 
environment where emotion often overrides 
evidence, fuelling the rise of polarised, passionate 
and personalised streams of information.
As newsrooms across Middle America are 
hollowed out, most new digital media outlets are 
concentrated along the blue-tinged coasts of east 
and west. The result is a media that only sees a 
wide swathe of US voters from 35,000 feet. These 
voters did not see themselves reflected in the main-
stream media and instead identified with Trump’s 
outsider message of defiance. The loss of influence 
is even more apparent given the high number 
of newspapers that endorsed Hillary Clinton. 
Endorsements do not define the outcome but can 
help to build momentum behind a candidate. 
The waning authority of newspapers is un-
surprising given that no more than 3 per cent of 
Americans named local and national print outlets 
as the most helpful source for election news. News 
websites fared slightly better, cited by 13 per cent. 
Instead, cable news and social media emerged as 
the two ‘most helpful’ sources of election news. 
Arguably, they were also the worst. 
Cable news is a misnomer. These networks are 
not in the business of evidence-based reporting. 
They are in the emotion business. And emotion 
sells. Ratcheting up anger and outrage on cable 
makes business sense. Trump’s fiery and obnoxious 
rhetoric was a ratings bonanza, spurring a growth 
in viewership for the first time in three years 
and, with it, rising revenues. Viewers tune into 
the channel that mirrors their personal political 
leanings, as audiences gravitate towards media that 
reflects and reinforces their biases and beliefs. 
Social media offers a space for voters to find, 
support and share facts, falsehoods or feelings. The 
impact of Facebook is staggering given that more 
than 40 per cent of Americans get their news from 
the social media behemoth. Facebook doesn’t just 
bring together audiences for the news. It shapes 
the news for audiences, drawn from the choices of 
their social connections and regurgitated by algo-
rithms to match personal preferences. It is a space 
deliberately designed to envelop users in the cosy 
embrace of the familiar, not challenge misinformed 
views or address unsubstantiated rumours.
Conspiracy theories about politics flourish 
on social media, where the currency is virality 
not truth. People will share false information if 
it fits their view of the world. Even if some don’t 
quite believe it, they will share an article with the 
aim of entertaining, exciting or enraging friends 
and acquaintances. Fake news spreads so fast that 
potentially hundreds of thousands of people could 
have seen it by the time it gets debunked. Facebook 
was already criticised for failing to stem the rise of 
fake news before the election results came in, with 
even Barack Obama talking about a “dust cloud 
of nonsense.” 
When everyone can be the media, both left 
and right sought to be the media. Sometimes it 
was through the use of automated propaganda 
bots on Twitter. One study found bots were behind 
50-55 per cent of Clinton’s Twitter activity. That’s
nothing compared to the 80 per cent for Trump.
Such frenzied tweeting is intended to create the
impression of a groundswell of public opinion. At
other times, it was engaged publics who took to
social media to craft their own election narrative.
For example, Clinton supporters appropriated the
#nastywoman to show their support for a female
candidate. Trump supporters took to #repeal19,
the amendment that gave women the right to vote.
Such a media diet of affective news designed 
to stir up passions, feed prejudices and polarise 
publics is a far cry from the practices of insti-
tutional journalism.  Reporting is kept separate 
from opinion and commentary. Facts are prized, 
with emotion finding its place in features, rather 
than the news. Looking back, facts never stood a 
chance. Beyond the weaknesses and failings of the 
news industry, in a smackdown between emotion 
and evidence, emotion always wins. Audiences 
swim in a media blend of tumbling facts, 
comment, experience and emotion, resulting in a 
news cocktail tailored to individual tastes.
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Real-life developments are the lifeblood of jour-
nalism. Naturally, journalists are drawn to spaces 
where news events and stories unfold. Twitter was 
one of the US election’s most popular social spaces 
for public and real-time analysis, commentary, 
and deliberation of two notoriously polarizing 
candidates (recall, for example, #TrumpTapes, and 
the Twitterstorm that followed the Washington 
Post’s release of a 2005 video where Donald Trump 
boasts about sexually assaulting women). 
Journalists’ affiliation with legacy news media 
traditionally warranted their adherence to a set 
of institutionally defined values, procedures and 
practices, and many news organizations attempt 
to uphold these on social media platforms via in-
stitutional policies that encourage or even regulate 
engagement. Ahead of the election, digital native 
Buzzfeed and legacy media such as The New York 
Times and Washington Post sent out memos to 
their staff, which reminded them to refrain from 
bias on social media when covering the heated 
election. This already foreshadowed that some 
journalists’ Twitter engagement during this time 
might not be as impartial and balanced.
Journalists who covered the election had to 
handle a striking and unprecedented amount of 
soft news topics. For example, an analysis by the 
Columbia Journalism Review found that this year’s 
first presidential debate focused more on person-
ality than any other in US history. For political 
journalism – one of the classic hard news genres 
with an undisputed focus on fact and analysis – 
this became uneven territory at times, as personal 
attributes, subjective experiences and character 
judgments took center stage and even turned into 
news stories themselves. 
 It was precisely these kinds of stories, the 
‘softer’ ones, that encouraged many tweeting 
journalists to be snarky, witty and funny in their 
coverage. And tweets of this nature with high en-
tertainment value (but low news value) happened 
to be those that did exceptionally well on the 
platform in terms of generating audience engage-
ment and driving traffic – a very much desired 
outcome by both individual journalists as well as 
the news organizations they work for. To compli-
cate matters for what we normatively understand 
as ‘quality journalism’, both of these (i.e. being 
funny on Twitter and followers liking it) clearly 
reinforced each other. 
It was an election that stirred up many 
political sentiments in all corners of the country, 
including the news industry, where many 
candidate endorsements were unexpected or broke 
long-standing traditions of party support. Donald 
Trump quickly developed a reputation for picking 
fights with media outlets, blacklisted some of them 
(which was later reversed, but the overall message 
this sent was loud and clear), he publically attacked 
countless reporters, and made a name for himself 
as a bully on Twitter. Leading up to election day, 
USA Today reported a ‘massive rise’ in election-re-
lated hate speech on Twitter, much of which 
seemed directed at journalists. While Twitter has 
just started to address abuse on its platform, news 
organizations often don’t provide support for jour-
nalists to manage negative experiences and attacks, 
as findings from my research suggest.
Twitter is often perceived as a repository of 
what’s clever, and its culture as ‘casual’, so some 
reporters have found it difficult to bite their 
tongue. What came out was often emotionally 
charged, opinionated and biased to some degree or 
other. As I’ve argued before, this may not neces-
sarily be to dish out revenge, but to blow off steam 
or out of a protective instinct for one’s reputation 
and career. 
We know of many past examples where 
journalists have gotten into trouble for saying 
something on Twitter they shouldn’t have (leading 
to suspensions or even losing their jobs). While 
some reporters during this election have trans-
gressed what their professional code (and quite 
possibly an institutional social media policy) 
outlines as acceptable professional behavior, we 
rarely heard of consequences. My research findings 
support this: the majority of journalists are aware 
that their engagement on Twitter also waves their 
employer’s flag on it. Thus, news organizations 
tend to reap the benefits of journalists pro-active 
Twitter presence and allow the occasional degree 
of freedom a journalist may take, and reserve inter-
vention only for when things go wrong. 
Biased reporters on Twitter seemed to have 
gotten away with what was once a privilege 
reserved for opinion writers. 
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In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s election as 
the 45th President of the United States, there is 
much soul-searching about the state of journal-
ism: How could journalists have been so wrong? 
How and why did they misread the electorate? Is 
political journalism fundamentally broken, given 
how much of it is built around horse-race polling 
that was shown to be erroneous anyway? Did 
data journalism, so recently seen as a key part of 
journalism’s digital future, fail us? As one exas-
perated observer put it: “So all the fact-checking 
of Trump’s lies, all the investigative journalism 
about his failures, even the tapes—none of it meant 
anything.” In short, what happened to news and its 
normative purpose in the political process?
Setting aside their relative merits for a 
moment, these critiques and others like them carry 
an implicit assumption: “news” still means more 
or less what we think it means. But is that really 
a safe assumption, anymore? In much of journal-
ism studies, and in much of the metajournalistic 
discourse that occurs as pundits and audiences 
alike critique the press and its performance, the 
discussion often assumes that when we talk about 
news, we’re all more or less talking about the same 
thing - that there’s some kind of thingy-ness to 
recognizing news as news.
True, there have always been charges of media 
bias and manipulation, and lately no shortage of 
mistrust in the press much like other professions 
and institutions. Moreover, as we show in Bound-
aries of Journalism, determining what counts 
as journalism and who counts as a journalist 
is a perpetual struggle for definitional control. 
Nevertheless, news was assumed to be something 
everyone recognized, even if with a certain distaste 
for the product or disdain for its producers. You 
didn’t have to like the news, but you recognized it 
when you saw it.
No single trend explains the dissolution of 
news. For example, consider what has happened 
to news from the perspective of Trump supporters 
in rural America. As Joshua Benton points out in 
Nieman Journalism Lab, newspapers that served 
as key community institutions have been hollowed 
out, much like the factories and church pews, 
and the print-to-digital shift has only accelerat-
ed the concentration of power to coastal news 
elites—the same elites who mostly responded to 
Trump and his ilk with snark and scorn, either 
explicitly on Twitter or implicitly in their framing 
of news coverage. Cable news and talk radio 
provide platforms for challenging the legitimacy of 
so-called “mainstream news” with incessant claims 
of liberal media bias while encouraging selective 
exposure among partisan lines.
More recently, social media make possible 
(cheap-to-make) fake news, the easy spreadability 
of misinformation, and the social and algorith-
mic orientations toward homophily. Together, 
those influences won the day (for example see 
this, this or this). Shared notions of “news” did 
not. Facebook especially, as Benton puts it, has 
“become a single point of failure for civic informa-
tion… Some of it is driven by ideology, but a lot is 
driven purely by the economic incentive structure 
Facebook has created: The fake stuff, when it 
connects with a Facebook user’s preconceived 
notions or sense of identity, spreads like wildfire.” 
The central problem is that social media, rather 
than being a mere source of political information, 
is increasingly the structure for political discussion, 
as Phil Howard of the Oxford Internet Institute 
describes: “Social media platforms have provided 
a structure for spreading around fake news, we 
users tend to trust our friends and family, and we 
don’t hold media technology firms accountable for 
degrading our public conversations.”
What we ended up with was a filter bubble 
election. The decline of shared news, the echo 
chambers of partisan media, and the algorithms 
that serve confirmation biases coalesce in frighten-
ing ways for the future of the republic. Much of the 
post mortem criticism now being levelled at the 
news media assumes that basic terms like “news” 
have some shared understandings attached to 
them, some agreed-upon normative expectations 
for journalism in public life. We shouldn’t be so 
sure anymore, and scholars need to figure out why.
This is also an ongoing issue, not a static one. 
It is clear that the forces of division in politics and 
in the media ecology reinforce each other in ways 
that portend greater cleavages for future elections. 
One way forward is to move beyond an interest 
in how information circulates across channels to 
attend more to what these messages are from a 
holistic viewpoint. No single laid-off newspaper 
reporter, talk-radio broadcast, or item in a social 
media newsfeed can explain the forces that are 
shaping how we think about journalism. It is only 
by looking across these outlets and their intercon-
nections that we can hope to understand the media 
world that surrounds us.
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The discussion about filter bubbles has exploded 
after the 2016 US election. Evidence suggests 
voters access separate, ideologically homogenous, 
newsfeeds – the Red Feed and the Blue Feed as 
demonstrated by the Wall Street Journal. Therefore 
it is time to ask more questions about how algo-
rithmic platforms such as Facebook and Google 
impact voters’ information environment during 
elections. As we know from numerous Facebook 
press releases, Facebook strives to select the most 
relevant and engaging content to appear in the 
Newsfeed. But how should society deal with a 
‘relevant’ newsfeed that turns into a filter bubble, 
often based on fake news? 
Quality of information is particularly 
important during elections campaigns, when the 
electorate should make informed choices about 
candidates and policies. Obviously social media 
did not give us Donald Trump, as argued by Daniel 
Kreiss - larger historical, cultural factors have given 
ground for Trump’s presidency: such as frustration, 
polarisation and mistrust in elites and institutions. 
But I will still argue it is worthwhile to discuss the 
quality of information voters interact with in the 
decision-making process and how information is 
selected and presented. Thus, fake news and Face-
book’s algorithm is relevant in this context. 
An increasing number of citizens are using 
social media to follow the election campaign and 
inform themselves about the candidates. In 2016, 
62% of Americans got some news via social media, 
up from 49% in 2012 according to a Pew survey. 
Facebook is in this context the most used platform, 
in addition to Reddit and Twitter. 44 percent of US 
adults and two thirds of Americans aged 18 to 29 
claimed to have used social media in an ordinary 
week in order to learn more about the 2016 presi-
dential election.
It is still too early to tell how strong the filter 
bubble has been for voters in this election, but Wall 
Street Journal’s website Blue Feed and Red Feed 
gives us a pretty good idea of the sharp contrast 
between the two information streams. 
The most relevant and engaging newsfeed 
might be wonderful for users and consumers, 
but concerning for scholars of democracy. If the 
information environment becomes so polarized 
and fragmented, it allows voters to live in different 
realities –the so-called balkanization of the public 
sphere. It gets even more problematic when fake 
news is added into the filter bubble. Fake news got 
heavy circulation online during the run-up to the 
election, and Facebook’s algorithm allowed the 
misinformation to be amplified and disseminated widely.
Filter bubbles are often understood as 
personal ecosystem of information that has been 
catered by algorithms, such as Google or Facebook. 
This way, the users are presented with information 
that confirms and strengthens their own cultural 
or ideological bubbles. Even though the term filter 
bubble got its digital definition from Pariser, we 
have had analogue filter bubbles that skews or 
limits our views, but historically, they have been 
related to our news consumption, education, social 
network, or geography, to mention a few of our 
social filter bubbles. There has always been too 
much information in the world for us to grasp, 
comprehend and register, so we have filtered and 
excluded information based on our needs. Before 
the internet, editorial media helped us sort and 
prioritize information and news. After the internet 
became mainstream, algorithms became useful 
tools to sort and present information, either it was 
related to which book to buy, which movie to see, 
which song to listen to, or which news story to read. 
Facebook’s role in selecting and calculating 
the most “relevant” information has ramifications 
that are also political. The debate about whether 
Facebook is a media or a technology company 
got intensified earlier this fall. The Norwegian 
newspaper Aftenposten protested Facebook’s 
censorship of the Napalm girl picture, arguing that 
Facebook made editorial decisions interfering with 
the free press. As Facebook increasingly becomes 
the information source for people around the 
world, the company has a unique responsibility in 
striving for information diversity and quality. In 
addition to “relevant” and “engaging”, “serendipity” 
should be built into the newsfeed. The Red Feed 
and the Blue Feed reinforces old filter bubbles from 
the party press era. Do we want filter bubbles to 
be reflections of the party press that we got rid of 
decades ago in liberal democracies? If Facebook is 
not able to diversify and fact-check the newsfeed, 
the most popular social network might end up 
with an algorithmic driven newsfeed based on fake 
party propaganda. 
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Two tribes go to vote: symbolism on election day
Typically private thoughts underpinning voter 
choices are hidden within the black boxes of 
human psychology. One might assume how 
choices are arrived at through statistical analysis 
of available data. However such analyses cannot 
capture how emotions and feelings inform 
specific choices.
In the digital age some make feelings public. 
This piece is based on observations of the use of 
social media, and in particular Instagram, to show 
how symbolism, through the interaction between 
visuals and text offers meaning to the act of voting 
and voter choice making. 
Tweets and posts to social media accounts 
from the queues outside the polling stations offer 
such insights. The political meet the mundane 
in the tweet “waiting to vote Trump, hungry for 
change, hungry for a big mac” one of many similar 
contributions which show how voting and the 
election impinge on but fit within broader life 
experience. However Instagram offers a different 
set of affordances. Here we can see how symbolism 
is used to show a shared identity about how on 8th 
November in the US two tribes went to vote.
Tribe Trump
Trump supporters’ text reflected the very broad 
and very mundane aspects of their candidate’s 
campaign. Making America great, some adding 
‘again’ was repeated a lot as a broad call to arms. 
Issue politics of the everyday were also referenced; 
protecting jobs… from immigrants, the Chinese, 
and a variety of outside threats. Taking the country 
back, from bankers, corrupt politicians, Muslims, 
immigrants, was also a theme; where politicians 
were mentioned as the ‘other’ the slogan ‘drain the 
swamp’ was invoked. 
But of more interest was how pictures were 
used to accompany these. Sometimes it was simply 
‘Old Glory’, the flag as the ultimate symbol of 
nationalism which accompanied an act of pat-
riotism. If voting was motivated by a desire to 
make America great, the flag tended to feature. 
Other contributors used more humorous pictures. 
Someone took a picture of a sink plunger and 
accompanied this with the text ‘off to vote Trump 
to unblock our system’. Others had more sinister 
overtones. A picture of a cache of arms, one hopes 
to have been a stock Google image, accompanied 
the text ‘voting Trump to exterminate immi-
grants’. Such ideas, with one picture of a queue of 
black Americans accompanied by ‘why I’m voting 
Trump’ showed that while not every Trump voter 
was racist, most racists voted Trump. Where the 
voters showed themselves or others as the ‘in tribe’, 
they tended to by white, middle aged or older, 
casually or very informally dressed and holding or 
wearing symbols of the nation.
Tribe Clinton
Clinton supporters overtly showed a more middle 
class image, those who showed themselves tended 
to be female and this was symbolically invoked 
as the motivation for voting. A 30 something, 
well dressed lady with two daughters is pictured 
saying, ‘We are making history for the women of 
America’. This theme was frequently replicated 
across various states. Even in Alaska, one of the 
safest Republican states, a woman showed herself 
in the act of voting to say ‘let’s make history, put a 
woman in the White House’. Few policy initiatives 
were invoked; the symbolism reflected the shared 
gender of candidate and voters.
A more diverse bunch told their followers they 
were voting Clinton to block Trump. One man 
is pictured holding his nose accompanied by the 
comment ‘an anti-Trump Clinton voter’. Whether 
her image, gender or scandal-mired campaign 
drove this antipathy is not expressed, rather 
pictures of queues, feet in a line, or voting booths 
accompanied the phrases ‘voting’ and ‘anyone but 
Trump’. There seemed less positive reasons moti-
vating those that voted Clinton beyond a small but 
highly motivated group of women who wanted a 
female president.
Othering
The tribes did not simply use pictures of them-
selves. Images of Ku Klux Klansmen, ‘Bubba’ the 
stereotypical redneck, even Wile E. Coyote was 
pictured as a typical Trump voter. While some 
Trump supporters showed pictures of Black 
American and Hispanic voters to suggest the racial 
significance of their vote, others offered a more an-
ti-establishment perspective. One queue, featuring 
mostly men and women dressed in work clothes, 
including dungarees with one man in a suit in the 
middle accompanied the text: ‘spot the Clinton 
voter’. Here we saw the tribes self-identify through 
the act of othering; defining what they are not in 
order to claim a shared identity.
Tribal Politics
Instagram was used by a range of citizens, all voted, 
some were fervent supporters, some just wanted 
to be part of the moment and make a statement. 
The tribes demonstrated points of connection with 
their chosen candidate and made identity refer-
ences. Trump’s supporters showed diversity along 
issue lines. Some wanted job security, others white 
supremacy with connections and convergences 
along a long continuum. Clinton supporters made 
gender the issue, others physically or symbolically 
held their nose to try block Trump. In turning 
their experiences into an image they made voting a 
symbolic act, capturing their innermost feelings as 
they took part in this most historic of contests.
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The Twitter technology for sharing is retweeting. 
You find a tweet or a url referencing something on 
the web that you think is interesting or important, 
and you tell Twitter to retweet it. Twitter then 
sends it to all of your followers, to people with 
whom you are sharing thoughts. It is important to 
us as observers to know what was being shared and 
how widely it was shared. What is the reach of this 
sharing?
Tweets were collected from the streaming API 
with the search terms ‘Clinton’ and ‘Trump’. The 
number of tweets per day was in the hundreds of 
thousands for each candidate. Twitter does not 
share all tweets through the streaming API so this 
analysis is based on a subset of the total tweets 
about Clinton and Trump.
Twitter has given public voice to millions of 
people concerned about politics, and one result is 
widespread attention to ideas that find the right 
place and the right time. In the day before and 
the day of the election one tweet was spread very 
widely through retweeting.
RT @whytruy: vote hillary clinton idc if she a 
liar yall boyfriends lie to yall everyday and yall still 
fw them so gone head and vote for her
According to Twitter It was retweeted more 
than 40 thousand times. It was posted to Twitter 
by whytruy who is a person of color, as the saying 
goes, and who goes by the name Not Pinkett Smith. 
She joined Twitter in 2014, has tweeted 7,413 
times, and has 15 followers. It is written with the 
kind of abbreviations that are frequently used 
in tweets to make the 140 character limit. It is a 
reason for voting for Hillary Clinton that obviously 
made sense to the community to which it was 
addressed. Twitter gives the followers of every 
person who retweeted this message, and their 
followers equal more than 24 million Twitter users. 
One young woman was able to reach a very 
large audience.
How much retweeting was going on in the 
final days of the campaign? It was 60% of all 
messages in this collection. For example, tweets 
mentioning Trump rose from six hundred 
thousand to nine hundred thousand, and 60% of 
those messages were retweets. Not many had the 
reach of Not Pinkett Smith’s tweet, but the stream of 
tweets about the campaign was largely sharing ideas.
What was being retweeted?
This analysis is based on looking at the top ten 
retweets for each candidate each day giving 300 
retweets to look at. Almost all could be character-
ized as either favoring Clinton or Trump and they 
could be classified as about character or what the 
candidate would do if elected.
The most striking feature of these retweets 
was the extent to which it was a campaign about 
character. Eight were about what a candidate 
would do if elected. The rest were about character. 
That is consistent with news media reports about 
the campaign that were heavily about character 
-- lying Hillary and misogynist Trump -- as 
examples. The retweets were more one-sided than 
had been the number of tweets. There were 1.4 
times as many tweets mentioning Trump as men-
tioning Clinton. And there were more than two 
times as many retweets among the top ten favoring 
Trump compared to retweets favoring Clinton. 
Almost universally the retweets were reasons to 
oppose the opponent. The only good news for 
a candidate was the many reasons people could 
think of for opposing the opponent. A large share 
of the negative retweets about Clinton were based 
on Wikileaks. The organization had a very large 
collection of hacked emails and tweets, and they 
used them to challenge the character of Clinton. 
Four and a half retweets a day challenging Clinton 
were retweets of Wikileak tweets.
And then: November 9, and 10, and 11, and 
12 saw a turnaround. There were ten favorable 
retweets about Clinton, then 17, and 16, and finally 
15 favorable retweets. The total for Clinton was 58 
and the total for Trump was 10. A major shift in 
the balance. And a major shift in what was being 
expressed. Almost all of the retweets mentioning 
Clinton were about finding a way to save us from 
Trump as president. On the tenth a call for signing 
a petition was the most frequent retweet.
Ask the Electoral College to save us. It was 
retweeted 18,593 times, and the call spread widely. 
The count of the followers of the unique individ-
uals posting the tweet numbered 50,703,306. And 
the next day it was repeated 14,817 times, and the 
next day 20,851 times.
Retweeting is about sharing ideas, and this 
campaign saw sharing being practiced quite broadly.
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In the age of social media, voters still need 
journalists
The American public got more of their news from 
social media than during any prior presidential 
election, according to a new Pew study. With 75% 
of Americans online, and of those, over 70% on 
Facebook, the public found news and talk about 
the 2016 presidential campaign in their Twitter, 
Facebook, and Instagram accounts. As my research 
suggests, political campaigns like social media 
because it allows them to talk directly to the public, 
bypassing journalists, whom they always distrust 
and dislike.
The question is: what kind of information does 
the public get directly from the campaigns?
In an ideal world, the presidential campaigns 
would provide the electorate the opportunity to 
reflect on the issues that face the country. They would 
learn the candidate’s policy positions and vision for 
how to tackle those problems, and evaluate the candi-
date’s character and attributes as they auditioned to be 
one of the most powerful leaders in the world. 
My research team and I analyzed Donald Trump, 
the Republican nominee, and Hillary Clinton, the 
Democratic nominee, and how they used social 
media during two phases of the campaign season. 
The first stage ran from October 2015 through 
January 2016, when the candidates began to 
introduce themselves and their positions to the 
public. We call this the surfacing stage. We then 
looked at the primaries stage from February through 
June 2016. We did this analysis as part of the Illumi-
nating 2016 Project, analyzing all of the presidential 
candidates’ social media messages on Facebook and 
Twitter through the entirety of their campaigns. 
We use computational approaches to analyze 
the messages. This requires creating categories to 
describe the messages, having people read and tag a 
sample of the messages, and then using software that 
looks for patterns in the messages that share the same 
category. The software then generates algorithms for 
what to look for in the messages so as to assign them 
to the proper category. 
Our algorithms are generally more accurate than 
people. For the categories we focus on, the algorithm 
is accurate around 75% of the time. 
Our analysis suggests that the public did not get 
the information they need to make a good voting 
decision. We still need journalists to push candidates 
to answer the hard questions and provide the public 
with a deeper understanding of candidate views and 
character because the candidates won’t necessarily 
provide that themselves.
Trump Less Likely to Talk Issues Online
There are stark differences in the ways Clinton and 
Trump used social media to strategically construct 
their vision for the country.
Clinton produced almost three times as many 
messages as Trump about the policy issues.
Indeed, the main Democrat candidates for the 
were more likely to post messages on policy and issue 
matters than the most popular Republican candidates. 
This is true if they are posting messages that articulate 
their own policy positions or attack others’ policy 
positions.
The style of Trump’s posts on the issues is distinct 
when compared with Clinton. Where she routinely 
provided reasons and facts for her positions, Trump 
offered broad generalizations or generic claims with 
little evidence. Take for example, these posts from 
Clinton on Twitter. By comparison, Trump’s positions 
were declared rather than reasoned. Additionally, he 
often retweeted messages from supporters instead of 
articulating his personal stance on issues.
Trump Is Not Consistently Negative
Political pundits and campaign watchers declared 
Trump to be profoundly negative. Some have predicted 
this was one of the most negative campaigns in history. 
But when you look in aggregate rather than anecdotal-
ly at each candidate’s individual social media posts, you 
get a different picture.
During the surfacing stage, when the candidates 
need to introduce themselves to the public, Trump 
advocated for himself more frequently than did 
Clinton on social media, and he attacked more, but not 
disproportionately so. When looking at the primaries, 
though, a noteworthy change occurs. Clinton attacks 
more than Trump on Twitter, at nearly twice the rate. 
It’s not until May that Trump goes on the attack – 
primarily against Clinton. This coincides with Trump 
becoming the presumptive nominee for the Republi-
cans. Once he starts to attack Clinton, he stays on 
the attack.
When you look at the substance of the attacks, 
there are noteworthy distinctions. Trump’s attacks 
are often personal. In February, for example, Trump 
primarily attacks Bush, but Rubio and Cruz are 
not spared
Yet, while Trump provides only thin policy 
claims, he is not constantly on the attack, unlike 
the public perception of his Twitter stream. Indeed, 
Clinton tends to be more negative than Trump on 
social media. 
We Still Need Journalists to Rigorously Cover 
Campaigns and the Public to Read Those Accounts
With the public increasingly getting information 
directly from the candidates themselves on social 
media, what they get is of limited breadth and depth 
to make effective judgments about who is the best 
candidate to lead the country. 
Our democracy still needs journalists to cover 
campaigns, ask the candidates challenging questions, 
and hold candidates to account for their claims and 
actions. And the public needs to take the time to seek 
out quality journalism about the campaign. Candi-
dates, on their own, tend to focus on their image and 
character and provide a rosy portrayal of their policy 
positions. But, that’s not enough to make a good 
decision for whom to vote.
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Dark magic: The memes that made Donald 
Trump’s victory
Move aside 2012, the 2016 US Presidential election 
was the real meme election. Since the primary 
season kicked off, the American people have lent 
their time, attention, and Twitter hashtags to 
vernacular play with Little Marco, Ted Cruz the 
Zodiac Killer (or blobfish, or sweaty, sad phone 
banker), and the disposable camera snapping 
sweater prodigy known as Ken Bone. Don’t see any 
of your favorites? Try this A-Z guide. 
But it wasn’t all fun and games. Alongside 
more lighthearted play were memes premised on 
broader identity politics. Progressives proudly 
reclaimed Donald Trump’s accusations that many 
undocumented immigrants are “bad hombres” and 
Hillary Clinton is a “nasty woman.” Conservatives, 
for their part, proudly reclaimed Clinton’s assertion 
that racist, misogynist, and xenophobic Trump 
supporters were “deplorables.”
On the furthest end of the conservative 
spectrum, white nationalists operating under 
the banner of the so-called alt-right were espe-
cially prolific. Participants hijacking Pepe the 
Frog, for example, managed to catapult its maybe 
ironic, maybe sincere bigotry to mass attention, 
prompting months of journalistic coverage (and 
prompting us to declare the motives behind racist 
Pepe memes were irrelevant).
Alt-right icon, Breitbart editor, and exiled 
Twitter hate vessel Milo Yiannopoulos has 
called this “meme magic,” arguing the alt-right’s 
“shitpost” machine is so influential it is able to 
directly influence the process in favor of their “God 
Emperor” Trump, whose unapologetic bigotry the 
alt-right embraced and helped perpetuate. 
Despite the alt-right’s gleeful self-congratu-
lation, however, 2016’s “meme magic” conjured 
very little wholly new. If 2016 was the meme 
election, it’s not because of alt-right shitposts or 
even Trump himself. Rather, it’s because Trump 
tapped into prejudices bigger and older than the 
internet: hateful racial stereotypes, oppressive 
gender norms, sweeping anti-elitism, and good 
old fashioned fear of the other. By tugging at these 
strings, Trump ran a campaign whose platform 
consisted not of policy proposals or thoughtful 
argumentation, but almost entirely of memes.
The term meme in this sense, as described by 
Milner, doesn’t merely label internet play. Online 
or off, memes emerge when resonant ideas spread 
within and across social collectives. Factual, 
objective truth isn’t a requisite if underlying idea 
connects and compels sharing.
Through savvy appropriation of supporters’ 
existing anxieties and biases, Trump exploited this 
process, invoking the following resonant memes:
• Many Mexicans are murderers and rapists, (so 
we need to “build the wall”)
• Muslims pose a threat to national security and 
should be barred entry (until we can “figure 
out what is going on” with them)
• Crime is rising in “inner cities” full of 
dangerous, violent people (read “black people” 
and “poor people”) 
• There’s unchecked voter fraud (especially in 
those “inner cities,” and so you have to watch, 
and by watch “you know what I’m talking 
about, right?”)
• The federal government is full of corrupt 
failures (and Trump will “drain the swamp”)
• “Career politicians” are untrustworthy (con-
trasted with Trump who “tells it like it is” and 
“says what he thinks”)
• “Crooked Hillary” Clinton is a criminal (so we 
should “lock her up”)
• Women are emotional slaves to their biology 
(especially when a woman has “blood coming 
out of her...wherever”)
• Women who get abortions are waging a war 
against future generations (and therefore 
“should be punished”)
• Women are sexual objects (“grab them by the 
pussy,” the President-Elect suggests)
• America needs to return to its glorious roots 
(i.e. that we can “Make America Great Again” 
by going back to a time of much narrower 
political and social enfranchisement)
These ideas are memetic; each resonates independ-
ent of factual realities, to the point of countering 
factual realities. Why these memes resonated with 
Trump’s supporters is, like the motivations behind 
the alt-right’s “meme magic,” opaque. Maybe they 
agreed (“he says what we’re thinking”). Maybe 
they cherry-picked the memes that resonated 
most, while downplaying others (in order to “drain 
the swamp” you have to deal with a little “locker 
room banter”). Maybe they just couldn’t stand 
the thought of electing...that woman… (a meme 
itself). Maybe they were willing to burn down the 
house because one leg of the table wobbles (that’ll 
really “shake things up”).
What Trump himself thinks about the memes 
he propagates is unimportant. What matters is the 
impact these memes have. The most fundamental 
impact is they normalize hate and denigration 
to the point hate speech is no longer seen as hate 
speech. It just becomes speech, whatever Trump 
happened to tweet that day was later reported by 
journalists as an expected part of the news cycle. 
The second, more visceral, impact is the power 
of these memes to undermine the basic sense of 
safety, worthiness, and political visibility of those 
populations--women, Mexican Americans, Muslim 
Americans, Black Americans, Americans with dis-
abilities, the list goes on--that have been targeted 
by the memes Trump and his supporters circulate. 
And these memes will continue to work their 
dark magic, so long as they resonate with enough 
people willing to embrace--or conveniently ignore-
-their very real, embodied consequences.
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Donald Trump is the first person in American 
history to win the presidency without first serving 
in government in some capacity. Much has been 
written about how a real estate developer and 
reality TV personality could pull off such an 
unusual feat. The accomplishment is especially 
extraordinary given how many controversial state-
ments Trump made during the campaign, which 
many commentators said would have doomed any 
other candidate. The executives and producers 
of Trump’s NBC TV show, which ran weekly for 
more than a decade, argue that “The Apprentice” 
made his candidacy possible because it consistently 
portrayed Trump as a successful businessman who 
was tough but fair. 
There also is a psychological aspect to Trump’s 
portrayal in “The Apprentice” that is worth 
exploring: the concept of parasocial interaction, 
which is the illusion of intimacy that people 
sometimes have with celebrities and politicians 
(Giles, 2002; Thorson & Rodgers, 2006).
In a parasocial relationship, viewers feel a 
special attachment to TV personalities and other 
media figures they watch regularly. Viewers often 
see TV personalities as close friends whom they 
know really well, even though they have never met. 
During its 11-year run with Trump as the star, 
“The Apprentice” and spinoff “The Celebrity Ap-
prentice” attracted as many as 20 million viewers 
an episode. That’s a lot of potential friends. 
The strength of the pseudo-friendship in 
a parasocial relationship can cause viewers to 
discount any negative things they hear that con-
tradict what they feel they know about the TV 
personality. It’s analogous to being friends with a 
colleague at work for 11 years and hearing them 
say only fair-minded things, until one day they 
make a seemingly bigoted or sexist comment. 
You may give the colleague the benefit of the 
doubt because the 11-year relationship created the 
impression that you know the colleague’s “real” 
thoughts and feelings, which are different from 
their recent negative comments. A similar phe-
nomenon may be at work with Trump supporters 
who were regular viewers of “The Apprentice,” 
which ran from 2004 to 2015. The reality show’s 
portrayal of Trump was different from his news 
coverage during the campaign. Trump was not 
shown on “The Apprentice” making contro-
versial statements. He was depicted as steady 
and reasonable, whereas news coverage during 
2015-16 highlighted his provocative remarks about 
Mexicans, women, Muslims, and other groups and 
individuals. Trump supporters with a longstanding 
parasocial relationship based on years of exposure 
to “The Apprentice” may have discounted incen-
diary remarks by the candidate because it did not 
fit with the “real” Trump they thought they knew 
from reality TV. 
The case for explaining much of Trump’s 
support in terms of parasocial interaction is 
especially strong because parasocial relationships 
happen the most among those who also fit the 
demographic profile of Trump supporters.
 Research indicates that parasocial interac-
tion is at its highest among the poorly educated 
and those heavily dependent on TV, of which the 
elderly make up the largest segment (Levy, 1979; 
Auter & Palmgreen, 2000; Robinson, 1989). Polling 
data suggest Trump found his greatest support 
among those with a high school diploma or less, 
as well as those ages 65 and over. In addition, 
parasocial interaction is most pronounced with TV 
personalities who are shown as themselves, such as 
newscasters, as opposed to playing fictional roles, 
such as characters in dramas or comedies (Rubin, 
Perse, & Powell, 1985). “The Apprentice” portrayed 
Trump as himself. Finally, parasocial interaction is 
high when a TV personality’s portrayal is consist-
ent over many years. As mentioned before, “The 
Apprentice” spent more than a decade displaying 
the most favorable attributes of Trump.
Parasocial interaction, of course, is not the 
only factor that helped Trump politically. Many 
supporters undoubtedly identified with his 
positions on key issues. However, it is interesting 
to note that on most major issues in 2016, such as 
building a wall along the Mexican border, surveys 
of self-identified Trump voters found that they 
were less likely to support Trump’s political views 
than self-identified Hillary Clinton support-
ers were to support her positions. As a result, it 
appears that long-term perceptions of Trump the 
man, which were crafted by reality TV, contributed 
greatly to propelling him to the White House. 
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A popular instrument in political marketing is the 
attempt of candidates to “humanize themselves”, 
in order to appeal to a larger audience. In recent 
decades talk-shows have been one of the best ways 
to make that possible and present politicians in 
a more human, approachable light. Baum (2005) 
even talks about how presidential candidates 
are “talking the vote” by “hitting the talk show 
circuit”. What started off in a tentative way with 
Bill Clinton playing the saxophone in The Arsenio 
Hall Show in 1992 has nowadays become the norm: 
politicians showing off their hidden talents, playful 
and joking side to gain the sympathy (and votes) of 
broader segments of the electorate.
But the way presidential candidates “hit the 
talk show circuit” in 2016 possibly created a new 
trend for future campaigns: it’s not about talking 
the vote, it’s about playing the vote. Trump and 
Clinton changed the rules of the campaign game 
and almost became comedians during their talk 
show appearances, passing from the role of inter-
viewee to one of a performer whose purpose is to 
entertain the audience.
Both had a very intense media presence, but 
their attempt to appeal to a broader segment of 
population (those seeking entertainment and 
not political information) by appearing more 
human, adopting a “one of us” image and proving 
their sense of humor, “forced” them to become 
comedians who act in short sketches: attacking or 
impersonating the opponent, making fun of his 
statements or physical aspects, talking about their 
own policies proposals in a simplistic way, and ulti-
mately being able to make fun of themselves. Let’s 
just consider the presence of the two candidates in 
one of the most popular entertainment talkshows: 
The Tonight Show.
Hillary Clinton appears on The Tonight Show 
in September 2015 in a sketch where she “played” 
herself having a phone conversation with a fake 
Donald Trump (played by Fallon). As the fake 
Trump interviews her, she has a chance to talk 
about issues on her agenda, but also make fun of 
her opponent’s hair, treat him like a true character, 
sipping on a glass of wine while pretending to 
listen to him and rolling her eyes. She’s being more 
than approachable and funny when she laughs 
about Trumps’ fake hair and asks Fallon to prove 
hers is real: “Did he ever let you touch his hair? Go 
ahead, touch mine!”
In January 2016 she appeared again on Fallon’s 
show and talked about her assets as a future 
president in a “Mock Job interview for President”. 
The host of the talk-show becomes a political 
commentator and interviewer (Jones 2005). 
When asked about her opponent, she tells that the 
campaign is going to be “quite a show-down” (and 
she guessed it well). On September 2016, she has 
a humorous moment in the same show under the 
title of “Kid letters with Hillary Clinton” where 
Fallon reads her letters received from kids. 
But that is not her best performance. She 
“makes her first steps” into an acting career in 
a Saturday Night’s Live sketch, where she plays 
the role of a bartender who mocks Trump whilst 
having a funny dialogue and singing with a “fake” 
Hillary, played by Kate McKinnon. 
Trump on the other hand, had fewer appear-
ances and was not that “extreme”. He tried to show 
his human, cool, friendly and humorous side, 
but not with the same magnitude. He had three 
appearances in The Tonight Show. First was the one 
in September 2015 where he “interviews himself in 
the mirror” and allows the moderator to imperson-
ate and imitate him. In January 2016 he appeared 
again on the show, taking the “mock interview for 
President” and making jokes about his looks.
In September 2016 he takes another “mock 
interview” to talk about latest campaign events 
and answer questions. He does perhaps the gesture 
no one expects and allows Fallon to mess his hair 
(though he does not seem comfortable).
Despite that both had fairly equal time and 
number of appearances in The Tonight Show, there 
is an obvious difference between the two candi-
dates: one (Clinton) does manage to “humanize” 
herself and shape her message and speech in 
accordance with the type of show, while Trump 
tried the same strategy without much success. 
The evident thing is that both “hit the talk show 
circuit” (both have been present in almost all the 
main entertainment shows) as a campaign strategy 
to present themselves in a whole new light in 
front of potential voters who tune in for an hour 
of entertainment; and they do that from a new 
position: the politician who can turn himself into 
an actor/comedian to win the hearts (aka votes) of 
his audience.
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Three days after the election, The Telegraph declared 
Nigel Farage would be Britain’s “unofficial ambassador” 
to the Trump administration, suggesting the former 
UKIP leader would have greater political visibility and 
potential power than few could have imagined just two 
years ago.
The Sun’s former editor Stig Abell describes 
Farage as the most successful British politician of the 
last 30 years (Twitter, November 9, 2016). His focused 
approach - particularly in terms of using social media 
to further his core message - has helped achieve some 
of the greatest political upsets of the 21st Century.
Farage and UKIP’s influence on Trump’s social 
media campaign should not be overlooked. Trump, of 
course, had a long established self-brand as a celebrity 
entrepreneur. However, his social media campaign also 
built on Farage’s methods during the 2015 election to 
develop a new, political persona. 
UKIP’s campaign used the increased visibility 
of the short campaign period as a first step towards 
achieving Brexit the following year, centred on Farage 
as the voice of the “UK” or “Britain”, often directly 
in opposition to the “EU” and “immigration”. This 
self-narrative had at its core a distrust of establishment 
institutions – particularly political parties and the BBC 
– viewed as the enemy of him, an “everyday British 
bloke”, longing to escape globalised multi-cultural 
society. This narrative went on to underpin the “Vote 
Leave” campaign approach for the EU Referendum the 
following year.
The connections between this and Trump’s “self-
brand” during the presidential campaign are, of course, 
easily identifiable. They both harnessed the power 
of digital communication within the contemporary 
cultural conditions of promotionalism. They used 
techniques of “digital dog-whistling”, nationalistic and 
anti-immigrant discourse linked to a central pledge 
that they will “Make Britain/America Great Again”.
For Farage, this approach resonated with 
Facebook audiences particularly. His page ‘likes’ during 
the 2015 short campaign were almost triple those of 
David Cameron and the number of people talking 
about him on the site was often more than all of other 
smaller party leaders combined. 
Similarly, throughout the American Presidential 
Campaign, success in terms of reach, share, likes and 
follows was evident on Donald Trump’s Facebook and 
Twitter pages. He regularly achieved 40 times as many 
retweets and shares than Hillary Clinton for social 
media posts on the same day. 
The way public figures use social media to 
construct personas for a strategic aim is a growing area 
of academic study and its implications for political 
communication and culture are significant.
P. David Marshall, who recently launched the 
Persona Studies journal, argues that a new cultural 
politics has emerged through presentational media 
–presentation of the self in digital space –which is 
quite different to that supported by traditional rep-
resentational media, such as journalism, TV and film. 
Studying persona is categorized as the exploration of 
intentional presentation of specific identities with purpose.
This approach offers insights into how Trump and 
Farage’s social media campaigns helped them achieve 
their political aims. Digital and personalised storytell-
ing techniques and representational media construc-
tion patterns are re-shaped, offering ever-new models 
of persona construction for strategic gain. 
Farage and Trump are the first in British and US 
politics to have fully harnessed the power of persona 
creation on SNS as a deliberate political communica-
tion tool. They use both SNS and mainstream media 
to build a persona created specifically to enable public 
consumption of their political message. Using individ-
ualism and self-promotion, they generate what Alison 
Hearn (2013: 27) in relation to reality TV stars, has 
described as “rhetorically persuasive packaging” and a 
“promotional skin” through which they can embody 
both the discontent of members of the electorate and 
ideas of alternative.
Trump and Farage’s personas colonize the lived 
experience of their followers and encourage them 
to actively display their mutuality of stance on SNS 
in order to perpetuate message. It is a new kind 
of political labour; highly stylized and mediatized 
self-construction, aimed at drawing the audience 
around a central bonfire and then directing them to 
specific action - first online and then in the voting booth. 
In this world, the political party is of decreasing 
significance and success can be far better judged by 
clicks, shares and likes than by opinion polls. Analytics 
mean successful messages are repeated and while 
this new electioneering is still of course often group 
activity –also performed by campaign managers and 
social media teams - at its core it is a personalised “Me” 
“You” and “Us” conversation. This approach enables 
campaign teams to produce content that allows instant 
identification rather than prolonged thought, commu-
nicating easily within the scroll of a social media timeline.
Farage and Trump’s approaches to political 
persona construction reflect its increased signifi-
cance across both digital and mainstream media and 
particularly how it has reshaped celebrity culture. But 
that’s not to say we should see this as an entirely new 
phenomena without any historical basis.
Considering how the far-right have successfully 
used developing media forms, nationalistic rhetoric 
and celebrity promotionalism in the past, means we 
may better understand the significance of mediatised 
persona construction to political communication. 
Through this we can begin to conceptualise this latest 
surge in populist politics, its societal implications 
and how its techniques may be channelled towards a 
different course.
Bethany Usher’s article ‘You, Me and Us: Constructing Political 
Persona During the 2015 UK General Election Short Campaign’ is 
published in a special ‘Political Persona’ edition of Persona Studies 
later this month.
 
Farage’s Trump card: Constructing political 
persona and social media campaigning
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Twitter has become one of the leading social media 
platforms and has become a key way for politicians 
to communicate with journalists and the public. 
President Obama joined Twitter fairly late (2015) 
compared to other key political figures, David 
Cameron joined in 2012, Hillary joined in 2012 
and unsurprisingly Trump has the oldest Twitter 
account out of these as he joined in 2009 which is 
due to his long term fame as a celebrity with his 
business ventures as well as his show The Apprentice. 
This presidential campaign has seen a rise in 
the importance of social media for campaigns, 
in particular allowing the campaign to commu-
nicate with supporters, both in a ‘good’ way and 
a ‘negative’ way. Trump has always been con-
troversial and his Twitter communication is no 
exception. In a way it can be argued this style of 
communication humanizes the political campaign 
as we all laugh at things about people we dislike. 
Sharing jokes (see opposite) with friends is a 
popular use of social media, and this is exactly 
what Trump did except he shared the joke with 
the public and all his supporters which makes him 
feel slightly more grounded (even though his ego 
is as close to the ground as the moon). However, 
the tweet can also be viewed as a negative for the 
campaign as this came from not just a politician 
but someone who could be President. Therefore 
while the tweet is grounded and humanizing, 
it can also be judged as highly unprofessional. 
This behaviour has caused concerns as what 
Trump might tweet or retweet jokes about foreign 
countries which as a person is acceptable but 
not when that person is the representative of the 
United States. In this context jokes can cause 
conflicts, damage trade for the US or worse. 
Another way that the Twitter use can 
humanize a politician’s campaign is how they can 
respond to both scandals about themselves and 
about their opponent in real time as well as being 
able to have debates on Twitter that we might not 
otherwise see. Opposite is one example of a feud 
Clinton and Trump had on Twitter which showed 
how politicians (especially in this campaign) can 
appear to act like children in a playground arguing 
about whose dad is bigger or who should get to 
play with a toy first. In this instance it showed 
how not having the best responses can lead to you 
getting humiliated by your rival as Hillary suffered 
at the hands of Trump. 
A further issue that can arise from politician’s 
Twitter pages are that tweets are often seen as 
scripted by a PR team which is unsurprising, we 
see it with most celebrities when they post tweets 
which lack a human dimension and appear as 
purely promotional or public relations. This is 
further demonstrated by Hilary’s opening tweet 
which refers to her in the third person, not usually 
the way someone would talk about themselves on 
twitter. This can make a politician’s Twitter feel 
staged or robotic which is not what social media is 
supposed to be about, it should be about individ-
uality. This can be seen by Hilary’s poor comeback 
that we can see in the figure and Trump points out 
how it is obvious Hillary is not the one posting 
most of the tweets on her page, making her appear 
even less like one of the people whose votes she 
is seeking. 
The more human a politician is seen the better 
as you feel like they will say what they mean and 
not just what their PR team tell them to say. When 
a politician makes a speech, personal experience 
adds another dimension to it making it more 
human and relatable. Kruikemeier’s research 
shows that a more personalized style can be a vote 
winner, whereas self-promoting in the third person 
can turn voters away. 
It seems that social media has become another 
area for spin doctors and PR teams to communica-
tion on behalf of politicians. Professional commu-
nication consultants thus become a middleman 
for the politician, interacting between them and 
their supporters and the public. It almost feels like 
another barrier between citizen and politician, as 
politicians embrace new forms of media they run 
the risk of becoming less human and more like 
puppets controlled by their PR teams.
The other side of the question asked is whether 
a politician’s use of social media could be seen as 
too human, with the politician commenting on 
every small issue and trying to become keyboard 
warriors which is not what we expect from our 
leaders. Our perception of leaders is that they need 
to be human but not too ‘ordinary’ as they should 
be intelligent communicators. Too much emphasis 
on using social media could be seen as immature 
when they should be focusing their time studying 
the key issues and making informed decisions 
instead of reposting petitions on social media or 
making jokes about those who they disagree with. 
Thus ‘correct’ use of such platforms is tricky, and 
politicians have to be careful when deciding when 
or when not to tweet.
Does Twitter humanize a politician’s campaign?
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“TrumpDASHIAN” – the US election as an 
extension of The Apprentice?
The US election has been dubbed the nastiest 
election in recent US history with both candidates’ 
attacking each other at any opportunity. But this 
does not seems too different to other elections of 
the past, mud slinging has always been a big part 
of the US debates. However, you would be forgiven 
in thinking you are watching another amusing 
boardroom firing session, as Trump’s behaviour 
can be likened to that of an Apprentice contestant, 
not a US presidential candidate.
Donald Trump, host of “Apprentice“, his brash, 
masculine and dominant persona suits the reality 
TV show genre. We’ve grown to accept these larger 
than life characters that are “just being honest” 
and “real”. Reality TV shows are great to watch, a 
guilty pleasure perhaps, but the outcomes are of 
no consequence to us as citizens. But this is the US 
presidential election, the contest to become leader 
of the free world with an unsurmountable level of 
responsibility. This surely should not be performed 
ina similar way to a reality TV show format, but a 
decision based on well thought through policies 
and political experience.
Trump says he prides himself on being 
“honest, real, the anti-politician” – sound familiar. 
Donald Trump’s style seems more akin to Kim 
Kardashian, than the qualities required for a world 
leader. He doesn’t have the qualifications or expe-
rience for a higher office, his plan and proposed 
policies are lacking in substance and most likely 
won’t see the light of the day. Instead, he is offering 
to American people an “Apprentice” style show, 
this special brand of positives (everything Donald 
Trump) against all of the negatives that he sees 
in both the current president,the Obama-care 
policy and the “weak economy” and his immediate 
opponent Hilary Clinton.
In the Apprentice we see candidates 
competing with each other to demonstrate they 
possess the qualities required to be a great busi-
nessman or woman or the best business leadership 
skills, although this can come across as excessive 
or childlike. Candidates regularly bicker and attack 
each other’s personal and professional persona in 
the board room. We see this channelled through-
out the primaries with him shooting down other 
candidates one by one. Now using the same tactics 
in the election, we see him try to dominate and 
intimidate his opponent with his very aggressive 
approach, with humiliation added to the mix. He 
seems to have forgotten that he has a duty to offer 
the American people facts and well thought out 
policies. Rather Trump seems happy to offend 
almost everyone, African- Americans, Mexicans 
(with his big great Trump wall), woman, Muslims- 
calling for a complete Muslim ban , Latinos, 
President Obama, and soldiers.
Recent interviews with Jimmy Kimmel and 
then Jimmy Fallon contain Donald Trumps’ 
monolog about his successful businesses, himself 
and of course all things beautiful. The presidential 
candidate never misses an opportunity to remind 
us how much he achieved in the business world 
and how he can use this knowledge and experience 
to make America great again! He is reorienting the 
qualifications required for US President. It is much 
easier for the American people to relate to business 
success than political success, such as Hilary 
achievements as Sectary of State, as often most 
things go on behind closed doors. So it may seem 
plausible that a successful business man could 
make America great again!
Unlike other candidates who use these shows 
to improve their rapport with the general public 
and repair or improve a damaged image, Trump 
uses these to appear more human. However, 
Trump seems to do the opposite, reinforcing his 
reality TV like character an extreme version of a 
human with extreme views! For instance, when 
asked about ISIS Donald states that “we should go 
after their families, wives and children, mothers and 
sisters”. He doesn’t seem to care that he is publicly 
suggesting committing war crimes leaving CNN 
anchor speechless on live TV. It may have appeal, 
but it lacks the measured approach one might 
expect of a president.
However, he still has supporters and people 
seem to relate to him. Is this the power of the all 
too familiar genre of reality TV style helping to 
secure the vote of voters that have never voted? 
He seems familiar, real and honest which is 
juxtaposed against the secretive and in Trump’s 
words “corrupt” politician Hilary Clinton. But 
simultaneously, he is actually alienating large 
groups of people, inciting fear and spreading hate. 
But this behaviour is so familiar to us on reality 
TV, that maybe the audience are desensitised to 
it, but if this were to become normalised it could 
be dangerous for democracy. Whether you’re a 
Democrat, Republican, or a fan of reality TV you 
surely couldn’t believe Trump is qualified for this 
monumental responsibility? 
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We have been deluged with coverage of Donald 
Trump and his campaign. There are the seemingly 
endless articles on his pronouncements and his 
behaviour; each story expressing barely suppressed 
disbelief that such a person is running for the office 
of President. And then there are the other pieces, 
in which reporters earnestly pursue Trump’s voters 
– the left-behinds of the mid-West and elsewhere, 
who, despairing of a political system that has failed 
them, turn to ‘the Donald’ as a saviour who ‘speaks 
their language’. 
But hidden within this coverage is another 
theme, one that has received less attention, but 
which runs through both types of story. This is 
not about who Trump is and who his supporters 
are, but what he is. It is a truth almost universal-
ly recognised that he is not a ‘politician’, either 
because he fails to meet the standards expected of a 
democratic representative or because he expresses 
no desire to be such a figure. But if he is not a poli-
tician what is he? What role is he playing? 
This question stems, in part, from the notion 
that the contest for the presidency is not an 
exercise in straightforward political competi-
tion. As the writer George Saunders observed: 
“American Presidential campaigns are not about 
ideas; they are about the selection of a hero to 
embody the prevailing national ethos.”
But this begs a further question, if the aim is to 
be a ‘hero’, what kind of hero are we talking about? 
Mark Singer, in his book Trump & Me, twice 
quotes a Trump associate as saying: “Deep down, 
he [Trump] wants to be Madonna”. Quite what of 
Madonna’s many incarnations they have in mind is 
unclear, but Trump as rock or pop star is a theme 
taken up by other writers. Jonathan Freedland in 
the Guardian described finding himself at a Trump 
rally, in the “standing area directly in front of the 
stage, a kind of Trumpian moshpit …”
Bob Lefsetz took the analogy one step further 
in a piece entitled “Trump is a Heavy Metal Band”: 
“Yes, Donald Trump is a rock star, if you go back 
to what that once upon a time meant, someone 
who adhered to his own vision living a rich 
and famous lifestyle who cared not a whit what 
others said.” And for Lefsetz, it is the genre that 
holds the key to Trump’s ability to command an 
audience: “Metal… Sold out arenas when no one 
was watching. Ain’t that America, where despite 
garnering dollars the establishment shies away 
from that which it believes is unseemly. And the 
reason metal triumphed was because it was the 
other, it channelled the audience’s anger, it was for 
all those closed out of the mainstream, and it turns 
out there’s plenty of them.”
The music writer Simon Reynolds also sees 
Trump in the guise of a rock star. Not, though, 
that of heavy metal, but of glam rock: “Trump 
surrounds himself with glitz. Trump and the 
glam rockers share an obsession with fame and 
a ruthless drive to conquer and devour the 
world’s attention.”
For other commentators, the rock star com-
parison is swapped for the more traditional ideas 
of showbusiness. The New Yorker compares the 
democratic contest to “a long-running Broadway 
musical” and Freedland talks of Trump rallies as 
‘sheer showbiz’. James Poniewozik of the New York 
Times sees Trump in terms of TV formats: “his tale 
has remained a kind of ‘80s prime-time soap of as-
piration and ego. …. [H]e cited his TV ratings the 
way another candidate might boast of balancing 
a state budget. Mr Trump’s primary win was like 
having a niche hit on cable. …. In programming 
terms, his campaign is nostalgia based content – 
that thing you used to like, I’m gonna bring it back 
again! He’s a classic TV show rebooted for Netflix: 
that old stuff from back in the day, but edgier 
and uncensored.”
And, of course, Donald Trump is a reality 
television star. His role on The Apprentice is key 
to understanding his ability to play the role of 
presidential candidate. As David Von Drehle wrote 
in Time: “the craftier characters of reality TV ex-
perience a different kind of stardom from the TV 
and movie idols of the past. Fans are encouraged 
to feel that they know these people, not as fictional 
characters but as flesh and blood.”
In research that colleagues and I conducted we 
found that young people in the UK saw figures like 
Alan Sugar and Simon Cowell as credible political 
leaders. They were seen as tough and decisive, 
attributes that were seen necessary to effective 
political leadership. And other political scientists 
have noted the rise of ‘superstar political celebri-
ties’ in the era of ‘anti-politics’. 
It might be said that the analogies on which 
commentators draw are just that – analogies; 
no more than a literary device. But equally it 
might be that the role of the politician is indeed 
becoming that of the rock star. And the answer to 
the question ‘what is Trump’ is that he is indeed ‘a 
politician’ after all. 
A version of this piece was also published by The 
Conversation
What is Trump?
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Out of touch, out of ideas? The American 
The election of Donald Trump as the President of 
the United States has been interpreted as evidence 
of a backlash against globalisation and the unfair 
distribution of its fruits, and an indulgence of the 
perception that the metropolitan elite (in collusion 
with big business) have stolen the American 
Dream and rigged the political system and the 
economy in their favour. The establishment are 
viewed as ‘out-of-touch’ with the concerns of 
ordinary people. I have been researching and 
writing about the fictional presidency in film and 
television since Barack Obama took office in 2009. 
I have observed its development and evolution 
since the early 1990s, from a desire for a return 
of the Reaganite, militaristic strongman during 
Clinton’s presidency, to the hope for an intelligent 
and sober leader to replace George W. Bush in the 
2000s. 
The most recent examples in film and televi-
sion have positioned the President within arche-
types previously unimaginable in this particular 
cultural repository: in Olympus Has Fallen (2013) 
and White House Down (2013), the President 
is recast as the ‘damsel-in-distress’, requiring 
rescue from dastardly terrorists by the heroic, 
musclebound white male. In Scandal and House 
of Cards, the institution is shown as rather weak; 
unable to bend the world to its will any longer, 
it is dependent upon underhand tactics, corrup-
tion and criminal behaviour in order to achieve 
anything. In House of Cards, President Frank 
Underwood (Kevin Spacey), assailed from all sides 
by his opponents, resorts to grotesque levels of 
manipulation and corruption to keep his place in 
the White House. In Scandal, President Thomas 
Fitzgerald Grant III ponders abandoning his 
position for love; he only ever pursued the position 
to best his father. Popular television appears to be 
suggesting that the presidency is a feeble and irrel-
evant institution, incapable of standing on its own.
Designated Survivor, which premiered this 
autumn, appears to represent something of a 
resurgence for the notion of the President as 
‘strongman’. President Thomas Kirkman (Kiefer 
Sutherland) is installed to the nation’s highest 
office after the Capitol Building is blown up during 
the State of the Union Address. Previously the 
Secretary for Housing and Development, he is 
entirely inexperienced and unprepared for the role. 
Kirkman proceeds cautiously, and refuses to bow 
to the more aggressive forces within the military. 
Unlike Sutherland’s iconic character Jack Bauer 24, 
Kirkman is reasonable, measured and careful in his 
execution of power. He will protect the nation, but 
he will not do so at the expense of liberal values.
If all this sounds hilariously out-of-step with 
what the United States has just inflicted upon itself 
and the world, that’s because it is. Kirkman is a 
‘normal’ leader; safe, stable, even boring. He is 
an intellectual (something of which he is slightly 
embarrassed, it seems, when he discovers that 
his secret service codename before becoming 
President was ‘Glasses’). He responds calmly to 
chaos, he enforces the rule of law and refuses 
to allow the country to become consumed by 
fear, intolerance and hatred. In reality, America’s 
Electoral College system has delivered a President 
who has been swept to the White House by inciting 
these unpleasant emotions. The equation has been 
flipped on its head: in my book, I argued that 
presidents in film and television tend to indulge 
the populist fantasies that we know (or, rather, 
knew) could not be enacted in reality. Films from 
Mr Smith Goes to Washington to Dave give us the 
idealised image of the non-politician wielding 
political power; Independence Day and Air Force 
One posit the notion that the great President is 
one who rides into battle himself to face down the 
nation’s enemies. Until now, it always seemed to 
me that the fictional presidency provided a release 
valve to our dissatisfaction with the real candidates 
for President, and a safe revolt against the bargain-
ing and compromises necessary when in power.
So while contemporary film and television 
have explored the notion that the presidency 
cannot have it all its own way in a more diffuse 
and complex global environment, it seems the 
electorate have rejected such hard truths. Trump’s 
promise to ‘Make America Great Again’ was 
seductive enough for the groups of people to 
whom he appealed that he was able to win the 
White House on the basis that the President can 
change the way America, and the world, is run. 
He was elected on a fiction. While the President 
in film and television now might appear ‘out-of-
touch’ with contemporary politics, we should 
continue to monitor its development as a critique 
of the institution. If Donald Trump wants a primer 
of what is expected of him now he is President, he 
could do worse to look to the sobriety and modera-
tion of Designated Survivor for guidance. That said, 
I’m not holding my breath. 
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As an icebreaker, I ask students taking my course 
on American comedy and humour, “Who is the 
funniest person in the United States?” In July last 
year, the droll first response was “Donald Trump.” 
He was not the answer in July this year.
What changed? Obviously, the stakes were 
different. He was a few swing states away from the 
US presidency, something impossible to conceive 
of last year, something impossible to countenance 
up until Election Day, and the reality for at least 
the next four years.
The polling and the predictions did not 
bear out. “When you realize,” wrote the cultural 
historian, Robert Darnton, in The Great Cat 
Massacre, “that you are not getting something—a 
joke, a proverb, a ceremony—that is particularly 
meaningful to the natives, you can see where to 
grasp a foreign system of meaning in order to 
unravel it.” Perhaps we must look beyond big data 
and a STEM-oriented production of knowledge 
to understand Trump’s win. A proposition: the US 
presidential campaign is pop culture.
It definitely has a culture. Anything that lasts 
for so long must, especially if so many are watching 
– even more so if those watching include a con-
tinuous news cycle that increasingly incorporates 
netizen journalism and social media.
Trump used this culture more successfully 
than Clinton because he forced the campaign 
to become, almost wholly, pop culture: that is, 
the domain of mass entertainment consumed, 
distributed, and created according to shifting and 
entrenched tastes. 
Cultural theorist Stuart Hall wrote that 
popular culture “is the arena of consent and 
resistance. It is partly where hegemony arises, and 
where it is secured.” For example, “Build the Wall!” 
is the barest immigration policy. It is, however, 
when coupled with a demonization of out-groups 
(Mexicans, Muslims), a provocative cold open 
to an outrageous act that catches on, spread by 
word of actual and virtual mouth, a slogan that 
can stand for everything from hateful xenophobia 
to evidence of Washington’s failure to economic 
anxiety under global capitalism.
Like old-school comedians, Trump takes 
control of the room by physically dominating the 
stage and hectoring the audience into submission. 
Much like many male, establishment comedians 
in the wake of the furore around Daniel Tosh’s 
rape joke, supporters defended his right to say 
whatever he wants to get a laugh (that is, a vote), 
praising his outsider fearlessness in a political-
ly correct and politically corrupt America. His 
chauvinistic and racist comments reek of many 
things—including the authenticity so prized, 
contemporarily, of tell-it-like-it-is comics (Jon 
Stewart, Amy Schumer, Louis CK).
The media reported Trump’s act, and mildly 
held it to account. But his supporters and proxies 
spun and blustered and obfuscated, so that the 
reports are just part of the scene, like drinks being 
served in a comedy club – they only fuel the 
response and spread the punchlines.
Clinton was reduced to an insistent heckler. 
Hecklers never look good. They ruin the act. They 
bum everybody out: “Sit down and shut up and let 
him get on with the show.”
Clinton cannot “win” at pop culture. She 
admitted as much at her Democratic National 
Convention speech: “I get it that some people just 
don’t know what to make of me.” Uncertainty is 
disturbing, and it allowed Trump and his support-
ers to make something of her for themselves.
Her contrived attempts to reach young 
people (“More like Chillary, Am I right?”) were 
instantly lampooned for their inauthenticity. 
According to a Gallup Poll tracking July 11-Sept 
18, the words Americans mentioned hearing most 
in relation to Clinton were “email” followed by 
“lie,” “health,” “speech,” “scandal” and “foundation.” 
For Trump, “the top substantive words Americans 
use when reporting on Trump include ‘speech,’ 
‘president,’ ‘immigration,’ ‘Mexico,’ ‘convention,’ 
‘campaign’ and ‘Obama.’” These were Trump’s 
punchlines, and they prevailed.
Further, Clinton is a staple target of pop culture: 
a woman. Her length of time in public life notwith-
standing, no male political candidate has been given 
the scrutiny over dress, demeanour, health, intimate 
relations, and age that Clinton receives.
And even when Trump received acute 
scrutiny, it worked for his outsiderness and 
authenticity. The tape of Trump bragging about 
groping women revealed nothing new other than 
the existence of the tape. Everyone, including the 
people that voted for him, knows that he is like 
this. Many men, both inside and outside locker 
rooms, are also like this, especially men in power 
(such as disgraced Fox News heavyweight and 
Trump adviser Roger Ailes). It’s part of the arena of 
consent and resistance of pop culture. It is power, 
and the election of Trump suggests that his perfor-
mance of this kind of power is aspirational.
It’s never just a joke: Pop culture and the US 
presidency
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Election night in America has been stunning. 
The outcome may be catastrophic and transform-
ative for America and the world. The pundits 
and pollsters consistently reported throughout 
the long, long US campaign that Hillary Clinton 
was consistently in the lead in the popular vote 
estimated across the average of most national polls. 
The projection of a Clinton victory had seemed 
widely plausible. By all accounts the Democrats 
had a unified convention, a well-funded campaign, 
an experienced, well qualified and knowledgea-
ble candidate, the overwhelming endorsement of 
the mainstream press, the support of a team of 
heavy-hitters including POTUS and FLOTUS, a 
popular President, a low economic misery index, a 
well-organized get out the vote ground game, and a 
consistently winning debate performance. 
By contrast, the Republican leadership has 
been deeply divided with lukewarm support for 
their own standard-bearer. Donald Trump offered 
himself as a candidate emphasizing a toxic brew of 
racist, ill-informed, misogynist, nationalistic and 
vulgar rhetoric, offending women, Hispanics, and 
many minorities, with only a loose association with 
the truth, no substantive detailed policy platform, 
no experience of government or the military, less 
funds than his opponent, and minimal advertising 
and polling. And yet, still the Republicans ended 
up holding both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. 
What explains the populist earthquake in 
American politics?
Some factors are clearly specific to this election 
campaign. The way that the Republican primaries 
turned into a circular firing squad for the moderate 
candidates. The lack of effective new blood 
competing in the Democratic contests, allowing 
all the bag and baggage of the Clinton haters to be 
reignited. Events such as the Russian-hacking of 
the DNC and the Wikileaks endless recycling of the 
Clinton email story. And so on.
But the populist earthquake is also part of a far 
broader picture.
Like Donald Trump, leaders such as Marine 
Le Pen, Norbert Hoffer, Nigel Farage, and Geert 
Wilders are prominent today in many countries, 
altering established patterns of party competition 
in contemporary Western societies. These parties 
have gained votes and seats in many countries, and 
entered government coalitions in eleven Western 
democracies, including in Austria, Italy and 
Switzerland. Across Europe, their average share of 
the vote in national and European parliamentary 
elections has more than doubled since the 1960s, 
from around 5.1% to 13.2%, at the expense of 
center parties. During the same era, their share 
of seats has tripled, from 3.8% to 12.8%. Even in 
countries without many elected populist repre-
sentatives, these parties can still exert tremendous 
‘blackmail’ pressure on mainstream parties, public 
discourse, and the policy agenda, as is illustrated 
by UKIP’s role in catalyzing the British exit from 
the European Union, with massive consequences. 
The electoral fortunes of populist parties 
are open to multiple explanations which can 
be grouped into accounts focused upon (1) the 
demand-side of public opinion, (2) the supply-side 
of party strategies, and (3) constitutional arrange-
ments governing the rules of the electoral game.
Applying these explanations to the Trump 
phenomenon, the demand side concerns the 
cultural backlash concentrated among older white 
men who want to ‘Make America Great Again’, 
meaning a vision of an older small-town America, 
reflecting traditional values common decades ago 
over more progressive, cosmopolitan and multicul-
tural values. The supply-side concerns how parties 
compete and the way that the Tea Party wing of the 
Republican party advocated and laid the founda-
tion for many of the populist themes which Trump 
subsequently echoed, including anti-establishment 
and anti-government, birtherism, climate change 
denial, and know-nothingness. The institutional 
context concerns the weakness of party control 
over the selection process and the path that 
provides for an outsider candidacy.
But the explanation of the populist revolu-
tion is less important than the consequences of 
a President Trump. This is not just the choice 
of another leader like any other, where there 
are genuine party differences on public policies 
and debate about alternative ways to manage 
the country. The authoritarian tendencies of 
his leadership, his attack on basic democratic 
principles, and the isolationist withdrawal of 
America from the world, are likely to be deeply 
damaging, to human rights at home and abroad. 
Brexit was a disaster for Britain – and Europe. But 
it was just a seismic tremor presaging a far bigger 
tsunami. President Trump will be a catastrophe 
for America and the world.
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How did brand magnate reality TV star with a 
vindictive style and no political experience become 
President of the United States? A few years back I 
asked a colleague in Italy to explain Berlusconi. He 
pointed to a corrupted and dysfunctional political 
system that angered voters enough to throw a 
bomb into government. Never mind that Trump, 
like Berlusconi, oozes a special corruption all his 
own. Most of the press and party elites missed the 
scale of angry emotion aimed at them by white 
working and middle class Americans. Indeed, the 
cosmopolitan press had long rendered these folk 
nearly invisible, brushing off the early warning 
signs of the Tea Party as a minor disturbance. And 
so, most media experts and party insiders engaged 
in knowing discussions of how impossible it would 
be for anyone to be elected with Trump’s combi-
nation of inexperience, shady business dealings, 
and inability to manage his emotions and stay on 
script. 
Meanwhile, Trump found and fed the white 
anger with simple, emotional messages, such as 
the promise to “drain the swamp” in Washington. 
He branded “Crooked Hillary” as the ultimate 
insider, with close ties to the banks, a trail of 
(largely manufactured) scandals, and argued it was 
difficult drawing a line between official business, 
the Clinton Foundation, and her ties to Wall Street. 
Despite the baggage that Clinton carried through 
the campaign, she did win the popular vote, and 
might have won the election had the (Republican) 
FBI director not renewed an investigation of her 
handling of official emails as Secretary of State. 
This was the “October surprise” that sent many 
undecided voters, including a majority of white 
women, to Trump. 
Clinton tried in vain to get policy messages 
into the news, but Trump dominated the daily 
media spectacle with tirades against immigrants, 
government corruption, establishment politi-
cians from both parties, the press, and the global 
economy. When he mentioned Clinton, the crowds 
ritualistically chanted “lock her up,” which he 
promised to do. Reporters were herded like cattle 
into fenced pens at rallies, and crowds shook their 
fists and chanted at them when Trump denounced 
the lying, biased media. Reporters needed Secret 
Service protection at these events. Through his deft 
use of social and conventional media and relentless 
appearances at rallies, Trump created a movement 
that revealed, like Bernie Sanders in the Democrat-
ic primaries that selected Clinton, the emptiness of 
the US party system. 
The Trump revolt echoes the rise of the radical 
right sweeping European democracies. Traditional 
parties have become “hollowed out,” in Peter Mair’s 
term, uninterested in engaging voters beyond 
crude marketing campaigns at election time. The 
British felt this shock with the Brexit vote, and no 
fewer than 28 countries in Europe have radical 
right parties on the rise, or already in power and 
threatening basic democratic values. Even though 
the radical left is as numerous and angry as the 
right, it is burdened with identity politics and the 
romance of deliberative democracy, which under-
mines conventional party organization, leadership, 
and the capacity to generate appealing ideas that 
travel via simple emotional messages. 
The spectre haunting democracy today is the 
legacy of centrist neoliberal elites, and the press 
organizations that cover them. The core democrat-
ic institutions of press and politics have failed to 
engage white working class populations that have 
been economic casualties of globalization. Perhaps 
even more troubling is the failure of the center 
left and right to engage white middle classes who 
are more the symbolic casualties of globalization. 
These are the god fearing Christians for whom 
racial and patriarchal privilege once offered social 
identity and status, and who now feel threatened 
by multiculturalism, immigration and Islam. Yet, 
neoliberal politicians from Tony Blair to Barack 
Obama have told them that globalization is irre-
versible, so get over it. 
Clinton’s message of “stronger together” surely 
felt wrong to those who lived in Trump’s America 
and wanted to make their nation great again - in 
their own image. Beyond the ‘lying’ mainstream 
press, which Trump helped his followers de-
construct every day, Trump’s coded messages of 
resurgent white nationalism circulated through the 
alternative or “Alt” right media system in the US. 
Among hundreds of Alt right websites is Breitbart, 
with19 million unique monthly visitors. Late in 
the summer, when struggling with self-inflicted 
damage in the establishment press, Trump picked 
Breitbart publisher Steve Bannon to head his 
campaign. The campaign media team was soon 
joined by Roger Ailes, who began his political 
career reinventing Richard Nixon for the televi-
sion age, and later headed Rupert Murdoch’s Fox 
News channel until he was driven out by a sexual 
harassment scandal. Bannon and Ailes have visions 
of consolidating their victory by forging a Trump 
media network that will serve as a surrogate party 
organization, and bypass the mainstream press in 
keeping Trump propaganda flowing to supporters. 
In light of these trends, it is time to ask: What 
is the future of democracy given the imbalance 
between left and right, and the disdain shown by 
many victorious right politicians for civil liberties, 
moral tolerance, racial, sexual, and religious 
diversity, press freedom, and basic civility? Those 
of us who benefit from cosmopolitan societies and 
global economies have failed to notice that the 
democratic institutions of press and parties have 
withered, while a new and more ominous political 
and communication order has emerged in our 
midst. 
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A striking feature of the 2016 Presidential election 
was the strength of the simplistic delusionality 
which the successful candidate offered, and which 
appeared to be so warming for so many people. 
‘Donald will put the mines back.’ ‘Donald will build 
a wall.’ ‘Donald will make America great again.’
Of course, the call of simplistic and delusional 
rhetoric is hardly a new phenomenon. Even in 
his serious pursuit of conspiracy theories, Trump 
stands in a long political tradition, that of the 
‘paranoid style’, as the historian Richard Hofstadter 
called it in 1964. But there is a case for seeing in 
2016 a new level of obliviousness to both moral 
principle and to reality-testing. 
At one level, Trump’s appeal is because he 
is a populist and nationalist. Populism is usually 
a divisive force, but is not always as toxic as 
Trumpism threatens to be. Nationalism is an empty 
container, which can be filled with many different 
kinds of politics, and different kinds of emotion. 
To understand the surge of Trumpist nationalism, 
we need to analyse it psychologically as well 
as politically.
An American historian who wrote with 
scholarly eloquence about American politics was 
Christopher Lasch, author in 1979 of The Culture 
of Narcissism. While a lot of hostile commentary 
on Trumpism has used the term ‘narcissist’ to refer 
to the man himself, there has been less examina-
tion of how the basis of his appeal to American 
voters lies in his reflection of their own 
ideological narcissism. 
To be clear, narcissism in the technical sense 
is not a spontaneous arrogance or selfishness, a 
self-love which some people just happen to have 
and others don’t. As Lasch described, it takes 
many behavioural forms, some of which are very 
different from the popular image of the preening 
narcissist. Essentially it is an internal state of 
mind, a delusional inflation of the self which is 
a defence against anxiety, against unconscious 
fears of weakness and abandonment. Believe in 
your own invulnerability, and you will be fine. 
Given the vulnerability and dependency of the 
human infant, the tendency to fall into narcissistic 
fantasy is something we all have to work through 
in emotional development, and which situations 
of insecurity in adult life may re-evoke. In a world 
that seems dangerous, a narcissistically-based 
belief in your own powers to transcend reality can 
smother anxiety. 
The defensive narcissism of Trump the person 
is clearly on view, in a form consistent with the 
popular view of how a narcissist behaves. The 
absurd braggadocio would be hard to sustain, 
even as a deliberate performance, by someone not 
bunkered in an experience of their own majesty. 
Precisely what fear and insecurity lies beneath, 
we can only guess. More pressing, and more 
do-able, is the task of understanding why this toxic 
defence is so plausible and welcome across the 
American electorate.
American nationalism has probably always 
had a strong element of narcissistic grandiosity, 
even when American power in the world meant 
that its citizens could feel safe at home and had 
less need to fantasize invulnerability. But part of 
the legacy of 9/11 has been a narcissistic wound, a 
gash in the fantasy of American invincibility. Such 
an experience will stimulate some people to face 
the complexities of the world, while others – those 
with more anxiety and fewer emotional resources 
to manage their anxiety - will cling more tightly to 
images of the supremacy which Trump promised 
to recover immediately.
The moral strengths and creative richness 
of American society have created visions of 
the American nation not based on narcissistic 
defences. But the scale of Trumpist nationalism 
suggests that Lasch’s diagnosis was more accurate 
than we might have thought when Obama was 
elected. When deployed in the field of political ide-
ologies, narcissism can rapidly conjure up a volatile 
nationalism, a huge shield which offers massive 
reassurance against many kinds of anxiety - social, 
economic, and cultural, and also existential. 
Trumpism offers a magical healing of the 
narcissistic wound festering since 9/11, a complete 
restoration of the narcissistic defence. This is a psy-
chically turbo-charged nationalistic populism, in 
which hatred of the ‘elite’ can reach hallucinogenic 
levels of intensity. It does not matter that Trump 
himself belongs to a global elite, one which has led 
the assault on national cultures. The strategic trick 
of the populist is always to appear from outside 
power, to be the virgin politician. Whether the nar-
cissism which Trump embodies can be contained 
when he is in the White House, or whether it 
will have calamitous consequences, may depend 
on how strong and malignant are his needs for 
control and domination, as well as on how much 
the complex realities of politics may restrain him. 
And realities aside, whether 47.5% of the American 
public continue to support him depends on how 
much the narcissistic defence which he offers 
continues to work for them.
100
Peter Bloom
Senior Lecturer and 
Head of the Department 
of People and 
Organisations at the 
Open Universit
In a country divided by race, class and the growing 
chasm of ideology, 2016 seemed to offer very little 
common ground between Clinton and Trump 
supporters. They appeared to represent not just 
competing political desires or interests but two 
fundamentally opposed worldviews. On one side 
stood a tried and true vision of tolerance and in-
cremental progress. On the other misdirected hate 
and an impassioned cry for the complete sweeping 
away of the status quo.
First appearances, though, can be deceiving. 
Amidst these profound differences was a shared 
sense of alarmism tinged with optimism. 
Democrats were terrorised by Trump and his 
supporters’ fascist overtones and excited that this 
would most likely spell the end of the Conservative 
extremism that had taken hold of the Republican 
Party since Obama’s inauguration. For those on 
the Right, they feared a Clinton monarchy and 
the continuation of an economy and society that 
seemed content to leave them behind.
Even more fundamentally, both camps 
passionately embraced candidates who offered 
them little more than false solutions in a country 
that had seemed to run out of answers to its most 
pressing economic, social and political problems. 
Trump is the most obvious target for such a 
critique. The now president elect showed himself 
throughout the campaign to be a emotionally 
resonant con ma extraordinaire - promising to 
make American Great Again even while insulting 
a growing portion of its population. Clinton, 
however, was by no means free of such political 
sins. She offered high minded platitudes and piece 
meal reforms in place of a genuine record or vision 
of bold progressive change.
Emerging was a more chronic and serious 
disease afflicting American democracy. If the 21st 
century had thus far shown the American public 
anything – it was not just that government was 
ineffectual but that it was completely unimagina-
tive. Amidst its sound bites and carefully staged 
debates, it spoke little to the real concerns and ex-
periences of those they ostensibly represented. This 
was especially deplorable in a time when inequality 
was on the rise while economic and political power 
firmly rested in the hands of elites. International-
ly, America seemed stuck in a vicious and costly 
cycle of militarism and terrorism. The country was 
further torn apart over issues of police brutality, 
mass incarceration and the looming threat of 
climate change.
The insurgent progressive candidacy of Bernie 
Sanders was to a new generation a potential 
antidote to this cultural paralysis. His rejection of 
corporate money and call for a “political revo-
lution” showed glimmers of jumpstarting the 
sputtering nation from its ideological malaise and 
entrenched partisan battles. It was a call to take 
back the government for the people. Yet it also held 
out the hope that it was still possible for everyday 
citizens to mobilize and shape history rather than 
simply being shaped by it.  
The elite Liberal dismissal of such efforts reflected 
just how deeply the cynicism from the Centre ran 
and how scared it was of radical change, regard-
less of which political direction it came from. 
Conversely, Trump tapped into a populist outrage 
with the “establishment”, dragging it down to the 
lowest common denominator of racism, sexism 
and discrimination. Without any alternative, most 
Americans chose to stay home discontent with 
having to choose between (to quote one popular 
meme) “An incredibly shitty status quo” and a 
“dystopian nightmare future”. 
The cultural theorist Fredric Jameson 
famously declared “Someone once said that it is 
easier to imagine the end of the world than to 
imagine the end of capitalism”. On November 8th 
many Americans voted for the unthinkable after 
years of being told that their longing for a truly 
better future was little more than a naïve dream. 
The rest of the country now must wake up and 
confront our worst political nightmare. 
With mainstream politics seemingly devoid of 
answers, many vote for the previously unthinkable
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Irrational beliefs matter
Populism is surging across the western world. 
Lately the surge spiked due to the prevalence of 
Donald Trump in the US presidential election. 
Although he lost the popular vote marginally, he 
won the majority of the electoral college votes. He 
was backed by a coalition of traditional Republican 
supporters and white blue-collar, low- and middle- 
income voters without a college degree residing 
mainly in rural areas and smaller cities. 
It seems that the economy shaped the election. 
The majority of the electorate (52%), according to 
the exit poll, prioritized the economy as the most 
important issue facing the country. In this context, 
despite the good condition of the American 
economy including positive growth rates, record 
low unemployment, rising wages and falling 
poverty; most voters considered otherwise. As 
the exit poll suggests, the public majority (62%) 
evaluated the condition of the national economy 
as ‘not good’ or ‘poor’. From this 62%, more than 
six out of ten voted for Trump. Furthermore, it 
seems that income inequality affected significant-
ly the Trump vote. According to a post-election 
Bruegel analysis, Trump’s electoral performance 
was stronger in the states displaying the highest in-
equality gap. As a result, the majority of the public 
(49%), according to the exit poll, considered him, 
rather than Clinton (46%), as the most capable to 
handle the economy. 
It should be noted that the President-elect 
has attributed the responsibility for US economic 
woes mainly to globalization, including global 
competition, free trade and immigration. Against 
this backdrop, Trump has suggested as a remedy 
an economic plan consisted of protectionist 
policies along with large tax-cuts for the rich and 
deregulation to boost growth, wages and manu-
facturing employment. 
However, his policy proposals have largely 
been criticized as unrealistic and damaging by 
the overwhelming majority of prominent econ-
omists including Nobel laureates. In particular, 
opposing voices point out that if Trump’s policy is 
actually implemented, it is expected to worsen the 
condition of the economy undermining growth 
prospects, increasing unemployment, lowering 
wages, leading to deteriorating public finances 
which will likely hurt the low and middle income 
classes most. 
So the question that naturally emerges, given 
that the electorate has been informed about the 
implications of Trump’s economic policy, is why 
so many voters and especially those coming from 
the working class, accepted his narrative? Why 
did they vote against their own interests? In other 
words, why did they act irrationally? 
It is possible to argue that voters hold sys-
tematically erroneous and biased beliefs about 
economics which can, to a great extent, explain 
their irrational political decisions. Specifically, 
voters tend, among others, to appear pessimistic 
about the course of the economy believing that 
it is going from bad to worse as well as to under-
value the economic benefits of interaction with 
foreigners. In the case of the US election, there are 
already some indications highlighting such beliefs. 
For example, although the economy has exited 
recession and returned to rapid growth rates, seven 
in ten Trump voters consider, according to a Pew 
Research Center survey, that the economy has 
gotten worse since 2008. Moreover, most Trump 
voters believe that the free trade agreements have 
been a ‘bad thing’ for the US hurting families’ 
financial situation, while mean income and mean 
wealth have risen substantially since the 1980s. 
Furthermore, despite the fact the unemployment 
rate in the country has fallen below 5%, most 
Trump voters, according to the exit poll, share the 
view that international trade takes away US jobs 
rather than creates them.  
Certainly public frustration with the in-
equality issue (and the falling manufacturing 
employment) is valid. Yet, the perception of most 
of Trump’s voters about the root causes of these 
negative developments and the respective policy 
remedies is mainly erroneous. Globalisation 
appears to affect only partially these issues, which 
are actually multi-causal and are attributed more to 
other factors such as technological advancement, 
declining productivity, weakened labour unions, 
an ageing population, low public investment and 
insufficient welfare state provisions to compensate 
those who ‘got left behind’. 
Given the above, it could be said that irration-
al beliefs proved to be more powerful than reality, 
allowing Trump to capitalise on them, present 
‘globalisation’ as the main enemy and himself and 
his program as the sole antidote for that.
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It’s a shock. He beat the polls, overturned estab-
lished political knowledge about how to run a 
modern campaign and suspended the laws of 
political gravity that always pull down deep-
ly-flawed and gaffe-prone politicians.
But Trump’s victory is a symbol of a lack of 
confidence in government, a legitimation crisis in 
the USA. The ending of the long post-war boom 
and the declining confidence in the economic 
globalization project has raised a structural rather 
than just a temporal crisis of confidence. 
His success in Pennsylvania, Michigan and 
Wisconsin was based on the discontent of white 
blue-collar workers whose wages have been 
declining since at least 1970 and accelerating since 
2000. Many factors are at work but one of the most 
visible is deindustrialization. Manufacturing jobs 
provided the platform into the middle class for 
non-college educated workers. But manufactur-
ing jobs have declined dramatically. There were 
more than 18 million manufacturing jobs in the 
USA in 1984. By 2012 it was little over 12 million. 
A dramatic decline in good paying jobs that 
depressed regional and urban economies outside of 
the two coasts.
In the global shift in manufacturing from the 
developed world to the developing world, a new 
middle class was created in South Korea and China 
while a middle class was undermined in the USA 
with low wage growth for non-college educated 
workers and a decline in industrial cities and 
regions across the country. 
This discontent was not given political articu-
lation by the two mainstream parties. The Republic 
Party used its working class base as electoral 
cannon fodder to promote an agenda that aided 
its big donors. The base was fed rhetoric while the 
business wing received all the benefits from free 
trade and the disciplining unions. Meanwhile, 
the Democratic Administrations of Clinton 
and Obama pursued an economic agenda that 
promoted globalization. If the Republicans had a 
trickle down theory that believed, despite evidence 
to the contrary, making the rich richer benefits 
everyone, the Democratic equivalent was that the 
benefits of globalization would eventually raise all 
boats. Many of the blue-collar workers felt ignored 
by Democrats who promoted economic globaliza-
tion that undercut their jobs and a cultural relativ-
ism that undermined their values. Hilary Clinton’s 
2016 strategy was built on getting out the vote 
of blacks, Latinos and the millennials. She rarely 
addressed the concerns of white workers in rural 
and small town USA. White working class workers 
were ignored. Her Presidency promised a rerun of 
Obama but without the charisma and the sense of 
profound social optimism. The palpable animus 
against her was visceral, a mixture of Clinton-Oba-
ma fatigue, distrust of insider government-eco-
nomic elites, resistance to social progressive 
policies and outright misogyny.
Shamelessly used by the Republicans and 
shabbily treated by the Democrats, many turned to 
Trump. His outsider status and maverick campaign 
resonated with a substantial mass of Americans 
harboring a sense of alienation from the main-
stream political parties. 
The cozy relationship between the main 
parties and the money of Wall Street was also 
a matter of public scorn. Both Democrats and 
Republicans worked to undercut the regulations 
in place since the New Deal that limited power 
of finance. And as the shackles were loosened the 
concentration of power continued and even more 
money flowed from the bankers to the politicians. 
There was a revolving door between Wall Street 
and the political establishment. It was a totally 
non-partisan affair as Hank Paulson, Robert Rubin, 
Timothy Geithner and Larry Summers moved 
from key government posts to a lucrative gig with 
banks and hedge funds and sometimes back into 
politics again. Later, in an act of political deafness 
or perhaps donor demand, the Obama Adminis-
tration appointed Geithner, directly involved in 
the deal, to become Treasury Secretary. The 2008 
bailout to a corrupt financial system signaled the 
extent of the Wall Street hijacking of government. 
Public discontent, exemplified in the rise of the 
Tea Party, soon hardened to a cynicism that is 
now baked into the present legitimation crisis. The 
Clinton candidacy was undermined by her Wall 
Street connections, 
Trump’s stunning electoral win demonstrates 
not so much the strength of his candidacy but 
the depth of despair felt by about the country’s 
direction. His win is the equivalent of a scream 
of resentment, an articulation of alienation and a 
symbol of a deep crisis of legitimation. 
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If non-Americans could vote for what is often called 
“leader of the free world”, Hillary Clinton would easily 
be the next US president. WIN/Gallup surveyed world 
opinion and Donald Trump’s support is extremely 
weak (apart from in Russia). Trump polled at 15% in 
Australia, 8% in Germany, 5% in Mexico, 4% in Spain, 
and 3% in Jordan, Japan and South Korea.
Some of this has to do with Trump’s possible 
foreign policies: the Japanese and South Koreans 
are key allies one day, and on their own the next 
day with encouragement to nuke up. Mexicans 
have been told they are going to pay for that “tre-
mendous wall” along their roughly 3200-kilometre 
border with the US, which would cost approx-
imately US$12 billion to build. This boast was 
unlikely to win Mexicans over to Trump.
However, while there is widespread disapproval of 
Trump’s nationalist, protectionist and racist policies, it 
is his persona that most repels non-Americans. Trump 
is strongly disliked across the world because he is the 
archetypal “ugly American”: obnoxious, uncouth, 
boastful, materialistic, and duplicitous.
I am writing a book on negative stereotypes 
about Americans, and Trump is the gift that keeps 
on giving. He is one of those Americans that 
foreigners have instantly strong opinions about. 
When George W. Bush ran for the presidency, and 
when Sarah Palin was chosen by Senator John 
McCain as his presidential running-mate, there 
was a mountain of criticism around the globe 
about their ignorance and parochialism.
People everywhere seemed to be saying – based 
on very little information – “I know this kind of 
American and I do not like them”. This reaction occurs 
because there is a long-standing stock of stereotypes 
about Americans that go back to the early 19th century, 
instantly available to animate one’s feelings.
My research, based on reading more than 100 
travel books written by Europeans from the early 19th 
century, argues six dominant stereotypes were con-
structed in the 1820s and 1830s. They have persisted 
ever since. These were: that American manners were 
extremely deficient; that Americans were often anti-in-
tellectual, uncultured, and ignorant; that Americans 
lived ultimately bland lives; that Americans were par-
ticularly prone to boasting and annoying patriotism; 
that Americans were money obsessed and financially 
untrustworthy; and finally that Americans were hyp-
ocrites. Trump, for many, is the embodiment of these 
negative national stereotypes.
1. Trump’s manners: In terms of manners, Trump
is the schoolyard bully as CEO. Trump’s bad
manners could generously be viewed as anti-elit-
ist populism challenging the failing status quo.
2. Anti-intellectualism: Forget Trump’s Wharton
School MBA – and his boast that “I know
words, I have the best words”. When it comes to
uncouth anti-intellectualism, Trump’s simplistic
solutions, lowest common denominator attacks
on opponents, and constant disregard for experts
and their findings, makes him top of the class of 
loud-mouthed American bloviators for many. 
In an earlier American generation, such rhetoric 
was associated with the Know-Nothing anti-im-
migration movement.
3. Bland lives: The third stereotype – that
Americans are sameish and live bland lives –
would seem at first glance to miss the mark with
Trump. This view of Americans is that their
lives, to quote de Tocqueville, are particularly
“unpoetic” and they live by cliches and hollow
catchphrases like “have a nice day”. If one takes
a deeper look at Trump and his enterprises, he
has a remarkable talent for making glamour 
bland and soulless. Behind all the bluster, Trump’s
vocabulary is repetitive and dull as he repeats the
same platitudes and self-praise over and over.
And for all of his money, the Trump diet consists
of lots of McDonald’s meals, extremely well-done
crispy steak, diet cola, and no alcohol. In a world
where eating a variety of food has become com-
monplace, Trump’s diet lacks sophistication and
imagination. Not only unhealthy, but for many
trashy.
4. Trump the patriot: When it comes to boasting, 
Trump is constantly self-congratulatory and
arguably the biggest self-promoter in living
memory. His patriotism is wrapped up in his 
claim that America will get so used to “winning”
everything under a Trump presidency it will get
sick of winning. He vaingloriously promotes his
poll numbers, primary victories and the dismissal
of his opponents as “so easy to beat”.
5. Money, money, money: His claim to have “made
it” financially is central to Trump’s appeal to 
many Americans. However, outside of America,
boasting about wealth and fame is largely seen as
gauche.
6.  Hypocrisy: Lastly, the saying that “those in glass-
houses should not throw stones” is something
that never occurs to Trump. Being a hypocrite
clearly does not concern him and this is one 
of those infuriating traits that makes him so
strongly disliked from Norway to Chile.
It is tempting to proclaim Trump is very familiar 
to us because he embodies the worst things about 
Americans. However, these traits are apparent across 
the world. Trump therefore is not merely an “ugly 
American” but amplifies commonplace cultural trends, 
such as narcissism, self-centredness, gnat-like attention 
spans, obsessive self-regard, preoccupation with the 
number of followers one has and a lack of interest 
in listening to others. These trends can be passed off 
“American”, but if we are honest, this behaviour is all 
around us. To prevent the next Trump – and there will 
be more – requires challenging the sources of selfish-
ness in modern culture that are on the rise everywhere. 
A version of this article was originally published on The 
Conversation. 
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There are six types of ugly American and Donald 
Trump is all of them
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The most important takeaway of the US 2016 pres-
idential election is that we are entering transitional 
times, with unusual levels of political turbulence 
the order of the day. This is true not just in the 
United States, but, to varying degrees, worldwide. 
At its core, the cause is a stagnant capitalist 
economy, with growing inequality, unemployment 
and underemployment, poverty and precarious-
ness the emerging features. Upon this is layered a 
growing sense of corruption in governance, and 
the inability of governing institutions in ostensible 
democracies to represent the interests of the bulk 
of the population to address and solve problems 
in an efficient, just and humane manner. And 
foremost among those problems are inequality, 
militarism and the climate crisis.
This is certainly the case in the United States, 
where the mainstreams of both major political 
parties were significantly abandoned by their 
voters in 2016. In stagnant and corrupt times the 
mainstream is increasingly dismissed as ineffectual 
and corrupt. As we learned in the 1930s, when 
the world was in a similar political economic 
crisis, the dominant growing alternatives are an 
authoritarian anti-democratic pseudo-populism 
on the right, generally known as fascism, and 
democratic socialism on the left. In the United 
States, the campaigns of Donald Trump and Bernie 
Sanders reflected elements of these two traditions 
respectively, and both did dramatically better than 
anyone would have thought possible for generations.
Indeed, had the Democratic Party not rigged 
the primary process in close collaboration with 
Hillary Clinton and the news media to guarantee 
she got the nomination over Sanders—indeed, to 
prevent any effective competition for the nomi-
nation—she may well have been defeated in the 
spring. There is reason to believe that Sanders, 
who is hugely popular among independent voters, 
would have crushed Trump in a general election. 
The turnout and enthusiasm among young people 
would have been markedly higher—Sanders is 
arguably the most popular politician with voters 
under 30 in modern American history—and 
early analysis of the election results suggest such 
a higher turnout would have provided victory 
margins in several of the states Hillary lost. 
The election also drew attention to a number 
of issues that undermine the notion that the United 
States can be termed a democracy, unless one uses 
scare quotes.   
Hillary Clinton actually won the election, if 
one simply looks at the popular vote. She lost de-
cisively in the “electoral college,” an absurd device 
put in the constitution primarily so slave-owning 
states could get credit for the slave population—
each slave counted as 3/5 of a person—without 
letting them vote. 
The total vote for all the House of Repre-
sentative races split fairly evenly between the two 
parties, but the Republicans got a landslide 46 seat 
majority, largely due to gerrymandering, whereby 
politicians rig election districts to favor the 
dominant party at the state level. 
Moreover, millions of Americans were unable 
to vote because they failed to meet strict identifica-
tion policies put in place universally by Republican 
state governments with the clear intent of lowering 
the number of poor and minority voters. 
The US system makes “lesser-of-two evils” 
voting highly rational behavior, thereby locking in 
the two-party duopoly and allowing them to serve 
corporate interests and not worry about losing 
their voters to the one permissible hated alternative. 
And, to top it off, the total cost of the 2016 
campaigns has yet to be tabulated, but it stands 
to be much like 2012, when US candidates spent 
30-40 times more per voter than did candidates in
Germany or Britain in their most recent national
elections, mostly for generally asinine TV political
advertisements. Much of that cash comes from
wealthy individuals and corporations and is unac-
countable “dark money.”
So is it any surprise that the United States has 
the lowest voter turnout of any major democracy 
in the world, with barely 50 percent of the vot-
ing-age population participating in 2016?
There has been much grumbling about how 
the mainstream media has been dreadful and su-
perficial in its election coverage, and it is justified. 
But there was a far greater problem in 2016 that 
got almost no mention: there is very little coverage 
of political races by journalists any longer. The US 
model of commercial journalism has collapsed and 
when people go to the polls they have almost no 
idea who the candidates are and what they stand 
for aside from what they might have seen in the 
TV ads. Unless there are clear public policies to 
establish a competitive independent news media, 
it is difficult to see how the governing system can 
be corralled to serve the interests of the people. 
Whatever their flaws, that was something the 
framers of the constitution understood in their 
bone marrow. In a genuine democracy, this would 
be an issue of the highest magnitude.
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The Wørd: Stupid Power
My fellow Americans. [Well, a little less than half of 
you.] From the fiery forge of the 2016 presidential 
elections has emerged our Great Leader. [Trump 
Hates Love.] And this Great Leader has promised 
to Make America Great ... Again. [Backwards 
and Upwards!] I know that I, for one, am looking 
forward to living in the swanky hotel that will be 
Trump America. [Until it goes bankrupt.] But I also 
know that many of you [a little over half] are asking 
yourselves, hey, just how the hell is this guy even 
going to make things mediocre? Many of you are 
thinking [more of an internal shriek], hey, this guy 
has never met a fact that he didn’t ignore. What’s 
so great about that? [You get to wear your hair any 
way you want.] 
Well, I’m here to tell you what’s so great 
about that. I’m here to let you in on the great 
secret of our Great Leader’s great strength. [Oh 
... great.] And that secret is: Stupid Power. [Ditto. 
The phrase works meta, too.] Let me repeat that: 
Stupid Power. Now, some may call it the Power of 
Stupid. [Opposite to the Power of Love. Huey Lewis 
shout-out!] But that’s too many words for me. That 
sounds too smart. Too accurate. And where did 
smart and accurate ever get us anyway? [Most 
recently, out of the Bush Great Recession.] No, I’m 
here to tell you about the pure and simple bullet 
train of Stupid Power. I’m here to invite you to 
climb aboard [the Soulless Train!] for a thrilling 
ride straight off the rails. [Meeeeeeeeeeeee!] You 
see, folks, with Stupid Power, you don’t need no 
science. [Is it hot in here to you?] You don’t need 
no education. [Unless you can teach “leadership” 
with a straight face.] You just need your deeply 
held beliefs [eventually to be pried from your dead, 
cold hands] founded on the down-to-earth creed 
of a gun to love, a bible to misconstrue, several key 
demographic groups to hate [Let Freedom Sting!], 
and plenty of salt and sugar in your diet. [Mmm, 
that nice cushy lining of brain-fat.] After all, these 
principles are what made America Great in the 
first place. [White supremacist capitalist patriarchy.] 
And these core values, under the guidance of our 
new Great Leader, surely will transport us back 
to that great future. [Kicking and screaming in a 
DeLorean.] 
Now, I acknowledge that Liberals are pro-
foundly disappointed with the election results. 
[A woman just can’t win for winning.] I realize 
they feel like all the hope and change of the past 
eight years [hereafter to be known officially as “the 
obamanation”] will be wiped out in our Great 
Leader’s first one hundred days. [Hey, I can do 
it in fifty. Believe you me.] But you Liberals need 
to stop your progressive bellyaching. You need 
to man-up [literally] and get with the Greatness 
program. [Translated: you pussies are about to be 
grabbed.] Manifestly, this is Destiny. This is God’s 
Will. His Great Plan at work. Because, let’s face it, 
God obviously wants old white men to be rich and 
powerful. Just look at His selfies. [Visual: Michel-
angelo’s “Creation of Adam” with Trump’s head 
replacing Adam’s.] Yeah, that’s right. That’s strictly 
man-on-man action there, folks. That’s proof. 
That’s Providence. (Aside: Oh my, Adam sure does 
have small hands.) Anyway, my point is, Liberals, 
what have you got to lose? You can never get your 
act together anyway. [Feel the Berned.] You just 
put up the most qualified candidate ever to run for 
president [except for the naughty bits] and she was 
soundly defeated by the minority of voters.
 The American people have spoken [all 538 
of them in the Electoral College], and the outcome 
is clear. Our Great Leader has lead a populist 
revolution in America propelled by congressional 
gridlock, the sky-high ratings of for-profit news 
outlets, systematic voter suppression, a public 
addicted to reality TV, and an anti-elitism personi-
fied by a trust-fund brat. [Yep. What he said.] That’s 
right, folks. Only in America. Only in America. So, 
Liberals, put an end to your fruitless street protests 
[#notYOURpresidentanywaysucka]. Cross over to 
the Drumpf side [audio: Darth Vader breathing] 
and surrender to the delicious certainty of Stupid 
Power. It’s a belief you can get behind, that leaves 
no doubt in your mind. [Because your mind isn’t 
involved in the transaction.] It’s a glorious reaf-
firmation of the inspiring vision for America as 
set out by the Founding Fathers. [Let Caucasian 
boys be Caucasian boys!] It leads inevitably to the 
Greatest Good. [For the Greatest Few. Obfuscate 
that pyramidal order!] Yes, the blessings of Stupid 
Power have brought us to this historic moment. 
So what do you say we just shut that whole 
history thing down right now. We’re there. We’re 
finished. We’re done. We’ve arrived. [The Neoliberal 
Jerusalem!] Remember: Stupid is as Stupid doesn’t 
do. And that’s The Wørd.
[Note: a huge tip of Uncle Sam’s top hat to 
Stephen Colbert, who Made Satire Great Again, for 
his device of satiric argumentation, The Wørd.]
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